Quantum Resilience by Roberts, Thomas (Author) et al.
Quantum Resilience 
 
by 
 
Thomas Wade Roberts 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved April 2015 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee: 
 
Brad Allenby, Chair 
Mikhail Chester 
John Anderies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
May 2015
i 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Quantum resilience is a pragmatic theory that allows systems engineers to 
formally characterize the resilience of systems. As a generalized theory, it not only 
clarifies resilience in the literature, but also can be applied to all disciplines and domains 
of discourse. Operationalizing resilience in this manner permits decision-makers to 
compare and contrast system deployment options for suitability in a variety of 
environments and allows for consistent treatment of resilience across domains. Systems 
engineers, whether planning future infrastructures or managing ecosystems, are 
increasingly asked to deliver resilient systems. Quantum resilience provides a way 
forward that allows specific resilience requirements to be specified, validated, and 
verified. 
 Quantum resilience makes two very important claims. First, resilience cannot be 
characterized without recognizing both the system and the valued function it provides. 
Second, resilience is not about disturbances, insults, threats, or perturbations. To avoid 
crippling infinities, characterization of resilience must be accomplishable without 
disturbances in mind. In light of this, quantum resilience defines resilience as the extent 
to which a system delivers its valued functions, and characterizes resilience as a function 
of system productivity and complexity. System productivity vis-à-vis specified “valued 
functions” involves (1) the quanta of the valued function delivered, and (2) the number of 
systems (within the greater system) which deliver it. System complexity is defined 
structurally and relationally and is a function of a variety of items including (1) system-
of-systems hierarchical decomposition, (2) interfaces and connections between systems, 
and (3) inter-system dependencies. 
ii 
 Among the important features of quantum resilience is that it can be implemented 
in any system engineering tool that provides sufficient design and specification rigor (i.e., 
one that supports standards like the Lifecycle and Systems Modeling languages and 
frameworks like the DoD Architecture Framework). Further, this can be accomplished 
with minimal software development and has been demonstrated in three model-based 
system engineering tools, two of which are commercially available, well-respected, and 
widely used. This pragmatic approach assures transparency and consistency in 
characterization of resilience in any discipline. 
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PREFACE 
 
 I confess to being surprised by the definitional latitude allotted to the idea of 
resilience. The literature is filled with metaphor and analogy that permits resilience to 
serve as an umbrella for a wide variety of concepts that already had distinct and growing 
research areas. It is with an admittedly broad brush that I am painting, but if the evolution 
of the “resilience industry” had avoided this expansiveness, it might have been more 
effective. Instead, a significant amount of clarity has been sacrificed in the name of 
definitional tolerance. This has, unfortunately, resulted in stagnation when it comes to 
actually operationalizing the concept of resilience. In spite of the fact that one might 
frequently read or hear about “designing for resilience” there has been little rigor directed 
at actually achieving an ability to do that and there is certainly nothing that permits a 
measure of whether or not such a design has actually been accomplished. Even literature 
purporting to propose metrics for resilience frequently falls short because it generally 
offers long lists of “things” that must be considered when creating metrics, instead of 
actually providing a usable formulation. 
 As a veteran of many large systems engineering projects, I can also testify that the 
concept of resilience is rarely addressed by systems engineers (though I’m willing to add 
“until lately”). As to why that is (was) the case, I can only guess that it has something to 
do with an intuitive understanding among systems engineers that resilience was being 
provided by the many functional redundancies built into the systems. Whether 
telecommunications, national defense, intelligence gathering, or healthcare claims 
processing, “more” function was always better, and the challenge was always cost and 
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schedule management. It was never a question of how to make the system more 
resilient—that was a routine part of the job. 
 Still, resilience is a systems concept, so I found myself qualified to speak into this 
discourse. On occasion I found it difficult to hear my discipline misunderstood in the 
literature, but this only reinforced my desire to not only clarify the concept of resilience, 
but provide some insights into the discipline of systems engineering. Further, it was vital 
for me to provide a way forward—one that was acceptable and useful in the 
interdisciplinary future we know to expect. The result is quantum resilience. As a first 
generalized theory of resilience, it both clarifies the concept and provides a way forward 
for resilience theory. 
 My background and pragmatism drove inexorably to providing mechanisms that 
enforce transparency and consistency in resilience analysis. Importantly, it was required 
that this be accomplished with commercially available tools and scant methodological 
impact. There is no need for custom tools, just simple extensions that are easily vetted in 
the marketplace of ideas and then adopted and incorporated into commercial tools as 
needed. There is nothing particularly specialized about resilience analysis since it flows 
directly out of good systems engineering practice. Importantly, quantum resilience does 
not create a new “resilience elite” it simply operationalizes resilience for everyone. 
  
xiv 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Resilience is frequently noticed to be heir-apparent to the increasingly diffuse 
sustainability discourse (e.g., Cascio, 2009). Unfortunately, this exposes it to similar risk 
of being lost as a usable engineering concept. Its popularity as a topic has ensured its 
mention in a large percentage of recent publications as researchers strive to demonstrate 
their awareness of its currency. Frequently the references to resilience are very casual and 
most merely attempt to contribute incrementally to the definition of resilience instead of 
actually demonstrating how to quantify it and use it in sustainable engineering practice. 
To ensure resilience can be operationalized, a generalized and quantifiable theory is 
required. Quantum resilience provides this. 
 Founded in general systems theory (von Bertalanffy, 1968; Rapoport, 1985), 
quantum resilience recognizes that to be a meaningful engineering concept, resilience 
requires rigorous definition and must be quantifiable and embedded in existing systems 
engineering approaches and tools. Systems engineers are uniquely aware of how the 
concept must be bounded if it is ever to be useful in engineering projects (both forward- 
and re-engineering). This resulted in a first step of clarification and distinguishing 
resilience in the discourse. Disambiguation was required because resilience is frequently 
conflated with broad and often inchoate ideas like adaptation, transformation, recovery, 
and learning. Quantum resilience specifically acknowledges the importance of such 
research areas, but holds that they do not belong in a generalized theory of resilience. 
 Importantly, quantum resilience not only clarifies resilience and makes it 
quantifiable, but it positions other scholarly work, and the common terms they use (e.g., 
“adaptation”), in the space. That is, it allows other researchers to see the merits of their 
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work and suggests where it must fit into the clarified discourse. For example, many are 
speaking of robustness and casually adding the word resilience in order to meet 
publication and grant requirements. Quantum resilience frees them to distinguish their 
work and suggest specifically how it contributes (e.g., to system “productivity” or 
“complexity”). Those who speak of resilience metrics and list items that should be 
considered in calculations will be challenged to rethink their ideas in terms of system 
productivity and valued function. Those who find resilience to be an emergent 
characteristic of their systems will be challenged to model their systems and specifically 
allocate the functions they value to specific parts of their system, forcing actual definition 
and proper system scaling. Quantum resilience also supports any forthcoming theories of 
complexity while specifically recognizing the need to analyze systems in order to 
understand them better. 
 By actually modeling the systems in question, quantum resilience removes the 
ability to mask important and frequently normative details behind euphemism and 
analogy. Quantum resilience makes the systems of interest completely transparent and 
initiates the important dialogue over what the specific valued functions of a system are, 
and how they should be quantified. It is generalized and operationalized for all systems in 
all disciplines at all scales, and is a required step in the establishment of resilience as a 
meaningful science. Quantum resilience allows resilience to be formally characterized for 
all systems at a time when no other theory is available to accomplish that. Researchers 
who speak of metrics but do not formulate them are frequently hampered by their 
inability to either identify or quantify normative concepts. Quantum resilience provides a 
mechanism by which transparency of such measurements can be guaranteed and 
xvi 
consensus garnered. The vanishingly small numbers of researchers who actually present 
calculable metrics for resilience tend to focus on system efficiency as a proxy for 
resilience which leads them into optimization campaigns and Monte Carlo explorations. 
This is not wrong, but it is not resilience theory. 
 Vitally, quantum resilience is easily instrumented in model-based system 
engineering tools that support industry standard lifecycle, unified, and system modeling 
languages (LML, UML, SysML) and fit into important frameworks like the US DoD 
Architecture Framework. Deploying the resilience characterization formulation in 
commercially available tools ensures broad adoption and maintains the goal of 
transparency and consistency. Since, for the first time, engineers will be able to compare 
homologous systems and make decisions based on alternative deployment options, it 
becomes vital they are using the same calculations. 
 Quantum resilience establishes a new measure of fitness for resilience literature, 
one that demands resilience be characterized for any system to which it is attributed. That 
is, if a so-called resilience theory cannot provide a characterization of a system’s 
resilience, it must be abandoned. Though quibbling over specific methods and 
characterization approaches is expected and applauded, scholars must force themselves to 
specifically quantify resilience in terms of valued function and system structure, or 
resilience will no longer be a useful and operational scientific concept. 
 
1 
OVERVIEW AND PRÉCIS: QUANTUM RESILIENCE IN A NUTSHELL 
 
 As a concept that has become more expansively defined over time, resilience has 
struggled to achieve operational value. Quantum resilience allows the concept to be 
operationalized while serving to clarify it in the discourse. While resilience remains a 
systems concept, quantum resilience changes the focus of resilience analysis to the 
functions and services of value and enforces proper analysis of the systems that provide 
them. Resilience is not about a system until it is first about a valued function. The system 
which provides the valued functions can be characterized for resilience, but only after the 
valued functions are acknowledged. Quantum resilience employs system function and 
structure (productivity and complexity) to properly characterize a system’s resilience. 
 Systems within all disciplines exhibit quanta of resilience which define the level 
at which resilience can be observed and (potentially) managed or engineered. A quantum 
of resilience is a unitized output of a valued system function or service. In any analysis, 
quanta of resilience must be defined and related in units that are germane to the valued 
function. Admitting to such a quantum enforces the consideration of scale and identity in 
anything that might be called “design for resilience.” Importantly, there may exist in each 
system potentially dissimilar “subsystems” which redundantly deliver the valued function 
(whether by pure redundancy or degeneracy). If specific functions are not considered, 
designing (or managing) for resilience makes no sense, since it is the functional delivery 
level at which resilience can be discussed and designed. The implication is that managers 
and engineers need expend no energy “designing for resilience” unless they are 
addressing particular functional quanta. When resilience is an important design or 
management requirement, quantum resilience permits a more appropriate focus. 
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 Quantum resilience takes a pragmatic approach to resilience theory and focuses 
on operationalization. Once characterized, resilience defines the extent to which a system 
delivers its valued function. In short, a system’s resilience can only be characterized 
when it is understood in the context of delivering its valued functions. 
 Quantum resilience asserts that resilience cannot be reduced to a universally 
absolute value but can be characterized on a per-system basis which permits comparison 
of similar systems or alternative system configurations. Further, because of the vital focus 
on function, characterization of resilience demonstrates that system resilience can be 
bolstered only in increments as quanta of each valued function are incrementally 
delivered by redundancies added to the system. In this way, resilience is a quantum 
concept. Resilience is not binary—that is, systems are not either “resilient” or “not 
resilient” because this is meaningless without reference to function and context. Further, 
resilience cannot be said to be qualitatively “higher” or “lower” unless specific reference 
is made to identified quanta of valued function. 
 Resilience is characterized by (1) identifying valued functions and the systems 
implicated in their delivery, (2) specifying the quanta of the valued functions delivered, 
(3) calculating the apparent complexity of the valued function delivery system, and (4) 
combining these in such a way that resilience of similar systems can be compared and 
contrasted in design or management decision frameworks. 
 Each of the principles of quantum resilience is discussed at length herein, but to 
briefly set the stage, quantum resilience forces analysts to acknowledge: 
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1. Valued Function. Initially, quantum resilience assumes nothing about systems but 
acknowledges that there are important functions and services provided by them—
functions that humans have decided should be enduring (frequently acting in 
proxy for Nature). Human values are expressly acknowledged because quantum 
resilience starts with the question “what functions or services are valued?” 
Ultimately, since it is a human-created concept, the meaning of resilience is 
wrapped up in observer-dependent superimposition of value. Hence, to 
operationalize it, these values must be acknowledged and it must be recognized 
how they are reflected in the functions and services provided by the systems 
humans refer to as resilient. Resilience is only observed in the delivery of valued 
functions and services. Identifying (admitting to) the valued functions is the first 
step in properly analyzing resilience. 
2. Scale. By focusing first on function, there is consequent and automatic 
acknowledgement of scale (both physical and temporal) because the answer to the 
question of value defines a scope at which the valued functions are (or can be, or 
should be) facilitated. In practice, and as witnessed in the literature, the system 
that delivers the valued function has been observed to be larger in scale than is 
initially thought. Admitting to appropriate scale often serves to temper the goals 
of engineers and managers who wish to design (or manage) for resilience. Further, 
valued functions must have a temporal extent that allows them to be valued at the 
scale on which they occur. 
3. Identity. Acknowledging the scale at which the valued function is delivered leads 
to definition of the structure of the system that delivers the valued functions. 
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Structure and function comprise system identity. If a system structure changes 
such that a valued function ceases to be provided, the system has lost its identity 
vis-à-vis the valued function and cannot be considered resilient. At such time, it is 
acceptable to carefully suggest that the system has evolved (or adapted, or 
transformed) into a new system, but this is not the same as resilience. Instead, a 
recognition of (or search for) new valued functions can begin (with the new 
system in mind), or a search for an alternative system that delivers the originally 
valued function can occur. In general, a system that adapts or evolves becomes a 
different system. It stretches credulity to suggest the system is “resilient” if it fails 
to maintain its identity. 
4. Redundancy. Once it is acknowledged that it is the valued function that matters in 
discussions of resilience and that this sets the scale and establishes system 
identity, it is easily observed that resilient systems are those which incrementally 
and redundantly deliver their valued functions or services (via pure or degenerate 
redundancy). Operationalizing resilience, therefore, will pragmatically focus on 
redundant provisioning of the quantum of resilience. Once the quantum of 
resilience is identified, a redundant and diversified portfolio of service delivery 
can be planned. Functional redundancy remains the driving design principle for 
resilient systems. 
 
 As discussed at length below, quantum resilience suggests that resilience is the 
extent to which a system delivers its valued function. Characterizing resilience requires 
both the function and the structure of the system to be quantified. Assuming system S 
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performs some function of value V, the resilience of S (Rs) must be a function of the 
system and its function: 
𝑅𝑠 = 𝑔(𝑺, 𝑽) 
 
 Quantum resilience employs the notion of nearly decomposable hierarchies 
(Simon, 1962) to characterize system structure. This implies that as systems are 
decomposed, their subsystems will have progressively less inter-system interaction and 
become effectively more isolated. This has proven to be a worthy model over many years 
of systems engineering experience and is almost universally witnessed in Nature. Further, 
quantum resilience refers to the structural and relational character of a system S as 
apparent complexity, C, and calculates it based on hierarchical decomposition (number of 
subsystems (s), interfaces and connections (c), and inter-system dependencies (d). 
Hierarchical decomposition provides a measure of structural complexity, while the 
interfaces and dependencies provide a measure of the relational complexity. Complexity 
is recursively summed over the entire system hierarchy as shown in the formulation 
below. Other complexity formulations could certainly be substituted though (in keeping 
with Gell-Mann & Lloyd, 1996) no alternatives have been discovered that better 
“measure” system identity. 
𝑺 ≝  𝐶 =  𝑠 +  ∑(𝑐𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖)
𝑠
𝑖=1
 
 
 For clarity, quantum resilience refers to the overall system functional value V as 
system productivity and asserts that system productivity, P, is the sum of the product of 
the quanta of valued functions provided (q) and the number of subsystems that provide 
those functions (m). Multiplying the quanta of valued function by the number of systems 
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that provide it implements a sort of force multiplication factor that recognizes how more 
independent subsystems providing the function (however little of it) magnifies system 
productivity: 
𝑽 ≝  𝑃 =  ∑ (𝑚𝑖 ×  ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
)
𝑓
𝑖=1
 
 
 The final resilience characterization formulation is based on the intuition that 
resilience is directly proportional to system productivity and inversely proportional to 
system complexity. Hence, resilience can be characterized as follows: 
𝑅𝑠  =  
𝑃
𝐶
 
 
 The terminology of quantum resilience can be exemplified and clarified by 
thinking of a typical boulder you might encounter while hiking in a typical mountain 
landscape. Boulders are fairly rugged entities. They have existed for millions of years, 
been stepped on by a variety of species, been subjected to wind and rain, fire and ice, and 
withstood the onslaught with aplomb. In fact, it is likely that you could airlift one and 
drop it on pretty much anything and expect it to inflict more damage than it would 
sustain. Boulders are arguably, if superficially, robust and enduring. But we do not learn 
about resilience from boulders. Why? Very simply, we do not value them because they 
do nothing for us. 
 That changes when you arrive at a particular mountain pass and need a better 
vantage point from which to view the scenery. If you climb the rock and are presented 
with a good view, the boulder has taken on value. It is no longer simply a rock but a 
“viewing system.” If the view is enrapturing enough to evoke expressions like, “Wow! I 
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could stay up here all day!” or “I really need to tell other people about this!” you might 
well start to worry about the resilience of the rock, but this is only because you have 
started to value it for the function it delivered. Now it is a “system” that you wish to be 
resilient. Importantly, however, your interest in resilience is not incited by the system (the 
rock). Instead, it is brought about by the valued function it provided. This is the way 
resilience must be addressed if we are to operationalize the concept. That is, however, not 
really the end of the rock story. 
 Recall that the rock became an important viewing system because of the treasured 
view it facilitated. But depending on your perspective it might be considered short-
sighted to see the boulder as the full extent of the system. In fact, if the view is so 
beautiful, you might want that to be enduring and resilient as well. This greatly expands 
the scope of the implicated system. If the valued function is extended beyond provision 
of a “view” to providing a “beautiful view” you must be concerned not just about the 
rock, but also about what is being viewed. Now it becomes apparent how valued function 
establishes the scale of the systems for which resilience is a goal. Further it reminds us 
that both aspects must be included in any model of the system. 
 Assuming you only cared about getting a “view” and did not care about what you 
were looking at (and recognizing that this is a conscious engineering or management 
choice) the next logical step is to agree that a rock is not the only way to get a view. In 
fact, there are many redundant and diverse ways to enable a hiker to get a view and 
express wonder. For example, you could climb a tree as easily as a rock, or you could 
walk on stilts. This obviously introduces other social aspects to the system. For example, 
to satisfy Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations, a tower 
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with a safety railing might be required, and to meet accessibility requirements, an access 
ramp and elevator must be installed. Notice that while all you need is a rock, you must 
admit to certain other values that creep into the analysis. The rock might provide a view, 
but the tower provides a safe and accessible view. In every case, resilience must be 
characterized in light of the valued function in the context of the full system. 
 Note as well that the many uses of a boulder extend beyond making it possible to 
get a view. I once saw a sharp curve in a rural road adjacent to which someone had 
placed a huge boulder to ensure that overly aggressive speeding cars (presumably driven 
by resilient teenagers) did not venture too far beyond the road and come to rest in his 
living room. It is obvious that this person—perhaps from experience—valued the rock in 
a way that most do not. As with providing a view, there are many other ways to keep cars 
out of living rooms. Roads can be rerouted, guardrails can be installed, teenage driving 
can be restricted, etc. If the valued function was keeping cars out of living rooms, it must 
be seen that there are many redundant means by which this can be accomplished. The 
system need not include a rock, and it is the valued function that lends clarity and drives 
the analysis. 
 What if the boulder-with-a-view was crushed into a million small stones? 
Obviously, this is a significant insult to the system and one which might inspire some to 
lament that system’s “lack of resilience” in the face of a particular perturbation. While 
this gets more into the idea of robustness (to be addressed at length later), recall that such 
lament would only occur if you lost some valued function. In this case, the resulting 
stones could be piled and climbed in order to view the treasured landscape, but it might 
be more difficult to climb, provide unstable footing, and not enable as far a view in the 
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end—a severely degraded function. Alternatively, you could argue the boulder has 
entered a new stability regime—one in which the services offered are once again 
different than providing a view. For example, now the boulder could be used in 
xeriscaping a Phoenix yard. But it is important to recognize that the valued functions are 
entirely different for this new system. Such a transformation disallows characterization of 
resilience to proceed as it did previously. This is new function and new system identity 
requiring new characterization of resilience. 
 This simple example is used in this brief introductory overview of quantum 
resilience to elucidate the formulation of resilience characterization. Later sections go 
into intricate details, but this will serve to set the stage and demonstrate the operational 
value of quantum resilience. It illustrates the need to focus on valued function, system 
scale, system identity, and redundancy when characterizing resilience for a system. 
Perhaps we can learn about resilience from a rock. 
 Extrapolation from this hypothetical rock story suggests a simple “combined 
viewing system” based on a rock and a tower. What is shown in Figure 1 adequately 
highlights the difference in system complexity between a rock and a tower (though 
clearly the tower can be further decomposed), and shows that both provide a view. 
Additionally, it should be pointed out that for simplicity sake, only hierarchical 
complexity is shown. There is no relational complexity in this simple example though it 
should be clear that connectivity and dependencies exist in even the simplistic tower 
model. The only relational complexity counted in this simple illustration is from the 
“output” of the valued function. 
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Figure 1. Simplistic “Viewing” System 
 
 Importantly, as I alluded above, a “view” is seldom enough for a system that is to 
be used by humans, so the example will present a comparative analysis of resilience 
based on a progressively complicated, but integrated function in which the “view” is first 
expanded to a “safe view” and then ultimately to a “safe and accessible view”. Then the 
same models will be presented with differentiated functions (i.e., view, safety, 
accessibility). This will allow some discussion of the differences in the resilience 
characterizations calculated by the model. 
 Note that for the system where “view” is the sole valued function, the tower is 
configured with only stairs and a viewing deck, dramatically reducing its complexity. For 
the simple example, assume the tower holds 20 people on the viewing deck and that the 
quanta of the valued function, “view”, is therefore 20 views. Further assume the rock 
holds 10 people and therefore provides 10 views. This results in the following 
calculations (note that the output of a valued function constitutes a connection): 
Tower
Stairs
Rock
Combined viewing system
Viewing Deck
Safety 
Railing
Access Ramp
Foyer
View
View
Elevator
Motor
Cable
Car
11 
 
Tower Productivity = 20 quanta of the valued function 
Tower Complexity = 3 systems (tower, deck, stairs) + 1 connection = 4 
Rock Productivity = 10 quanta of the valued function 
Rock Complexity = 1 system + 1 connection = 2 
 
Resilience (R) = productivity/complexity 
 = (2 systems provide valued function)*(20+10)/(4+2) = 10 
 
 Table 1 summarizes the outcome of the resilience characterization for the 
combined system where “view” is the only valued function. 
 
Table 1 
R-characterization: View Only 
System (Function) Productivity 
Tower (View) 20 
Rock (View) 10 
  
Productivity 60.00 
Complexity 6 
R-characterization 10.0000 
 
 If the valued function is expanded to “safe view” the tower structure will require a 
railing, increasing tower complexity to 5. Note that the rock is not considered safe so it is 
calculated as if “view” and “safe” contribute equally to the function output. This means 
instead of 10 quanta when the function was “view” it becomes 5 because the rock can 
only provide half of a “safe view”. For this simple example, this is a fair approach, but 
recall that system experts would need to come to consensus and thereafter be consistent 
when such situations arise. It would be equally valid to determine the rock simply can no 
longer participate in providing the valued function (as, for example, is demonstrated in 
the function-differentiated example to follow). 
Tower Productivity = 20 quanta of the valued function 
Tower Complexity = 4 systems (tower, deck, stairs, railing) + 1 connection = 5 
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Rock Productivity = 5 quanta of the valued function (just “view”, not “safe”) 
Rock Complexity = 1 system + 1 connection = 2 
 
R = productivity/complexity 
 = (2 systems provide valued function)*(20+5)/(5+2) = 7.1 
 
 Table 2 summarizes the outcome and the lower resilience characterization. Note 
the increase in complexity due to adding the railing and the decrease in productivity since 
the rock can only provide a view that is not safe. 
 
Table 2 
R-characterization: Safe View 
System (Function) Productivity 
Viewing Deck (Safe View) 20 
Rock (Safe View) 5 
  
Productivity 50.00 
Complexity 7 
R-characterization 7.1429 
 
 To provide a “safe and accessible view,” all the complexity shown in Figure 1 is 
required. Here, the rock is neither accessible nor safe, so following the previous 
approach, it can only contribute one third of the valued function (10/3). Table 3 
demonstrates how the decrease in productivity and the increase in complexity further 
erode the resilience of the system. 
 
Table 3 
R-characterization: Safe Accessible View 
System (Function) Productivity 
Tower (Safe and Accessible View) 20 
Rock (Safe and Accessible View) 3.33 
  
Productivity 46.66 
Complexity 13 
R-characterization 3.5892 
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 In general, it should be obvious that as complexity increases, resilience is 
diminished. But also note that increases in productivity can often offset increases in 
complexity and maintain resilience. Importantly, when the valued function is integrated 
into one function (i.e., “safe and accessible view”), the rock has limited ability to provide 
it. Hence, it might be interesting to determine if isolating the valued functions results in a 
different outcome. 
 The same modeling can be done using differentiated valued functions: view, 
safety, accessibility. Assuming experts are happy with the way the “view” is quantified, 
decisions must be made about how to quantify safety and accessibility. OSHA may 
publish guidelines or regulations that are used by inspectors, but importantly, it matters 
only that consensus is gained among the experts and that consistency is employed if such 
models should ever be compared to others. For the purpose of this simple example, it is 
arbitrarily determined that one full unit of “safety” is provided by the railing, and the 
ramp and the elevator each provide one half a unit of “accessibility.” Table 4 shows the 
outcome of the resilience characterization. 
 
Table 4 
R-characterization: Function-differentiated Viewing System 
System (Function) Productivity 
Access Ramp (Accessibility) 0.5 
Elevator (Accessibility) 0.5 
Railing (Safety) 1 
Viewing Deck (View) 20 
Rock (View) 10 
  
Productivity 63.00 
Complexity 16 
R-characterization 3.9375 
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 Note that in all cases modeled, the rock and the tower contribute redundant 
“viewing” capacity. If safety is a paramount concern, it could be argued that the rock 
must be removed from the analysis. This can easily be done and Table 5 summarizes the 
outcome. 
 
Table 5 
R-characterization: Tower Only Viewing System 
System (Function) Productivity 
Access Ramp (Accessibility) 0.5 
Elevator (Accessibility) 0.5 
Railing (Safety) 1 
Viewing Deck (View) 20 
  
Productivity 23.00 
Complexity 13 
R-characterization 1.7692 
 
 Note the dramatic decrease in resilience due to two factors. First, the rock’s 
incremental delivery of valued function “view” has been removed. Second, there is no 
longer redundancy in the provision of “view”. 
 Though this example has all the risks associated with any oversimplification, it is 
clearly useful in demonstrating the specifics of quantum resilience characterization. 
Valued function is figured predominately and is used to establish the scale at which the 
analysis proceeds. Identity of the system (structure and function, see later discussion) is 
clearly tracked through the analysis providing adequate basis for comparative analysis of 
alternative system deployments. Finally, the contribution of redundancy is easily 
observed. 
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CLARIFYING RESILIENCE 
 
 The resilience literature has enjoyed a several-decades-long season of 
unrestrained expansion. During this period many titillating ideas have found safe haven 
under the resilience umbrella, but it is vital that resilience be understood for what it is 
without these expansions. These other ideas certainly deserve to be researched and 
pursued, but they should not be conflated with resilience. To introduce this chapter, I 
offer a simple taxonomy to position resilience in a highly confused literature. Each of the 
concepts is discussed at length in the following sections. 
 As defined herein, once properly characterized, resilience is the extent to which a 
system delivers its valued function. Resilience must take into consideration the functions 
provided by a specifically scoped system and therefore it implicates system function 
(what it does) and system structure (what does it) in its characterization. Note well that 
resilience is defined on a scale or spectrum, so it cannot be said to have opposites. 
Suggesting an opposite for resilience is like suggesting an opposite for a certain 
wavelength of light, or a temperature of 60 degrees. Since all systems are resilient to a 
degree which can be characterized, there is no antonym for resilience.  
 Robustness is the extent to which a system is protected from the environment in 
which it must operate. Jen (2005, p. 17) understands this protectionist idea, but fails to 
understand that it is not simply unanticipated disturbances from which systems must be 
protected. Robust design includes protection against threats and disturbances which are 
expected (as with evolutionary biology) as well as those that can be reasonably predicted 
(e.g., think of the Mars Lander design). Though caution must be used with this 
terminology (more below), opposites of robustness include specific vulnerabilities. 
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Robustness cannot be said to contribute to resilience unless a proper characterization of 
resilience has demonstrated that particular protections enhance resilience. That is, 
sometimes features designed (or evolved) to contribute to a system’s robustness do not 
directly contribute to valued function delivery and will only be represented as part of the 
system’s complexity (in the denominator of the quantum resilience characterization). 
 Though glaringly absent from the resilience literature, anticipatory systems 
(Rosen, 1985) are a breed of system that contains a model of the system and its 
environment. Importantly, the model operates faster than real time providing a limited 
look-ahead into possible futures. Depending on the way they are instrumented and the 
sophistication of the model, anticipatory systems can plan a future based on what is 
deemed an optimal path through a variety of projected landscapes. Humans are 
anticipatory (for example, we experience what some refer to as a “theater of the mind”) 
so systems with humans in the loop are sometimes observed to be anticipatory (but again, 
this depends on how they are instrumented). In fact, though they go unidentified as such, 
it is anticipatory systems that are most frequently confused with resilient systems. 
Sometimes such systems are referred to as adaptive, but since adaptation can only be seen 
after the fact it is best to avoid that word. Biological organisms are anticipatory to 
varying extents depending on their complexity and how they are instrumented. 
 Adaptive systems are generally anticipatory though their internal models may be 
very simple. Living organisms from the smallest bacteria are adaptive because they 
satisfy two criteria. First, adaptive systems are homeostats that can regulate themselves 
(within tolerances) for operation in a given environment. Given the definition above, this 
obviously means they are, to a specific extent, robust. Second, they also have some 
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manner in which to “remember” phenotypic “lessons-learned” in their genotype. For 
many millennia, biological life has been adaptive, but the aforementioned “remembering” 
mechanism by which the genotype was enriched was managed by completely arbitrary 
and accidental processes. If a bacterium (phenotype) happened to get the right random 
mutation in a gene that made it somehow survive longer and pass that gene on to its 
progeny, it is (retrospectively) considered adaptive. Humans are adaptive systems and, 
having mastered language and memetic evolution, are no longer at the mercy of accidents 
of nature to transfer lessons-learned to their progeny—effectively extending the genotype 
to include culture, society, and its tools. Today, humankind determines what is adaptive 
and to a great extent what is selected. Because humans are adaptive, some of the systems 
in which we participate are also adaptive, starting first as anticipatory systems and 
surviving long enough for us to look back upon and notice they have been selected. 
Adaptive systems can certainly be resilient, but that has very little to do with them being 
adaptive. In fact, a system that must be adaptive to be resilient is taking a great risk. 
 Learning systems are special in that they have “solved” what scholars refer to as 
the stability-plasticity dilemma (cf. Grossberg, 1980). Not only do such systems have a 
repository of learned behavior (usually a real or artificial neural network), but such 
systems have “figured out” how to remember new things without forgetting what they 
already know (a phenomenon known as “catastrophic forgetting”). There are many 
theories on how this is best done, including those which have a filter that suggests what 
should be learned (e.g., a “resonance”) and those that implement short term memories 
that become learned once reinforced and promoted. Again, when learning systems are 
conflated with resilience, it is because humans are in the loop lending use of their neural 
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networks in an attempt to improve their future by not repeating negative past experiences, 
or, as is frequently the case, normatively dictating what should occur in the future. A 
system can be (and is) resilient without being a learning system. 
 Transformation beggars the idea of resilience, anticipation, adaptation, and 
learning since it resets all systems back to experimenting with accidental evolution, 
spontaneous generation, punctuated equilibria, or flashes of imagination. Transformation 
is not related to resilience because transformation necessarily results in a new system. 
Transformation is a wonderfully aggressive and revolutionary-sounding word that 
permits humans to pursue their hopes and dreams based on projected futures which may 
or may not be supported by historical trends or anticipatory models. It is also a dangerous 
word since it usually assumes facts not in evidence and relieves us of the need to do the 
hard work of properly characterizing resilience. 
 
Resilience and Robustness 
 
 As clearly indicated in the definition and characterization formulas, resilience is 
not about perturbations, disturbances, environmental threats, or other insults that might be 
suffered by our systems. This section discusses why, and proposes the resolution is the 
tried-and-true idea of robustness as a unique and independent concept. Understanding the 
environment in which our systems operate teaches engineers to expect and protect against 
perturbations, but including perturbations in characterization of resilience is not a way 
forward for resilience theory. Instead, perturbations fall under the purview of robustness, 
forcing the distinction of resilience and robustness as separate concepts. Very simply, 
robustness is environment specific, resilience is not. 
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 The rationale for excluding perturbations from resilience analysis is contained in 
the following (rather long) sentence: If systems can be said to be resilient, and such a 
moniker applies in some degree to all systems, yet individual systems are exposed to only 
a subset of all possible perturbations by virtue of their specific operating environments, 
and if this subset of perturbations is different from, or not entirely a subset of the 
expected perturbations on another system operating in another environment, then the idea 
of perturbations can neither contribute to any generalized definition of resilience nor be 
included in any generalized characterization of resilience without introducing infinities 
into the formulation. 
 Assume E is the universal set of possible environments in which systems operate. 
Assume P is the set of all possible perturbations, imaginable or unimaginable, infinite in 
scope, a universal set of perturbations collected from the universal set of environments. 
Assume system S1 operates in a target environment e1 (a subset of E) wherein some 
subset p1 of P defines the perturbations on S1. Further assume system S2 operates in a 
target environment e2 wherein some subset p2 of P defines the perturbations on S2. 
Assume that p1 is not equal to p2 and that p1 – p2 is not the null set. That is, perturbation 
sets are free to intersect but are not proper subsets of each other. 
 
E = universal set of environments, 𝐸 =  ∑ 𝑒𝑖  
e1 ⊆ E 
e2 ⊆ E 
P = universal set of perturbations, 𝑃 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑖 
p1 ⊆ P 
p2 ⊆ P 
p1 ≠ p2 
p1 - p2 ≠ ∅ 
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 If resilience characterization were to be generalized to include perturbations for 
only systems S1 and S2, such a generalized characterization can easily be seen to require 
acknowledgement of all perturbations (p1 and p2) in the union of e1 and e2. This is 
obviously larger than smaller subsets p1 and p2, but perhaps still a tenable formulation. 
Extending this, however, to all systems Si and their environments ei and associated 
perturbations, pi, in order to achieve a completely generalized resilience characterization 
approach would require acknowledgement of the entire set P, the universal set of 
perturbations, and the entire set E of environments. It is clear, then, that any 
generalization of resilience that attempts to acknowledge perturbations is intractable. 
 Instead, quantum resilience asserts that specific defenses against specific sets of 
perturbations can be considered under the concept of robustness. Robustness can be 
defined as the non-infinite set of protections required for Si to operate in ei. Since a robust 
system exists within a specific environment, there is no generalized formulation of 
robustness, just a list of specific disturbances and defenses. In fact, it is fair to say that 
systems are robust against specific insults on a case-by-case basis to a certain degree. 
Even if this list is large, it is finite. For example, a satellite might be able to operate at 
temperatures down to -50C so it is robust to that degree, but it would fail if exposed to 
any lava flow, so it is not robust against that. 
 Carpenter et al. (2001) suggest that resilience analysis must answer the question 
“of what to what?” In light of this question, they define two kinds of resilience: specified 
and generalized. They suggest specified resilience has to do with responding to 
perturbations we know and expect, and generalized resilience is about responding to 
threats we predict might occur. In fact, what these authors have proposed is exactly the 
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process employed by engineers as they prepare a system to operate in the environment for 
which it is designed. Most engineers would agree that their systems must be robust 
enough to perform their duties within their operational environment (including some 
wiggle room or, tolerances that are sometimes summarized in a system specification or 
service level agreement). If systems fail to perform in their target environment, engineers 
are willing to agree they are poorly designed. What Carpenter et al. are promoting is the 
simple concept of robustness. In fact, if resilience is about either “specified” or 
“generalized” perturbations, its characterization can never occur because as demonstrated 
above the calculations are intractable. No matter how long the list of perturbations, it is 
always possible to suggest another. Such infinities are the bane of science and must be 
eradicated, there is no “to what” in resilience analysis. Resilience is about the system, not 
possible perturbations on the system. 
 Quantum resilience asserts that resilience is the extent to which a system delivers 
its valued function. It goes on to assert that this characterization of resilience must be 
accomplished without taking perturbations into account. That is, a system is resilient to 
some degree before any perturbations strike. If we can only characterize resilience after 
perturbations strike, it is not a useful concept for forward engineering projects since an 
infinite progression of destructive testing would be required to verify a system’s 
resilience. Robustness, on the other hand, deals specifically with expected and predicted 
perturbations by employing solid engineering practice to instrument protections against 
them and to define the acceptable degree of defense against them. In this manner 
resilience is distinguished from robustness. 
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 Robustness is most helpfully thought of as a constellation concept that applies to 
specific systems and their specific environments. In keeping with Jen (2005, p. 17), 
robustness can be defined as the extent to which a system protects itself from known and 
projected threats. As a concept distinct from resilience, robustness can be validated and 
verified with solid test efforts that can be specified as needed. Robustness allows for a 
discipline-specific short-list (or, constellation) of “protections” that adds no infinities 
because each perturbation and the associated protection is largely isolatable from the 
others. Robustness in the face of specific perturbations can be managed and implemented 
on a case-by-case basis. Each threat can be evaluated for the extent of system exposure 
(vulnerability) and appropriate defenses created to protect the system from the threat, or 
to respond to the threat. This is typical engineering design. When threats are only 
postulated (as for example they were for missions like the Mars Lander where the 
environment could not be known in full), they can still be managed on a case-by-case 
basis with our best available vulnerability and failure modes analyses. 
 Robust systems are so-called because they satisfy criteria which have accreted 
around particular classes of systems (e.g., bridges, satellites, governments, mammalian 
cells, etc.). That is, there is a constellation of protections that are associated with a system 
by virtue of its inclusion in a particular class of system. If a system in that class has the 
expected protections, it might earn the moniker “robust”, but it is important to be specific 
about the specific areas of defense and the degree to which the system is protected. These 
lists of protections can be short or long, rough or detailed, depending on one’s familiarity 
with the system class. For example, most people can understand that a bridge is (or is not) 
“robust” in a way that is different from a satellite. Bridge engineers know more 
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specifically about gravity, load, erosion, and concrete strength, and that discipline 
developed a long list of standard procedures to ensure robustness of their products. 
Similarly, satellite engineers know more specifically about vacuum, zero-gravity, attitude 
and orbit maintenance, high radiation, and vibration at launch, and have evolved a 
discipline that consistently delivers robust systems for operation in space. In effect, it is 
malpractice to build a bridge without solid footings and to launch a satellite into orbit 
without taking the vacuum of space into consideration. 
 Further, the constellation of protections may specifically exclude certain 
perturbations because of the class of system under discussion. For example, no carpenter 
who produces hand-carved mahogany desks requires that they be protected against the 
onslaught of a chainsaw—he might, but if he did not he would not be accused of 
malpractice. To earn the moniker robust, a wooden desk need not be protected against 
such an insult. 
 These domain-specific lists of protections that make a specific system robust are 
well-understood in the given discipline and frequently find themselves in designs. 
Importantly, to a significant degree, the perturbations and their associated protections are 
independent. For example, a satellite engineer can adequately protect against the unique 
thermal issues of space but forget to use radiation-hardened electronic parts. It can be 
easily argued that though such a satellite might function, it is “less robust” because of 
such a failing, but note well, it is less robust in that specific defense and could be very 
robust in other areas. In general, each of the protections can be measured in isolation 
from other protections on the list. This removes the crippling infinities. 
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 In light of this, it is important to manage the vocabulary. Like resilience, 
robustness really has no antonym because it is a constellation concept. The word that 
comes closest to being an antonym is “vulnerable” but care must be taken to identify the 
specific vulnerability (e.g., a satellite that is invulnerable to vacuum, may still be 
vulnerable to mudslides). The word “resistance” is also sometimes seen in the literature. 
Resistance can be considered the outcome of a specific “protection” that is implemented 
in order to make the system robust against a specific threat or expected disturbance. In 
this regard, resistance can be viewed as defining specific operating ranges or a service 
level agreement for the system (e.g., paint that should not be applied at temperatures 
lower than 40F, or a wristwatch that is waterproof to depths of 50 feet). 
 
 Robust design 
 
 It would be ludicrous to assume a system is not resilient simply because it cannot 
accomplish something for which it was not designed, but this is the logical outcome of 
including perturbations in definitions of resilience. For example, it would be silly to 
suggest an electrical power plant is not resilient simply because it cannot serve 
sandwiches and coffee to the public. While such an extreme example easily makes the 
point, researchers sometimes fail to see the similarities of that example with demanding 
that a power plant continue to function after being submerged by a tsunami. Somehow 
recovery after a natural disaster prompts us to implicate the idea of resilience, while 
demanding silly bistro functions does not. Instead, after admitting that a power plant was 
not robust against the onslaught of sandwich demand, we can consider whether it must be 
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redesigned to support these new bistro requirements, but we cannot suggest it is not 
resilient. 
 The same argument applies when we expect pristine Nature to survive intact 
through the exigencies of human development. Instead of realizing that Nature is not 
robust against the human challenge, many argue instead that its resilience has been 
diminished—but this can only be demonstrated after valued functions are identified and 
the system is properly characterized. That Nature has been so incredibly durable 
sometimes leads us to assume it is “resilient” when in fact, human development amply 
demonstrates Nature’s inability to meet expectations for which it was not “designed.” In 
such cases, engineers must admit that we are privileging Nature as we currently know it 
(or as we think it can be), and are expecting that Nature wants to remain that way. 
Obviously this is as ludicrous as a power plant serving sandwiches. Nature has never 
remained in any particular state, and assuming a “reference condition” from which it has 
decayed merely reflects normative beliefs. 
 Simply because a system cannot meet expectations for which it was not designed 
does not make it a candidate for a resilience analysis. Instead, it is either a candidate for 
redesign, or simply a silly notion. As a less extreme example, ask whether or not a 
teenager’s wardrobe consisting of jeans and T-shirts is not resilient simply because it 
cannot deliver an appropriate outfit for a Whitehouse dinner invitation. It is not legitimate 
to discuss this deficiency in terms of resilience. Instead, it is valid to say that a 
Whitehouse dinner invitation is a “disturbance” the wardrobe was never designed to 
handle (because it was not designed for the Whitehouse environment), and to consider a 
redesign, but this does not enter the resilience space. It is better to suggest that the 
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wardrobe is insufficiently robust, or inadequately designed to be responsive to such an 
invitation. Could a wardrobe be augmented to support such an environment once the need 
arises? Absolutely, but note that such an augmentation must come from outside the 
original system. It would require expanding the wardrobe system to include, for example, 
a shopper and a nearby tuxedo store. This is valid system expansion, but it would be 
wrong to suggest the wardrobe is “adaptive” because of this system expansion. Instead, 
as a part of a human-in-the-loop larger system, one could argue that someone was able to 
upgrade the wardrobe system to be useful in yet another environment. In fact, if one was 
anticipating a Whitehouse dinner invitation, a tuxedo may have already been added to the 
wardrobe in order to make it robust enough to withstand such an environmental insult. 
But again, this is not the same as the original wardrobe system being adaptive. Similar 
thought experiments could be staged for the remaining examples in Table 6. Such 
examples serve to illustrate that frequently there is confusion over the idea of resilience. 
 
Table 6 
Systems and Their Environments 
System (function) Normal “designed-for” 
Environment 
Environment outside 
design parameters 
Wardrobe (appropriate 
outfits) 
Work, recreation, home 
outfits 
Whitehouse dinner  
Bridge (vehicle conveyance) Gravity, vehicle load, 
erosion, thermal expansion 
Zero-gravity of space 
Satellite (science, or 
telecommunications, or 
surveillance, etc.) 
Vacuum, thermal 
environment, zero-gravity, 
attitude and orbit control 
Under water 
Commercial Aircraft 
(transport people and cargo) 
Controlled civil airspace Active jamming, live 
fire 
Desk (work surface and 
locked storage) 
Level office floor, indoor 
setting, drawer use 
Chainsaw, stairwell 
Office building (office space) Desk work, meetings Automobile repair, 
junkyard 
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 Erica Jen (2005) suggests “systems that are robust often are required to maintain 
their functions while exploring new functionality” (p. 16). Taken baldly this statement is 
clearly overreaching. For example, should a bridge “explore” serving coffee or teaching 
kindergarten while it continues to convey vehicles over a ravine? What would exploration 
of new functions resemble for a bridge? Does this mean a bridge cannot be robust? 
Obviously, such a caricature is not her intent, but her specific example illustrates it is not 
far from her meaning: she suggests that the Internet must be able to be upgraded “without 
interrupting functionality.” There are several things to comment on here. First, though 
perhaps a quibble, her example is not really about “exploring new functionality.” That is, 
her example does not leave the Internet performing new functions after the change. 
Instead, she describes a protocol upgrade that alters the manner in which a current 
function is delivered. Second, and importantly, her proposed change is certainly not at the 
Internet scale, which is the scale she defined as her system. That is, it is not the Internet 
that is “exploring” the new function. She has casually expanded her sense of the system 
from protocols and data delivery between computers to include the engineers and 
organizations that build and maintain those protocols. My discomfort with this approach 
is that it is simply too casual. In the case of Jen’s Internet example, the proposed 
“robustness” of being able to upgrade while still delivering function is facilitated by the 
redundancy in the network. No network engineer would argue that the software 
implementing a protocol can change while it is operating. There must be a discrete point 
in time when one approach stops and another starts (and for protocols that generally 
involves both ends of the interface). Third, her example is not really about robustness. 
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Instead, she is suggesting that the designers and builders of the system are actually 
changing it and deploying a new system. It is tantamount to saying that a factory floor 
producing widgets is “robust” because the assembly line can be shut down, reconfigured, 
and restarted to produce a different kind of widget. While this is certainly a testament to 
good planning and engineering, it beggars the idea of robustness. A better example of 
robustness in the Internet is that you specifically cannot change a protocol while it is 
operating. This illustrates the ability to defend against a known perturbation and ensuring 
the integrity of the communications interface. 
 
 Why does it matter? 
 
 The distinction between resilience and robustness is vitally important because, 
first, there must be clarity in the discourse. Conflating terms will never lead us to 
quantifiable results. Second, allowing perturbations and robustness (the “solution” to 
perturbations) to be implicated in the quantification of resilience leads to infinities that 
cannot be tolerated. Third, recall that most features that protect a system (i.e., augment 
robustness) arguably exist simply to enable the system to deliver its valued function in 
the first place. The satellite in orbit may protect itself from the unique thermal 
environment presented by space, but thermal management is a critical part of the system 
without which it could not perform its mission. Similarly, a factory built at the bend of a 
frequently flooding river might have a levy to protect it from the inevitable flood, but this 
must first be considered good design that contributes to system robustness and makes it 
possible for the factory to perform its purpose. Only after taking the entire system into 
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account and characterizing resilience properly can we determine if the levy contributes to 
or detracts from the factory’s resilience. 
 The individual protectionist features may actually contribute to the complexity of 
a system without contributing to its productivity. This is why it is so vitally important to 
fully document and model the system and to appropriately allocate functions to 
subsystems. Only when the full complexity of the system and the full productivity of the 
system are calculated can we characterize the resilience of the system. 
 
Resilience and Adaptation 
 
 Among the more problematic trends in the literature is the tendency to conflate 
adaptability with resilience, even suggesting that “adaptability is part of resilience” 
(Folke et al., 2010). In the process, the words have been redefined to expand the scope of 
the resilience research project to an extent that makes such a project intractable. The 
temptation to conflate these concepts is irresistible because of the simple equation that 
emerges when it is noticed that Nature is both adaptive and resilient. While quantum 
resilience provides a testable theory about why and how these concepts are connected 
(discussed later), it also recognizes them to be separate research areas. Resilience must be 
a useful scientific concept without conflating it with adaptation. 
 Though speaking in a different context, Ahl & Allen (1996) refer to “adaptation” 
as a “weasel word,” one that “confuses law-like processes that move a system forward, 
and observer-based rules that recognize significance and purpose after the fact” (p. 190). 
They are correct. Our ability to predict the future is fairly limited, but such an effort 
generally starts with anticipating future environments for our systems based on current 
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trends established with short histories. Once these future environments are projected, 
engineers begin to focus on how systems can be protected against or adjusted to survive 
the expected future landscapes. Frequently so-called adaptation is simply an exercise in 
good planning, including brute force methods like stockpiling resources in order to meet 
future maintenance or operational demands. Future system evolution becomes simply a 
matter of humans executing their plans on a schedule that has been determined by the 
cognoscenti. References to resilience are then simply self-congratulatory because if a new 
landscape was adequately predicted and successfully navigated, we have proven our own 
resilience. This brings us no closer to understanding resilience. 
 Typically, since we can anticipate only a few things we tend to privilege the 
present state and target that (or an only slightly modified version of that) in our adaptive 
management plans. There is no consideration that a completely different future might 
actually be better. This feeling persists despite the fact that throughout history we have 
consistently proven to ourselves that radically different and unimaginable futures are 
always better. Unfortunately, since real adaptation is an extremely risky approach to 
resilience, we will tend to fall back on limited projections of incrementally alternative 
futures and revert to good planning and safety reserves to see us through. Instead, real 
adaptation requires definition of future landscapes, definition of fitness on those future 
landscapes, exploration of evolutionary pathways for the phenotypic system, feedback 
with measures of fitness, etc. Not only does this become intractable very quickly, 
ultimately our success is only observable after the fact. 
 Still, the resilience literature has begun to define resilience in terms of 
adaptability. Since resilient systems can superficially be said to demonstrate higher 
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fitness, it has proven to be an irresistible equation and the Resilience Alliance (cf. Folke 
et al., 2010) has struggled to secure resilience as an independent research area. 
Unfortunately, they extended their umbrella framework into the realm of adaptive and 
transformative behavior before resilience was even codified and operationalized as an 
individual and important scientific concept. Because of this, resilience has become 
another word like “sustainability” which is defined as needed to meet the needs of the 
moment. 
 While on the surface adaptation might occasionally be construed as a mechanism 
that prolongs the existence of some systems, it can equally well be a mechanism that 
radically changes the system enough to kill it, make it unrecognizable, or unable to 
deliver its valued function. Dramatic changes in function (and associated changes in 
structure) may make a system more fit on a particular landscape, but this does not mean 
the system is more resilient. If function and structure change, how will the system be 
recognized and how would one argue for its resilience? Even if function remains, but 
structure changes, it is a new system that is providing the function. If the old system is 
gone, how can it have been resilient? Adaptation can only be seen as an extremely risky 
effort at targeting resilience—and the outcome is only known after the fact. This term has 
introduced even more confusion into an expansive literature that continues to miss the 
opportunity to operationalize the concept of resilience. 
 Toward the end of their piece, the team from the Resilience Alliance says: 
Confusion arises when resilience is interpreted as backward looking, 
assumed to prevent novelty, innovation and transitions to new 
development pathways. This interpretation seems to be more about 
robustness to change and not about resilience for transformation (Folke et 
al., 2010, p. 25). 
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 This is troublesome, but it is not just because phrases like “transitions to new 
development pathways” are vague, unexemplified, and devoid of actionable content. 
Neither is it troubling because “resilience for transformation” sounds grandiose and 
promising, but provides no operational target. This statement is troublesome because it 
disparagingly refers to other definitions of resilience as “backward looking” (whatever 
that means) and makes the assumption that other definitions of resilience somehow seek 
to “prevent novelty” and stop innovation. Not only is there no basis for this charge, it is 
highly self-serving. In fact, “confusion arises” when researchers continue to expand their 
definitions, open doors to all manner of alternative approaches, and include them under 
their research umbrella. Note well that systems can be resilient and adaptive and 
transformative (and many other cool-sounding words whatever they may mean), but these 
are all unique and independent ideas—and must remain so. Instead, such comments 
establish their definition of resilience as a bright and shining star that pretends to guide us 
to novel, innovative, and transformative salvation, while providing no mechanism to 
instrument our safe passage. 
 The consensus work of Folke et al. (2010) leverages the definition proffered by 
Walker et al. (2004, p. 4) where resilience is suggested to include the capacity to 
“reorganize while undergoing change.” As the proverbial camel’s nose under the tent, 
this idea of “reorganization” has been intermittently employed over time and has finally 
found purchase to the extent that ideas like adaptation and transformation are cited as 
goals for “resilience thinking.” It is troubling that there is an unqualified pretense of some 
ability to track the “resilience” of a system before and after a transformation given that 
33 
(1) words like “transformation” suggest that entirely different systems are being 
discussed (making their resilience incomparable), and (2) absolutely no mechanism for 
quantified characterization of resilience is provided. Perhaps it is possible that some kind 
of “transformation” can occur without impacting delivery of valued function, but it is 
very risky and it is absolutely required that this caveat be mentioned. It is meaningless to 
talk about resilience in the context of changes to systems that alter the functions they 
deliver and change their interfaces to the rest of the world. Simply “defining it away” by 
including phrases like “change to maintain” (Folke et al., 2010), is not sufficient. 
 For adaptation to be a useful design goal, we must have some knowledge of the 
future landscape. Rosen (1985) points out: 
It must be emphasized that it is in fact meaningless to characterize a 
phenotype, or behavior, as adaptive apart from a postulated measure of 
fitness…. It must be stressed that, until a measure of fitness is introduced, 
no simple state can be meaningfully characterized as adaptive or 
maladaptive; and this includes all the cybernetic mechanisms which have 
been proposed as examples of adaptation. This is a subtle point, but it cannot 
be emphasized too strongly…. The concepts of adaptation, fitness, selection 
and evolution are themselves linked; none of them can be completely 
understood unless all of the others are taken into account (p. 374ff). 
 
 As a theoretical biologist and polymath, Rosen contributed the definitive work on 
anticipatory systems. While reviewing his mathematics on adaptation and selection is 
beyond the scope of this work, it should be pointed out that in most cases when 
adaptation is discussed in the resilience literature the adaptive systems referenced are 
really anticipatory systems. It behooves us to understand that adaptation is really 
something we can only discern after the fact—and that makes it difficult to sell as a 
design goal. Further, it is generally forgotten that any projection of future fitness will 
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necessarily be a normative projection. A future we pursue is always one we feel should 
be pursued. 
 Still, given our human foresight, it seems we should be able to set ourselves up 
for future success and that somehow this should become a matter of good design. To 
accomplish this, we must leave behind the idea that we can build systems that can 
“change” or transform. Recall that any system with humans in the loop qualifies as such. 
Instead, we must focus first on building systems that are robust in the environments in 
which they operate, and that have spare capacity to deliver their valued functions. Such 
spare capacity can legitimately be termed adaptive capacity, not because it does any kind 
of adapting, but because it provides extra system structure which can be repurposed 
without impacting overall system productivity. Such an idea flies in the face of human 
engineering efficiency (especially when we are being told that resources are dwindling), 
but this is the way nature works as can be easily illustrated. 
 Once upon a time there was a widget factory on the river with 100 highly 
productive widget manufacturing machines. One sad day, one of the widget machines 
broke in a way that resulted in production of defective widgets (which became 
affectionately known as wonkets). The quality control group recognized the defects, and 
because widgets are difficult to recycle, simply discarded them behind the factory, 
forming a pile. Because widgets were selling so well, management barely noticed the 1% 
decrease in manufacturing efficiency and failed to investigate the waste of energy and 
materials. Over time the pile of wonkets grew, forming a large pile and creating a barrier 
between the factory and the river. Some creative employees even created a picnic area on 
the pile and would regularly enjoy the view while eating lunch. Then, on another sad day, 
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the river flooded unexpectedly and the pile of wonkets, serving as a levy, protected the 
factory by diverting the water and saving it from a disastrous flood. Management and 
employees alike rejoiced and cheered at their good fortune. 
 This is how degeneracy works in nature (more below). This is how nature builds 
adaptive capacity. Nature is completely oblivious, extraordinarily wasteful, and 
sometimes successful. As you might expect, having been saved from the flood by their 
pile of wonkets, management immediately formed a team to investigate where they 
originated. In the course of the investigation, the team found the broken machine and 
repaired it so it once again was manufacturing quality widgets. Then, management 
invested a large sum of money to have the wonkets removed to a landfill and to design 
and install a proper levy to protect against future floods. They have yet to establish a 
serviceable picnic area. That is how purposeful and efficient humans work. The 
differences are dramatic and serve to illustrate why we struggle with the idea of 
adaptation. 
 Active functional redundancy (i.e., degeneracy) can be said to provide adaptive 
capacity in the sense that delivery of more function allows risky and potentially 
deleterious experimentation with system parts while not falling below some necessary 
service delivery level. Assuming the system continues to deliver its valued function, this 
degeneracy can be viewed as a mechanism conferring greater resilience, but it is due to 
redundancy, not because of any as yet unproven “adaptations.” In fact, adaptation, as 
illustrated by the widget factory, comes through coopted redundancy (cf. Gould, 1997; 
Gould & Vrba, 1982). The factory and its management had no idea it was setting itself up 
for success on a different (flooded) landscape. Likewise, we have no way of planning for 
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adaptation other than providing redundant capacity that might eventually be tweaked, 
coopted, and employed for new functions. 
 As nature demonstrates and as illustrated by the widget factory, adaptation seems 
to be best orchestrated as opportunistic exploitation of redundancy through cooption. 
Kauffman (1995, p. 154) outlines how evolution by natural selection cannot really 
operate on a fully optimized “program” (or, organism) since optimization means there is 
no room for error. In many respects this disqualifies engineered systems from adaptation 
since they are generally designed to minimize extra parts and cost. Hence, while the extra 
parts in Nature may be added through extravagant wastefulness, there is an inherent 
conservatism because if it expects to survive (so to speak) Nature is only free to tinker 
with extra stuff. Nature must obey what has been referred to as a (sort of) law of “interim 
viability” (cf. Page, 2011, p. 124). So while redundant systems are instilling resilience, 
they are also providing this space for experimentation. Research demonstrates that 
“leaps” in evolution tend to be traceable to accidental copies of genetic material that 
eventually mutates, gets activated, then expressed. As a clever moniker for this idea, 
Gould and Lewontin (1979) coined “spandrels” for what Gould (1997) later suggests 
“arise nonadaptively as secondary consequences… but then become available for later 
cooptation to useful function in the subsequent history of an evolutionary lineage” 
(Gould, 1997, p. 10750). This is very likely the only way evolution can “leap.” The 
conservative exploitation of (near) redundancy is a way so-called adaptation can be 
facilitated in systems that are already resilient (note well the reversal in the equation: 
adaptation is not “part of” resilience, instead resilience is necessary for adaptation). Since 
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resilience is instrumented through functional redundancy, it should not surprise us that 
“adaptive capacity” is also instrumented through redundancy. 
 Quantum resilience asserts that resilience analysis must focus on the function 
(productivity) of the system. Nature is a good teacher in this case. It is not the complexity 
of the system that augments its resilience. Instead, it is the vast amount of functional 
redundancy that is contained (sometimes hidden) within all that complexity that 
augments resilience. Recall that since there is no absolute “high mark” for resilience (it is 
only comparative among homologous systems), resilience characterization numbers need 
not be large. Instead, think of “incremental contribution” and “incremental loss” of 
function (in the numerator) as the driver of resilience. Complexity must be accurately 
modeled no matter what function it supports. 
 For example, if (among other ways) a mammalian cell manufactures adenosine 
triphosphate (ATP) from glucose molecules during glycolysis, and manufactures more 
ATP during oxidative phosphorylation, then the full output of ATP must be calculated 
and placed in the numerator, while the full complexity of the glycolysis and 
phosphorylation systems must be modeled and calculated for the denominator. 
Obviously, if the cell can “figure out” another way to manufacture ATP, those additional 
productivity and complexity values would contribute respectively to numerator and 
denominator and then resilience could be re-characterized accordingly. If the new way is 
comparatively more productive and comparatively less complex than the others, this 
would disproportionately increase resilience. Likewise if the new approach is similarly 
productive and similarly complex as the others, it would still (very likely) improve 
resilience since it adds another redundant pathway. 
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 Reiterating the above, using biological examples as teachers, I can conclude that 
opportunistic exploitation of functional redundancy is how adaptive capacity is built. For 
example, when a gene in a germline cell is accidentally duplicated and not expressed, it is 
free to mutate (or not) without damage to the organism and with little additional energetic 
cost for its survival. This clearly adds complexity without function. This reduces 
resilience but, given the vast complexity of the organism, the energetic cost of 
maintaining the extra gene is small, so the impact to resilience would likely be 
unmeasurable.
1
 As we know, eventually another mutation might cause the extra gene to 
be expressed, resulting in either deleterious functional impact (e.g., if the gene had 
mutated) which (in the extreme negative case) kills the phenotype, or (with a positive 
mutation) perhaps adds new or additional function to the phenotype. This is important 
because now the additional complexity has function that contributes to the resilience. 
 Though gaps in knowledge are closing, biology still tends to have far more 
complexity than known function (e.g., there exists a significant amount of so-called “junk 
DNA”, there are metabolic pathways that are still not understood, etc.). Again, this is 
because biology wastefully exploits all the resources at its disposal and is unconcerned 
with efficiency. As a robust theory, quantum resilience can lead us to look for function 
within complexity that is already seen, but not understood. If function cannot be found in 
the complexity, however, it still must be properly quantified in the denominator. 
Generally, though without planning, if Nature has allowed complexity without function, 
                                                     
1
 Though recent estimates suggest Alu exists in over 1 million copies and comprises over 10% of the human 
genome, according to Maynard Smith & Szathmary (1999, p. 97): “there is an element known as Alu, 282 
bases long, present in 300,000-500,000 copies distributed throughout the genome, and accounting for some 
5 percent of the genomic DNA…. So far as is known, these Alu elements do nothing useful for the 
organism. They are only one of many kinds of repeated elements in the human genome.” 
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it is very likely not hurting the organism (e.g., has only a slightly negative energetic 
drain, as in accidental replication of genes in DNA). Systems of human design, on the 
other hand, are seldom so wasteful since deadweight is noticed and pruned. Still, 
quantum resilience drives the analysis to identify all complexity to ensure proper 
calculation of the denominator, so if significant complexity is detected in such a system 
without a corresponding provision of function, it might drive the analyst to identify 
forgotten function, or to acknowledge an expansion in system scope. 
 Since expansion in scope leads to a much larger analysis, it provides an important 
segue to a final comment about adaptation. Frequently the literature mistakenly assigns 
the term “adaptation” to systems that are experiencing upper-directed behavior (sensu 
McShea, 2012) in Simon (1962) hierarchies. That is, so-called adaptive behavior is 
actually being facilitated by the larger “containing” system when it has something “extra” 
to contribute to a child system by way of redundant capacity. This is almost certainly the 
intent of most of the literature that conflates resilience with adaptation. For example, with 
the goal of creating “resilient infrastructure”, humans plan for exigencies and stockpile 
resources (sometimes human resources) to enable swift recovery and restoration of 
services. Typically, this will be extolled as resilient infrastructure when in reality it is 
resilient human society that has learned to expect certain things and plan ahead. As usual, 
Nature is a good example of this approach (though without the foresight). Though it is 
not usually stated this way, Nature’s adaptive capacity stems from its access to (1) 
effectively infinite resources in the environment (at least until recently!), (2) effectively 
infinite time to employ them in experimentation, and importantly, (3) effectively no 
constraints on how trial and error adaptation is implemented. That is, Nature does not 
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care if it breaks itself while trying something new because nothing in Nature whines 
about failures in service provisioning and demands amelioration. Nature simply migrates 
or dies. In general, humans have learned from Nature, and only recently have we started 
encountering constraints that force us to rethink our previously adaptive behaviors (i.e., 
over-exploiting and then moving on). In this regard, our consciences make us far less 
profligate wasters of resources than is Nature. 
 To resist the trend of merging ideas like resilience and adaptation it is helpful to 
return to the principle that suggests resilience is about a function before it is about a 
system. Remember that all our observations of valued function are value laden. This 
implies that any idea of future goals would also be value laden. Recall that value laden is 
not necessarily wrong but we must admit to it and address it. Planning or designing 
“adaptive behavior” has proven difficult not only because we do not know the shape of 
the future landscape, but also because we do not necessarily know what future 
generations may need. What we can do is develop redundant and excess capacity that 
delivers the functions we currently view as important so that in the future we might have 
some excess capacity to exploit as values change and new systems become required. 
Forays into problem solving with artificial neural networks (ANNs) have demonstrated at 
least one thing: organization, programming, and planning only go so far in problem 
solving; more neurons and more connections contribute disproportionately to resolving 
such problems. Until we quantify valued functions, we cannot hope to deploy the 
redundancy we need in order to establish real adaptive capacity. Unfortunately, when the 
literature refers to adaptive capacity it is highly euphemistic and fails to provide 
examples of how it might work. Fortunately, quantum resilience provides a way forward. 
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Quantum resilience suggests adaptive capacity is instrumented through functional 
redundancy. Migrating excess capacity into alternative uses is a matter for differentiated 
research, but should be maintained as a separate discipline. 
 
Resilience is Resilience 
 
 Gunderson and Holling have supervised an exceptional body of work on 
resilience (e.g., Gunderson, Holling & Light, 1995; Gunderson & Holling, 2002; 
Gunderson & Pritchard, 2002; Gunderson, Allen & Holling, 2010). In general, these 
edited volumes target ecological systems and avoid focus on systems that involve 
significant levels of human engineering. To support this differentiation, Holling has 
coined the terms “ecological resilience” and “engineering resilience” and suggested they 
are fundamentally different. In-depth discussion of what Holling (1996) originally termed 
“engineering resilience” does not generally occur since few engineers are involved in the 
production of these edited volumes and related resilience literature. Engineers, however, 
might have difficulty appreciating the “fundamental” difference expressed by Gunderson, 
Holling, Pritchard, and Peterson as “essentially between a focus on maintaining efficiency 
of function (engineering resilience) and a focus on maintaining existence of function 
(ecological resilience)” (2002, p. 5). 
 While I applaud this mention of function in a discussion of resilience (it receives 
too little), it would be difficult for an engineer to separate these and think that somehow a 
necessary function could continue to be efficient if it were to disappear. Non-existent 
functions constitute system failure. Efficiency seems to demand existence. In fact, 
engineers generally go to great lengths to instrument functions with a variety of 
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performance levels since degradation is expected over time and under a variety of 
environmental insults and operational loads. Gunderson et al. go on to describe the 
difference between ecological and engineering resilience as “so fundamental that they 
can become alternative paradigms in which subscribers dwell on received wisdom rather 
than the reality of nature” (Gunderson et al., 2002, p.5, emphasis added). 
 The implication here is that engineers operate in a rote manner, ignorantly 
following the received wisdom in their handbooks, never being required to interact with 
the exigencies of the natural world, and blindly ignoring reality while they deploy their 
solutions. It is admittedly difficult to swallow such an allegation. While “received 
wisdom” can blind engineers to important nuance required in novel designs, it more often 
allows many years of hard-won experience to be leveraged. It is cavalier to assume that 
“received wisdom” is not at least in part based on the “reality of nature.” After all, these 
ecologists are themselves documenting their observations in order that future ecologists 
can receive and benefit from their wisdom. The caricature of the ignorant engineer with 
his head down banging out products for some alternative reality is unwarranted. 
 When “engineering resilience” is used in the literature, it is generally assumed 
that the explanation given by Holling (1996) was complete and correct and needed no 
further explication or defense. It is also apparent that “engineering resilience” is viewed 
as incapable of contributing to the management of the current array of problems facing 
humankind—those that are usually associated with complex socio-ecological systems 
(SESs). With little overstatement, it is not difficult to conclude that “engineering 
resilience” has been relegated to step-child status—it is that other resilience that must be 
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“bettered” if we are to successfully deal with hard problems. This is demonstrated in the 
following passage: 
The existence, or at least the importance, of multiple or single stable states 
determines the appropriateness of an engineering or ecological approach to 
resilience. If it is assumed that only one stable state exists or can be 
designed to exist, then the only possible definition and measures for 
resilience are near-equilibrium ones—such as characteristic return time. And 
that is certainly consistent with the engineer’s desire to make things work—
and not to intentionally make things that break down or suddenly shift their 
behavior. But nature and human society are different (Gunderson, Holling, 
Pritchard & Peterson, 2002, p. 6). 
 
 Beyond the overly simplistic rule that begins the paragraph (can resilience really 
boil down to whether or not there is one or several stable states?), there are at least two 
implications in this paragraph that are worthy of comment. The first is that engineers are 
never required to manage multiple stable states in their systems. This view might simply 
reflect the scales at which ecologists think engineers work (e.g., they might think 
engineers build “bridges” but not “transportation systems,” or they think engineers 
develop “microprocessors” but not “telephony networks”, or engineers build “radios” but 
not “global military command and control infrastructures”). It also disingenuously 
implies that ecologists do seek to simultaneously manage multiple stability domains. 
However, even if ecologists recognize multiple stable states like “clear” and “turbid” in a 
lake ecosystem, they must admit they only seek to manage toward the one with higher 
social utility. This would be analogous to engineers recognizing stability domains of 
“working” and “broken” and attempting to keep the system “working”. While they 
recognize the “turbid” state, it is never the intent of ecologists to ensure a lake remains 
“turbid.” Understanding the turbid state (just as engineers want to understand the 
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“broken” state) is important, but management efforts must proceed in a certain direction 
and that is usually toward the state of higher social utility. 
 The second implication is more interesting because it hints that while employing 
the (allegedly more powerful) tools of “ecological resilience,” the SES manager’s goal is 
not to “make things work”, or to prevent sudden shifts in system behavior. Apparently, 
they want to avoid that since after all, that is what engineers do! This is also 
disingenuous. Nature and human society may well be “different” as these scholars 
suggest, but when ecologists step into SES management roles they must admit that their 
clear intent is to “make things work.” They may have normative conservationist goals, 
but they obviously have a “working” outcome in mind. Resilience practitioners should 
not lose sight of their observer-dependent and value-laden goals. 
 But the denigration of the engineering approach continues as they attempt to 
further differentiate the ecological resilience approach as a novelty: 
If there are multiple equilibria, in which direction should the finger on the 
invisible hand of Adam Smith point? If there is more than one objective 
function, where does the engineer search for optimal designs? In such a 
context, a near equilibrium approach is myopic. Attention should shift to 
determining the constructive role of instability in maintaining diversity 
and persistence and to management designs that maintain ecosystem 
function despite unexpected disturbances. Such designs maintain or 
expand the ecological resilience of those ecological “services” that 
invisibly provide the foundations for sustaining economic activity and 
human society (Gunderson et al., 2002, p. 8). 
 
 Once again, while I applaud the reference to maintaining ecosystem function (and 
lament that it is so quickly forgotten), there is much that must be rebutted in this 
paragraph. First, “myopic” engineers have long worked with multiple equilibria 
(Rapoport, 1986, p. 67ff) and multiple objective functions (Rapoport, 1986, pp. 195, 
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202ff; ReVelle, Whitlatch & Wright, 2004, pp. 121ff), and multi-criteria decision 
analysis (MCDA) is a field with its own journal (cf. Wiley InterScience Journal of Multi-
Criteria Decision Analysis), so whether or not fault can be found with their approaches, 
the complexity of conflicting goals is not new to engineers. Literature about multiple 
objective functions does not imply that the problems are easily managed, but engineers 
have a long history of wrestling with multiple objectives and finding the non-inferior 
operational “sweet spots” that can be afforded or accomplished with the limited resources 
available. 
 More importantly, what can it possibly mean to determine “the constructive role 
of instability in maintaining diversity and persistence”? Even speaking in evolutionary 
terms, the “role of instability” is not constructive. At best, such language could be 
construed to be reminiscent of Schumpeter’s (1950) “creative destruction” as long as we 
understand that even his use of that idea was as a rhetorical device. Instability neither 
maintains nor leads to diversity. Even if the authors are envisioning “random mutation” 
followed by “natural selection” as a kind of “instability” that can lead to diversity, then 
they have forgotten two things. First, it must be remembered that evolution is largely 
conservative or ecosystems and the life they support would be too fragile to be sustained. 
It is difficult to imagine a successful ecosystem that “persists” in “instability” as they 
suggest. The terms are opposing—and it is hoped these authors are attempting more than 
clever rhetoric. While it is true that some systems “flip,” the unstable period during the 
“flip” is not a desired “state” and neither is it enduring (or “flip” would not be used to 
describe it). Second, the goal of pursuing resilience at all is to manage an SES toward 
some higher social utility while balancing Nature’s needs for the long term benefit of 
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both humans and Nature (maximizing enviro-social utility). Since that is the case, it must 
not be forgotten that humans (and other species) desire stable systems that deliver their 
valued functions over appreciable timeframes. Most species cannot survive a mostly 
“broken” system while natural selection takes its time coming to a “resilient” solution. 
(See the later discussion of Holling’s adaptive cycle). 
 Gunderson et al.’s (2002) internal conflict is highlighted when one page later they 
write: “Ecosystems are resilient when ecological interactions reinforce one another and 
dampen disruptions” (p. 9, emphasis added). Here, the authors negate their previous 
statement about the “constructive role of instability in maintaining diversity” and it must 
be observed that we cannot have it both ways. Does instability lead to resilience as 
suggested on page 8? Or does resilience require such disruptions to be dampened as 
indicated on page 9? The authors know the answer, but in an attempt to define a new kind 
of resilience, they have lost sight of the value of a cohesive approach—one which 
includes so-called engineering resilience. 
 The resilience literature generally focuses on what authors imply are the more 
complex socio-ecological systems and the management problems associated with such 
systems. They suggest such systems demand treatment with ecological resilience in 
mind. While most examples are fairly tightly defined ecosystems, these volumes do 
occasionally foray into social organization, politics, governance, and economics. 
Unfortunately, they fail to acknowledge that these are all human-engineered systems 
which quite feasibly can be addressed using so-called engineering resilience. To know 
that economies and governments are engineered by humans and to not at least 
demonstrate why so-called engineering resilience does not apply seems a significant 
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oversight. Blanket and broad introductory remarks like those cited above are insufficient 
to convince practicing engineers of the need to relinquish their “received wisdom” and 
abandon engineering resilience as a viable tool. Fortunately, I will demonstrate that the 
confusion spawned by the unnecessary distinction between engineering and ecological 
resilience is quite avoidable. There is only one “resilience.” 
 Abandoning multiple kinds of resilience 
 Since humankind has only been environmentally conscious for a couple 
generations, it is only recently that we have recognized the need to manage the ecological 
systems on which we depend. It is perhaps obvious that, since they are unconscious of 
their own existence, natural systems are extravagant and wasteful, unconcerned by the 
resource cost required to maintain themselves. Before the advent of the environmental 
discourse, humans themselves tended to assume the earth was big enough to not be 
impacted by a few “wasters” and we (perhaps excusably) adopted Nature’s approach of 
using everything at our disposal with little concern for dwindling resources. Of course, 
now that population and technology have multiplied our impact, the story is changing. 
We have noticed and have started feeling the resource crunch—as many species before us 
have, only to migrate or die. We have recognized our more negative impacts and realize 
that a natural response (i.e., migrate or die) is less feasible now that we have filled all the 
easily accessed parts of the Earth. In important attempts to come to terms with these 
changes, would-be managers of socio-ecological systems are feeling constraints that 
engineers have faced for a long time. Ironically, these SES managers have lately realized 
that “efficiency”—understood as appropriate allocation and consumption of resources, 
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and thought to be a hallmark of “engineering resilience”—might actually be an important 
step beyond focusing merely on the “existence” of the functions they value. 
 Unfortunately, in isolating “ecological resilience” from “engineering resilience,” 
the literature implies that “engineering problems” are somehow simpler, better bounded, 
and better scoped, than so-called socio-ecological problems. In fact, engineers have long 
been forced to deliver reliably functioning systems in the face of significant constraints, 
and engineering managers faced economic “realities” far earlier than their ecological 
counterparts. To manage such constraints they have adopted design patterns and 
principles (“received wisdom”) that have proven to be effective over time. For example, 
redundancy and distribution are employed when system function is critical enough for it 
to be cost-effectively implemented. For this reason, it is unfortunate that “engineering 
resilience” is not being explored as part of the solution space for SES management. 
 Interestingly just a few pages after they imply that engineering resilience is 
inadequate to the task, Gunderson et al. add: 
We propose that the resilience of ecological processes, and therefore the 
ecosystems they maintain, depends upon the distribution of functional 
groups within and across sales…. Across-scale resilience is produced by 
the replication of process at different scales. The apparent redundancy of 
similar functions replicated at different scales adds resilience to an 
ecosystem (Gunderson, Holling, Pritchard & Peterson, 2002, p. 10). 
 
 Such functional redundancy at different scales has been a hallmark of robust 
engineered systems for many years—largely because engineers noticed that it was 
effective in Nature. Several years prior to this Peterson, Allen and Holling (2010 [1998]) 
had suggested: 
It is difficult to envision how ecosystems without redundancy could 
continue to persist in the face of disturbance. We assume that since no 
49 
species are identical, redundancy does not reside in groups of species, but 
rather it emerges from interactions of species (p. 175). 
 
 Though the second sentence is somewhat unclear (and by using the term 
“emerges” even implies some mystery) they later clarify that “overlap in ecological 
function leads to ecological redundancy” (p. 176). The “interactions of species” they 
specify is instrumented specifically by the redundant delivery of important and valued 
functions. In these passages, the authors properly notice that resilience is instrumented 
through redundancy and diversity (what biologists call “degeneracy”, or, redundancy of 
function through different structure), and in doing so, provide a strong testimony in 
support of the power of engineering resilience which employs these very tactics. 
 Ultimately, the equivalence of engineering and ecological resilience is made 
completely clear when Holling, Gunderson, and Peterson (2002) speak of “imbricated 
redundancy” (p. 85). This within-scale and between-scale (sometimes termed “across-
scale”) redundancy is exactly the kind of redundancy that system engineers use to ensure 
robust systems from telecommunications, to health care claims processing, to space-
based surveillance. In fact, redundancy that is provided by diversity or portfolio 
approaches would be done more if it were not so expensive. For example, 
telecommunications networks have more than one way to connect a call; there is not just 
one kind of surveillance satellite (and neither do they all observe the same regions in the 
electromagnetic spectrum); and health plans do not have just one way of processing 
claims, but do them with a wide-variety of rules, in batches, one-by-one, manually, etc. 
Interestingly, these three exemplar domains are particularly rich with examples of 
resilience (through redundancy) because they are deemed vitally important and are well-
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funded. It appears that what ecologists have discovered is exactly what engineers have 
known for a long time: that it requires a lot of money to solve hard problems. 
 In engineered systems, the lowest level (smallest scale) sensors like thermistors or 
current monitors are frequently redundant because they are important to system health 
and status monitoring as well as being relatively inexpensive. Larger scale systems that 
contain these redundant sensors (e.g., power supplies, processors, telecommunication 
switches) are frequently redundant because they are deemed mission-critical enough to 
invest extra resources (e.g., mass, parts, labor, development and test schedule) and 
because at this scale they are still relatively inexpensive. At the largest scales (e.g., 
computers, disk farms, satellites) the systems are frequently redundant when replacement 
or repair time would significantly impact the mission or the revenue stream. For example, 
in addition to the full constellation of 66 satellites, the Iridium global telephony network 
(iridium.com) was deployed with six on-orbit spare satellites, not to mention redundant 
ground-based tracking stations, mission control centers, and telephone network 
gateways—recall, telecommunications systems are well-funded and customers demand 
they function, so resilience is ensured through engineering redundancy. 
 Unfortunately, Gunderson et al. (2002) appear to be unaware that engineers 
frequently provide resilience through such portfolio approaches. Rightfully, they say 
“within-scale resilience complements cross-scale resilience” (p. 11), but then they 
specifically deny the existence of the engineer’s portfolio approach: 
The consequence of all that variety is that the species combine to form an 
overlapping set of reinforcing influences that are less like the redundancy 
of engineered devices and more like portfolio diversity strategies of 
investors (p. 11). 
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 It is apparent that at least part of their problem stems from thinking that engineers 
design “devices” but not systems. This is a debilitating and inexcusable oversight. By 
reinforcing the idea that resilience can be operationalized through redundancy, they have 
equated ecological resilience and engineering resilience even while denigrating the latter. 
This is an important lesson that future SES managers must learn—and can avoid learning 
the hard way. So the question is why was a resilience dichotomy ever created? 
 It is possible that some fear so-called engineering resilience because it may lead 
to “deconstructionist science,” a command-control approach to management, or simple 
reductionism. However, there is simply no need to fear that since it was Nature that 
taught engineers how redundancy is the path to resilience—and Nature did it without 
command and control hierarchies. As a particular way to implement a management plan, 
command-control can be effective and has its place. It is certainly a way to provide 
humans a sense that they are in control—often an important outcome in itself. Since the 
eco-resilience literature specifically repudiates command and control approaches (Holling 
& Meffe, 1996), ecologists call themselves “managers” of SESs, but the feint is obvious. 
Their goal is control as they decide on appropriate outcomes and shepherd the system in 
what they perceive is the right direction. But it matters very little what humans call 
themselves, as Nature has modeled, and as engineering has followed, resilience will be 
implemented through redundancy. It is in the “doing” not the “defining” that a real 
definition emerges. 
 Peterson, Allen and Holling (2010[1998]) suggest: 
Ecological and engineering resilience reflect different properties. Ecological 
resilience concentrates on the ability of a set of mutually reinforcing 
structures and processes to persist. It allows ecologists or managers to focus 
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upon transitions between definable states, defined by sets of organizing 
processes and structures, and the likelihood of such occurrence. Engineering 
resilience on the other hand concentrates on conditions near a steady state 
where transient measurements of rate of return are made following small 
disturbances. Engineering resilience focuses upon small portions of a 
system’s stability landscape, whereas ecological resilience focuses upon its 
contours. Engineering resilience does not help assess either the response of a 
system to large perturbations or when gradual changes in a system’s stability 
landscape may cause the system to move from one stability domain to 
another, for these reasons we concentrate on ecological resilience (p. 179). 
 
 Unfortunately, the comparative statements made in this passage are not mutually 
exclusive and are largely meaningless, so it is difficult to understand the launching point 
of their comparison. That one kind of resilience focuses on “stability landscape” and the 
other on “contours” seems to be arbitrary employment of metaphor. Until the poetry is 
replaced with meaningful and actionable ideas, it is unhelpful. It also seems strange that 
engineering resilience helps with neither “large perturbations” nor “gradual changes” and 
forces one to wonder how engineers have accomplished anything at all with their meager 
tools. This is odd, especially since engineers use the same terminology (systems, 
structures, states, processes, transitions, stability, etc.) and very likely used it first. 
 It is for these reasons that I find the unnecessary distinction between engineering 
resilience and ecological resilience to be confusing and harmful to the discourse. This is 
especially true when tacit denigration of engineering resilience is nearly immediately 
followed by glowing testament to the power and importance of what is easily 
demonstrated to be the tools of engineering resilience. Engineers (perhaps indirectly or 
by osmosis) have learned the power of redundancy from the natural systems they 
observe. There is no reason that “engineering resilience” cannot be a powerful 
contributor to managing the complex socio-ecological systems we face today. It would be 
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far better to focus on operationalizing “resilience” than to perpetuate a confusing and 
meaningless distinction. Fortunately, when arbitrary distinctions and misunderstandings 
are clarified, resilience is revealed as a unified concept. Ecosystems are resilient due to 
their many functional redundancies and engineers have learned from this. Redundancy in 
the delivery of valued functions is exactly the engineering approach. 
 
Resilience and the Adaptive Cycle 
 
 Leveraging a traditional view of ecosystems which are observed to have periods 
of exploitation followed by conservation, Holling proposed the adaptive cycle as a model 
of how natural systems continually reformulate themselves (cf. Gunderson & Holling, 
2002, p. 25ff.). His model has four phases. In their mature conservative phase (K), 
ecosystems employ the resources available to them and deliver useful functions and 
services. During this phase, Holling suggests the resilience of the system is in decline. 
Ultimately, resources dwindle and resilience wanes leading to release and system 
collapse (Ω). Thereafter, Nature recovers and experiences a reconfiguration phase (α) 
which results in a new system. This leads to an exploitation phase (r) where the system 
builds to maturity while resilience is high. The cycle, Holling suggests, repeats 
indefinitely. 
 Holling’s adaptive cycle may be an important contribution, but the way it is 
employed in SES literature is sometimes forced to the extent that Holling himself might 
quibble about the way his model has been assumed to be a proven and working theory of 
the natural world instead of being merely an analogy. It is my purpose here to 
demonstrate that it must not be uncritically employed—and certainly not for systems with 
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significant human design and involvement. In fact, while some of its tenets are 
applicable, the entire model must be employed only with extreme caution. Note well, 
resilience characterization should not start with analogy, but with system analysis. 
 As a model of how natural systems might adapt over time (or “flip”, or “enter a 
new stability regime”, or “find a new basin of attraction”, the euphemisms abound), 
Holling’s adaptive cycle has been frequently employed in the literature and mapped to 
the behavior of some ecosystems. As pointed out earlier, when an ecosystem “flips,” 
organisms in Nature do not start whining about failures in the provisioning of services or 
valued functions, they simply migrate or die. If, however, the adaptive cycle were to be 
representative of systems engineered by humans, we would call such systems “broken” 
(and there would be significant whining). In fact, human-engineered systems that 
experience “collapse” and “reorganization” are repudiated. The goal of human 
engineered systems is to arrive quickly at productive stability (Holling’s K phase) and 
remain there for as long as possible. 
 Since humans have trouble using constantly changing systems, systems of human 
engineering (including SESs) must exhibit K phase resilience. K phase systems are 
mature and conservative, but are, unfortunately, where Holling predicts resilience will be 
declining (Gunderson & Holling, 2002, p. 44). If “bouncing back” (to employ a 
frequently seen euphemism) from perturbations is important, it is to the well-understood 
stability of the K phase humans wish to return, not to the frenetic and still-coalescing 
system of the r phase. Humans cannot effectively operate in the constantly changing but 
(allegedly) highly resilient space of the α and r phases. Humans need stable systems that 
provide stable services through which work can be accomplished. Picture, for example, 
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humans trying to flourish in the face of constantly changing economic or political 
regimes—history demonstrates our inability to do this. So it appears that humans need 
high resilience in the K phase at the very time Holling suggests it is waning. Hence, the 
adaptive cycle might reflect the operation of pristine Nature, but is clearly not a model of 
the way human systems are most effectively managed. Unfortunately, overemphasis of 
the adaptive cycle analogy has frequently engendered adherence to it as if it were an 
inexorable law of the universe. 
 The conflict between this presumed law of the universe and human needs is 
recognized by Baskerville (1995): 
The important point here is that the management of a natural system 
such as a forest is an attempt to prevent the cycle of exploitation/ 
conservation/creative destruction/ mobilization from operating 
normally. Indeed, if the cycle did not operate, there would be no need 
for society to manage those systems. In general, management is invoked 
to prevent the creative destruction step… (p. 92, emphasis added). 
 
 Later, he suggests humankind is on a “treadmill” trying to prevent the impending 
creative destruction. The tendency to see the cycle as inevitable—even in the face of 
management—is clear. Walker and Salt (2006) agree with Baskerville and brace 
themselves for the inevitable: 
No system can stay in, or be kept in, a late conservation phase 
indefinitely…. A significant back loop [i.e., collapse and reorganization] 
of one form or another is inevitable (p. 85). 
 
 This self-conscious adherence to the model is odd in light of the many 
equivocations Walker and Salt (2006) make. They allow for “many variations” (p. 82) 
and draw the model in a way that suggests a system can find its way around the four 
identifiable phases in a fairly uncontrolled manner (p. 83). Engineers would conclude that 
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a model so fluid and free has lost its ability to be useful—let alone inevitable—but 
ecologists cling to this model despite its inability to model reality and make predictions. 
Unfortunately, this resignation has prevented movement toward operationalizing 
resilience and instead has put us on Baskerville’s treadmill, bracing ourselves for the 
inevitable. 
 Because of this, it is difficult to envision how the adaptive cycle can be used as a 
model for socio-ecological systems where human influence and technology is dominant. 
In these cases, perhaps the “adaptive cycle” is best employed as a non-cycle or a one-time 
process that illustrates system growth from r to K to Ω and does not attempt to suggest 
systems arise from their ashes like a mythical Phoenix. While it is an incorrect 
application of the model to suggest a system’s “resilience” is demonstrated by repeated 
passes through the α-r-K-Ω cycle (recall that according to Holling resilience waxes and 
wanes within the cycle), it is equally problematic to suggest the same system emerges 
after the Ω phase. In fact, in any collapse and reorganization, it becomes clear that a new 
system emerges. While this is hinted at by Walker and Salt (2006, p. 75), the best 
expression that it is really a new system is provided by Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 
(2002, p. 75) when they demonstrate how the adaptive cycle can be stacked and used to 
reflect up and down the hierarchy in a Panarchy of systems. The very introduction of the 
Panarchy idea exposes the deficiencies in the adaptive cycle because it demonstrates how 
a system either escapes from the cycle or is really just part of a larger system. Since 
systems-of-systems ideas are well-worn in the engineering space, a new and confusing 
concept like Panarchy is not really necessary. 
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 What is possible (and is at least implied by the Panarchy idea) is that the entity 
that is progressing from r to Ω is a subsystem of a potentially resilient larger system. This 
is vital but not particularly clear in the literature. For example, when a human-engineered 
system like a government collapses, if the residual human society creates a new 
government, it is clearly not the same government system as the one that collapsed. That 
is, it is not the “government” that is resilient, but the human society which is the parent 
system. This is vital, because the human society draws on far more resources to recreate 
the government than the previous government left behind. This cannot be effectively 
shown with the adaptive cycle and is not sufficiently clear in the presentation of the 
Panarchy concept. 
 The adaptive cycle and Panarchies are tricky things since they tend to imply the 
same system is (re)cycling. Students struggling with the concept say they want their 
business to be resilient like the adaptive cycle, but are startled when asked how 
frequently they plan to schedule a business collapse. As expected, nobody wants their 
business to ever collapse. Instead, they eventually agree that they want to have a business 
model that supports a variety of projects that come and go as necessary, redundantly 
generating income to keep the business viable as the market evolves. When we talk 
instead about specific business thrusts that come and go, they can make better application 
of a (partial) adaptive cycle analogy (specifically the r and K phases). This also drives 
home the important fact that such “rebirth” must be greatly subsidized by the parent 
system. The assumption that a “system” simply reorganizes its mass and is reborn 
trivializes the important concept of system identity. There is more to identity than mass 
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and constituent particles (or people and buildings, etc.). As Ahl and Allen (1996) put it 
“from the perspective of the old system, the new system is a mystery” (p. 183). 
 This is illustrated in the conflict between resilience and the adaptive cycle 
exhibited in Carpenter et al. (2001, pp. 770-771). The authors employ Holling’s adaptive 
cycle to discuss the resilience of a lake-agriculture system. They suggest there are two 
parts of their SES, the social (which is comprised of human activities like agricultural 
production and regulatory action) and the biophysical (which consists of the lake’s water 
quality). This particular SES is managed to maximize (1) the net social utility of the 
agricultural production and (2) the freshwater use in recreation. Carpenter et al. suggest 
that “resilience of the clear-water state [is] high during the r phase” which follows 
Holling’s suggestion, but the claim is difficult to justify since they are describing a build-
up of Phosphorous in the surrounding soil. In fact, in specifically physical system terms, 
what is occurring is the degradation of the water quality as P increasingly leaches into 
the lake. By forcing use of the analogy they have forced themselves to suggest something 
that has not yet been demonstrated. That is, they have done nothing to quantify resilience. 
There are at least two issues with this approach. First, they have not adequately defined 
the system in the r phase. In fact, it appears they want to map the increase in P with the 
upward trajectory of the adaptive cycle in the r phase. This mapping might be irresistible, 
but unfortunately it leads to the second problem of making a single variable a proxy for 
resilience. Since P is increasing (and is, to them, inversely proportional to resilience), 
they cannot conclude the resilience of the clear water state is high. In fact, what they must 
say is that water quality (their valued function) is decreasing along with resilience. For 
their mapping to work, resilience must be decreasing in the r phase. Unfortunately, the 
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adaptive cycle forces them to await the K phase to allow for decreasing resilience. So, 
either they must better define what their resilient r phase consists of, or they need to 
acknowledge they are attempting to conflate increasing P with decreasing resilience and 
force-fit an analogy. 
 There is danger in using one measurable value as a proxy for resilience of a 
system. Carpenter et al. (2001) suggest “indicators of resilience that are appropriate for 
the current regime may become useless as ecological structures and social expectations 
shift” (p. 779, emphasis added). While this is superficially true (e.g., a hypothetical new 
regime may contain no Phosphorus and this would eliminate their ability to use P level as 
a proxy for resilience) it is also problematic since it ignores the overall system (and 
contradicts any acknowledgement of its complexity). The most graphic illustration of the 
confusion is in the chart on page 773. Figure 4 indicates it is plotting the resilience of the 
clear water state. But this simply cannot be—especially if the graphical portrayal of four 
Holling cycles depicted beneath it is accurate. This would require that resilience should 
wax and wane at least four times in this figure. Instead the chart may depict the turbidity 
of the water (or a notional representation of overall water quality), but it has nothing to 
do with its resilience—and the cycles shown are largely meaningless. All we can glean 
from the discussion is that higher P levels cause water turbidity which is bad for the 
recreation business on the water. Overall system resilience has not been addressed and it 
certainly has not been quantified. 
 In discussing one of the cycles, Carpenter et al. (2001, p. 773) say “soil P levels in 
the watershed began to stabilize or decline…. This change has increased the resilience of 
the clear water state.”  But this is not completely accurate. Instead, the change may have 
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reduced the turbidity of the water, but no quantification of resilience was done. 
Obviously, their system includes more than the water and this must be acknowledged in 
the characterization of resilience. It should also be clear that we cannot change (or plot) 
the resilience of a “state” as these authors indicate. Instead we can only speak of the 
resilience of a system. Even if it is granted that one could characterize the resilience of a 
system operating in a particular state, it still requires that all the state variables be 
employed in identifying that configuration. Most systems can exist in many states and as 
a system concept resilience should apply to any and all states in which a system may 
exist. Later they conclude: 
In the case of lake eutrophication, such indicators include soil P 
concentration, animal stocking densities, and land area under construction, 
which are inversely related to the resilience of the clear water state 
(Carpenter et al., 2001, p. 774). 
 
 This belated recognition of other contributors to “resilience” indicates the 
oversimplification previously discussed (and points to other, unquantified, valued 
function). Further, as “indicators” in the system, each of these contributes to the 
definition and identity of the overall system. They are not, however, indicators of 
resilience and since there has been no formulation of resilience, they cannot be assumed 
to be “inversely related” to resilience. Instead, these must contribute to or detract from 
whatever valued function has been defined for the system. What this simple statement 
demonstrates is the need for a system-oriented analysis. No conclusions can be drawn 
until such an analysis occurs. As they allude when they mention “the clear water state”, 
the items they list are ultimately related to the clarity of the water, not the resilience of 
the system. These are very different things. 
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 Ultimately, Carpenter et al. contend that the increasing P-concentration leaves the 
lake in a turbid state, triggering the Ω phase collapse that spurs “strong regulation of 
agriculture and a tumult of confusion, debate, and evaluation of the problem” (p. 770). 
They suggest, the outcome of regulatory activities serves to clear the water sufficiently to 
restore positive net social utility. Without even getting into the way they have casually 
expanded their system to include regulatory bodies, recall that this activity only 
superficially increases resilience of the system (because water clarity is the only 
measure). Afterward, Carpenter et al. suggest, the regulatory system relaxes and the lake 
returns to the turbid state forcing another reactionary regulatory cycle. Even if 
hypothetical, this is a poorly managed system, not an example of resilience. At best, 
according to their definition of resilience, it is a reminder that the lake system is highly 
sensitive to perturbations and hence not resilient. Obviously, a more effective regulatory 
regime would not simply relax and allow the same problem to occur again. Carpenter et 
al. hint at this by closing the discussion with: 
Active adaptive management leads to low-amplitude cycles that can keep 
the system in the clear water–high utility attractor for longer than laissez-
faire management (p. 771). 
 
 In fact, their concession that “low-amplitude cycles” might be achievable, does 
not mean they are necessarily desirable. As I contend above, humans do not want obvious 
cycles in their managed socio-ecological systems. How much “tumult of confusion” can 
humans tolerate? We desire our systems to be mature and stable. Unfortunately this 
occurs (according to Holling) where resilience is waning. That cannot be said to be 
successful management. 
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 In an attempt to employ the adaptive cycle, Carpenter et al. have assumed single 
measurable variables (P) are direct indicators of resilience and they have attempted to 
force the analogy to fit the gradual increases and decreases in this single measure. At no 
time is the resilience of the system characterized. In arguing for a management plan that 
allows “low-amplitude cycles” they seem to be suggesting that Holling’s cycle can 
operate without its Ω and α phases and hover in a shallow but continuous r-K cycle. As 
previously stated, this is closer to what humans need, but it does not match the cycle they 
have tried to force. This clearly exemplifies why the adaptive cycle should not be 
overused for SES management. Holling himself warned about its adoption as a theory or 
rigid model (Gunderson & Holling, 2002, p. 399). We must heed that warning. 
 Assuming there is an adaptive cycle frequently causes us to forget about the 
system and leads us to oversimplify and analogize our system in order to fit the analogy 
of the cycle. As illustrated, this too quickly leads to finding proxies for resilience and 
leads to incomplete analysis. This is not a way forward for systems research or resilience. 
This is especially true since the adaptive cycle can only predict future collapse and 
mysterious reorganization—something that is not useful when humans require stable 
function from their systems. 
 Given that the adaptive cycle is based on Schumpeterian “creative destruction,” it 
seems strange we so quickly forget the very reason for Schumpeter’s original idea. In 
fact, the seemingly random contributions of technology are what drove Schumpeter’s 
observation of the trend to randomly experience a regime shift that changes everything 
(cf. Allenby, 2012, p. 172). Technology is based on the human contribution and humans 
are the only species to supersede genetic evolution with memetic evolution. Because of 
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this (and with a few important examples), it seems strange that we would expect any kind 
of observable cycle. In fact, most agree that the earth system is engineered and sometimes 
recursively—or ironically—refer to it as “terraformed” as inspired by science fiction 
author Williamson as early as 1942 (cf. Williamson, 1951, 2001). Hence, it seems 
disingenuous to strictly expect a Holling adaptive cycle to apply even in the situations 
where the SES is mostly natural. Given any human input (engineering, design, 
management, participation, use, harvesting, etc.) we must concede that the system is 
“human” and thus subject to our manipulations and meme-based evolution instead of a 
purely natural gene-based evolution. This would imply that at any time in the so-called 
cycle, everything could change. This is a far more realistic model—and is supported by 
history. Unfortunately, it is not very illuminating. Given that, it is better to stick to actual 
system analysis instead of analogical reasoning. 
 Enthusiasm for the adaptive cycle requires moderation. In fact, it is likely fair to 
ask if it only applies after the fact. It seems that we only notice cycles retrospectively, and 
if its explanatory power is only in its ability to either model the past or predict eventual 
collapse, it seems limited. For example, it seems unhelpful to be forced to view an 
operational SES as currently in some kind of K phase on a trajectory toward collapse, but 
have no way to measure resilience either now or at some point in the future. Hence, as an 
analogy it might work, but it cannot really approach “theory” status. 
 Fortunately, an approach like quantum resilience provides a way forward and 
allows significantly moderated use of the adaptive cycle. Metaphors and analogies can be 
helpful, but they should not substitute for system analysis. A start at a proper assessment 
of the Carpenter et al. lake-agriculture system is provided as a brief example below. 
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Resilience and the Urban Space 
 
 Vale and Campanella (2005, p. 3) remind us that throughout history few cities 
have disappeared. Even after facing ruinous natural disasters, the vast majority are 
rebuilt, returning to viability and then vitality. Does this imply cities are simply de facto 
resilient? If this is the case, then cities must be studied so humankind can learn the 
lessons of resilience. Instead, however, it seems that much scholarship is invested in 
answering the question of how we can ensure our cities are resilient. Despite 
humankind’s history of near total success in establishing resilient cities, it seems our 
approach to urbanization has come under question and can no longer be trusted. Are we 
afraid that we have reached a stage in human evolution at which cities will no longer be 
resilient? Is it because we specifically recognize that “sustainability” demands we adopt a 
new approach for which we have no practice? Has the promise of future sustainability 
clouded our judgment to the extent that we fail to look at past successes for clues about 
future potential? 
 There are at least several reasons this may have become an important research 
topic. First, it is to be expected given the pervasiveness of the sustainability discourse and 
the importance of cities. At significant cost and risk, humankind is planning for a 
sustainable future—and it seems fair that cities must be involved in contributing their 
part. Alternatively, fears have arisen as we have witnessed recent bankruptcies of long-
important cities that have left their futures uncertain. The increasing threat and incidence 
of terrorism has also caused much concern, promoting discussion of protection and 
recovery. For whatever reason, urban resilience is vigorously trumpeted in the literature.  
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 It must be considered, however, that resilience might be meaningless at the level 
of a city. Certainly the principles of quantum resilience call into question the rationality 
of such an exploration. When considering, for example, the function of a city, it taxes the 
imagination to see it as anything but a huge list, and certainly smacks of impossibility to 
collect it in a single analysis model. Instead, it seems more likely that urban resilience is 
most meaningful if targeted at smaller “urban infrastructure systems” and the functions 
they provide. 
 Specifically, the “function” of a city stands at a different level than its robustness 
against, for example, terror threats, or hurricanes can impact. A city tends to frame itself 
in cultural and symbolic terms. For example, New York is “the economic capital of the 
world” or, “a symbol of freedom for huddled masses yearning to breathe free”, or “the 
city that never sleeps”, etc. Such cultural and symbolic constructs are “protected” by their 
redundancy throughout human society, throughout the world. Such constructs are 
obviously not limited to NYC or US cities, but includes many cities which are cultural 
icons like Paris, Rome, etc. 
 Some discussions of resilience are more or less meaningful from a scientific or 
operational standpoint and the resilience of cities qua cities is among the less meaningful. 
They are, as we know, already pervasive and have long histories. In fact, cities are 
resilient because humans make them so, and will continue to be because humans live in 
and invest in them. It is a “human” thing, and, very simply, sometimes humans decide to 
perpetuate something. Since New York City’s value is wrapped up in the fact that it is a 
cultural and economic icon, of course we will ensure it persists. But we must not forget 
that everything we do there can be done somewhere else. If NYC goes away we need not 
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lose any important functions of society. If we value New Orleans similarly, then the same 
will be true. It will be made permanent by our investment in it and immigration to it. 
 Note, however, that as with anything, a city’s value is observer-dependent. This is 
highly important and it is the very reason I use the word “value” in “valued function”. 
For example, the Chinese are not likely to value New Orleans the same way American 
culture does, and if it were up to the Chinese, New Orleans (or particular iconic aspects 
of it) may cease to exist because they will neither invest in them nor move there. This 
illustrates how quantum resilience is more meaningful from an operational standpoint. 
There are functions provided by New Orleans that the Chinese may value, but that is not 
the same as valuing New Orleans for our current cultural and aesthetic reasons. And, 
since all those non-iconic functions can and are provided by other cities, the loss would 
be inconsequential when viewed through their eyes. 
 At some point we must admit to valuing NYC or New Orleans for some specific 
reason (like an environmentalist might value a salt marsh for purely aesthetic reasons). 
And the reasons can constitute a long or short list. There are many “functions” in and of a 
city that one could value or be interested in preserving. Quantum resilience can start 
wherever anyone wants in defining valued functions. If the valued function boils down to 
its status as a cultural icon (e.g., “the joy of New Orleans”), that is a perfectly acceptable 
starting point for quantum resilience. The challenge of course is finding others who agree 
with you and coming to some consensus on how to quantify that joy. 
 The fact that a “system” like a “city” makes one think of “cultural icon” as a 
valued function is a perfect example of how the quantum resilience approach 
appropriately manages the analysis. With a valued function like “city as cultural icon,” 
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many would enter the analysis thinking “the city” (e.g. NYC or New Orleans) is the 
system we want to be resilient. But quantum resilience makes it clear that is the wrong 
starting point. Instead, it becomes glaringly obvious that the city is not the system 
because the collection of systems that delivers the function of “cultural icon” is vastly 
different from common ideas about what a city is and does. Instead, quantum resilience 
makes it clear that the entire society might be the system in this case. For example, when 
disaster strikes the city, the entire society sends rebuilding teams and invests in 
reparations. The entire society donates to the National Red Cross and permits its 
government to provide disaster relief funding. The entire society tracks the progress on 
the national news and does not stop caring until viability and vitality return to the city. 
We will invest until we are reasonably assured that the iconic status has been restored. In 
this way, quantum resilience has revealed the real system. Resilience is not about a 
system until it is about a valued function. 
 It is also unclear that building resilient cities—however it is defined—actually 
saves money for a culture. For example, there is recent concern about urban resilience in 
the face of terrorist threats. First, quantum resilience reminds us that resilience is not 
disturbance-focused. Second, it is arguable that a staggeringly large investment in 
security, and a similarly staggering erosion of personal freedoms could prevent such 
attacks, but it is completely unclear that such investment would contribute to the 
resilience of a city. In fact, any willingness to invest in such a large project already attests 
to the resilience of the city because it illustrates the human interest in protecting the 
cultural icon. Some of the media-reported reactions to 9/11 and the Boston Marathon 
68 
bombing are informative. They have the flavor of “are you kidding me!? You want a 
piece of me!?” That attitude defines the resilience of the city. 
 As regrettable as the loss of human life is at any level and at any time, complete 
prevention of such incidents also serves to remove any measurable way of assigning 
dollars-per-lives-saved (i.e., if you never lose a life, the expression becomes infinite). 
Further it would eliminate any idea of assessing whether or not the city was actually 
resilient in the face of the threat (not that quantum resilience agrees with such 
terminology, but assuming that terminology, if there is never a test, you have no way of 
knowing). In the absence of measurable progress, investment is likely to cease. Further, it 
is abundantly clear that there is no way to stop such crime. Since the sole intent of 
terrorism is spreading terror, the only way to prevent it is to stop being terrified by it. 
American reaction to 9/11 and Boston is indicative of this posture. This leads to defining 
the system at a scale that is not city-oriented. Again, this is a cultural thing. 
 But to focus on the terrorist threat is the wrong approach when resilience is under 
consideration. Instead, there are arguably two approaches that can be taken. A robustness 
approach can start by addressing the projected impacts of a bomb and providing defenses 
(physical or otherwise). A resilience approach might consider the actual impacts to 
valued function and propose that redundancies be implemented. Recall, there is no “of 
what, to what” (sensu Carpenter et al., 2001) in resilience analysis; it must focus on 
function. Quantum resilience understands that many perturbations result in similar 
functional impact. We do not specifically care, for example, that it was a bomb, a flood, 
or an operator error that ruined, say, the communications infrastructure. What we care 
about is that the function of communication must be redundantly provisioned in order to 
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increase resilience. The same operational approach applies if we are worried about 
buildings being lost, or infrastructure damaged, or transportation disturbed, etc. Such 
impacts can only be mitigated through functional redundancy (additional buildings or 
alternative workplaces, alternative water and sewer lines, alternative transportation and 
communications infrastructure, etc.). The answer does not change. Resilience can be 
provided through expensive but purposeful redundancy. 
 In their edited volume Resilent City: How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster, 
Vale and Campanella (2005) offer an interesting look at the narratives, symbols, and 
politics of urban restoration. Though their definition of resilience differs from mine, in 
their conclusion (pp. 339-351), they suggest twelve “axioms” of resilience: 
1. narratives of resilience are a political necessity, 
2. disasters reveal the resilience of governments, 
3. narratives of resilience are always contested, 
4. local resilience is linked to national renewal, 
5. resilience is underwritten by outsiders, 
6. urban rebuilding symbolizes human resilience,  
7. remembrance drives resilience,  
8. resilience benefits from the inertia of prior investment, 
9. resilience exploits the power of place, 
10. resilience casts opportunism as opportunity,  
11. resilience, like disaster, is site-specific, and 
12. resilience entails more than rebuilding. 
 
 Phrases like “political,” “governments,” “national renewal,” “human resilience,” 
“remembrance,” and “power of place” reinforce the point that cities are cultural icons 
more then they are factories of function. Urban resilience is more a matter of public will 
than anything else. Perhaps the words “narrative” and “symbol” (#3 and #6) are the best 
indicators of this because they remind us that icons are more about story than actual 
production. Though the stories and symbols may be exaggerated, they are generally based 
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in fact, so after the will is found, there is a generally a direction in which it can be 
exerted. 
 While urban resilience is far more about symbol than anything else, there are 
material aspects that must ultimately be brought to fruition in order to keep the stories 
alive. My insistence that we focus on the valued functions is because that is the only 
practical way to roll-out an icon! Consider for example a culturally rich city like New 
Orleans with no external access (transportation infrastructure), no ability to make a hotel 
reservation (communications infrastructure), and no means by which to freshen-up if you 
ever did arrive (water and sewage infrastructure). Without these “amenities”, important 
culture would be wasted and quickly fade from memory. 
 Interestingly, Vale and Campanella did not neglect to mention the power of 
investment (“underwritten” in #5 and “investment” in #8). In fact, these two axioms are 
the only ones that can be operationalized beyond promoting a cultural esprit de corps! 
Very importantly, they mention “outsiders” (#5), which further illustrates that resilience 
is very often assumed at a smaller level than it is actually instrumented and 
operationalized (neglecting the “real” system extent). Further, when the idea of “cultural 
icon” extends beyond nation-state boundaries (as it does, for example, with Paris, Rome, 
New York City, etc.), resilience and permanence are fairly guaranteed, because now there 
is significantly more redundancy in those “outsiders” who are underwriting the recovery 
and contributing to the rebuilding. 
 Though they are large, there are only two requirements for a resilient city: 
“attraction” and “infrastructure”. First, there must be some iconic status, some mythos, 
some symbol that will serve to keep a city alive, first in the hearts and minds of humans, 
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and only then in the physical dimensions. Note well that such mythos can be simple 
nostalgia or a strong media campaign. Second, there must be infrastructure. Water, 
power, transportation, waste management, communications, businesses, buildings, 
homes, etc. are “life blood” items that support any and all who find themselves in the 
urban space. Attraction draws, infrastructure keeps. If either aspect wanes, the resilience 
of the city is diminished accordingly. Quantum resilience can certainly model both 
aspects of urban resilience, but it should be obvious that consensus among experts is far 
more likely to be gained when concentrating on the specifics of smaller portions of urban 
infrastructure than when attempting to establish the relative merits of particular cultural 
items. 
 For this reason, though an important topic, urban resilience is not one of the more 
meaningful scientific analyses. Instead, because we know physical and organizational 
infrastructure contributes directly to urban resilience, it seems better to focus system 
analysis and modeling efforts in these areas. 
 
Resilience and the Safety Industry 
 
 Though this is a rather broad definition, there is a particular “angle” on resilience 
that is taken by researchers I position in the “safety” industry. Though their work is not 
particularly relevant to what is discussed herein, their literature is frequently cited and 
takes similar approaches to merging and conflating the idea of resilience with other ideas. 
I discuss this here very briefly because it presents another angle on the “time domain” 
questions (see further discussion below). The “safety” industry is a broad moniker I apply 
to systems where humans-in-the-loop and emergent events lead to active decision-making 
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(e.g., air traffic control, healthcare, etc.). Hollnagel, Woods and Leveson (2006) 
demonstrate how they are clearly positioned in the “emergency management planning 
and response” domain where protection of human lives is paramount (see also Hollnagel 
et al., 2011). Note well that where decision-making humans are in-the-loop at a level that 
impacts the dynamics of the valued function delivery (e.g., landing an airplane), just about 
anything can be called adaptive, or transformative, or learning, because humans can 
change their mind and “direct” the system in a different way—usually toward a safer 
outcome that prolongs the “life” of the system (so you can see why “resilience” is 
somewhat cognate). There are, however, important caveats and distinctions that must be 
discussed. 
 Transient “structures” (like decisions) cannot be considered “resilient” because 
they are ethereal and passing. There is no expectation of durability or permanence for a 
spur-of-the-moment decision no matter how well-reasoned and hard won. This does not 
mean that we want such decisions to be wrong or poorly considered, but there is no 
intention that the decision last any longer than it takes to be recorded in a log book (or 
digital equivalent)—and note that the record of the decision is distinct from the decision. 
Note that while we might legitimately want to learn from the decision-making process in 
order to improve our future success, this contributes more to the robustness of the system 
and may not contribute to its resilience. In fact, such “learning” contributes to the model 
that exists within the anticipatory system (see above), making the system with humans in-
the-loop potentially better able to anticipate a future event and plan accordingly. 
 Recall that resilience characterization requires that function be delivered over a 
time frame long enough to actually value it. So, for example, do we value and 
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characterize resilience for an airplane? Yes. Do we characterize resilience for its 
particular flight path? No, because a flight path is just an option, a choice, a transient that 
is based on many other factors that will never be repeated. Can we value and characterize 
resilience for the air traffic controllers and their organizations and equipment? Yes. Can 
we characterize resilience for the specific directions they give that are contingent on 
weather and wind and other aircraft? No. We can characterize resilience for the ATC 
system (including the operators) at a given time, but we cannot (and it makes no sense to) 
characterize resilience for the thousands of transient events that exist “in” the system at 
that specific time. Recall that the goal is a resilient decision-making system, not resilient 
decisions. This should be obvious because decisions are transient and they are not 
systems. 
 Perhaps an easy way to distinguish these is to ask “where is that flight path now?” 
Or, “where are the decisions that determined those choices now?” If the answer is that 
they are “history,” that is, at best recorded in a log along with all the rationale that 
contributed to them, then they are not in the class of items for which we can characterize 
resilience. Sure, we can characterize the resilience of the system that does the “logging” 
but that is an entirely different thing. We can certainly ensure the log is “persistent,” and 
we might do this because we want to learn from it so we can make good, repeatable 
decisions in given contexts. Repeatability, however, is not permanence. 
 As humans we find it difficult to distinguish our “agency” from our “system-
ness”. For example, humans are resilient, but it is not because they can change their 
mind. Humans are resilient because they are chock-full of redundant structures (some of 
which even comprise this idea of “mind”). Humans are resilient not because they can 
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make their human subsystems do specific things like mind-changes, but because of the 
way their systems are deployed. Consider that “changing one’s mind” is a valued function 
performed by the human system. Now that it is clear it is something the “human system” 
does, quantum resilience forces you to model the actual system that delivers that 
function. Once proper consensus has been achieved, the system can have its resilience 
characterized. 
 Woods provides a definition of resilience that demonstrates how the “safety 
industry” works and thinks: 
Resilience/brittleness is a parameter of a system that captures how well 
that system can adapt to handle events that challenge the boundary 
conditions for that system’s operation…. The capacity to respond to 
challenge events resides in the expertise, strategies, tools, and plans that 
people in various roles can deploy to prepare for and respond to specific 
classes of challenge (Woods, 2009, p. 499-500). 
 
 First, it is fair to ask why “brittleness” is inserted. Presumably, this defines a 
logical opposite for resilience and establishes a spectrum for its values. It has already 
been noted, however, that such opposites can only be notional (and should probably be 
avoided). Second, resilience is defined as a “parameter” of a system, very casually 
employing a word that has a clear meaning in the systems engineering world. Again, 
calling resilience a parameter almost makes it sound as though it is a setting that can be 
adjusted, or at least something that can be measured. Of course, Wood offers no 
measures. Third, adaptation is assumed, and is later redefined as “capacity to respond” 
(note the positioning of the repeated phrase “events that challenge” and “challenge 
events”) which conflates resilience with both robustness and simple if-then response 
protocols. Fourth, it is unclear what “boundary conditions” actually means in this context. 
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Does it mean the analysis boundary? Does it mean that a system should be able to 
perform in an environment other than that for which it was designed? Does it mean that 
its performance criteria (e.g., operating tolerances) or service level agreement must be 
expanded? Fifth, it is made obvious that humans must be in the loop since a “capacity to 
respond” specifically implicates things that “people in various roles” do. Sixth, if it 
“resides” in human activities and expertise, “resilience” has clearly become attributable 
only to systems with humans in the loop—a very narrow definition of resilience. Finally, 
it is clear that “specific classes of challenge” position this idea in the robustness space 
and that the “parameter” Woods refers to is the humans in the loop. 
 Obviously, those contributing in the domain I refer to as the “safety industry” are 
doing fine work in improving the systems in that discipline, but it is only marginally 
related to resilience and would benefit from consideration of anticipatory systems theory 
(Rosen, 1985). 
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QUANTUM RESILIENCE 
 
 Since I argue strenuously that “resilience is resilience” and call attention to 
authors who append terms to the front of the word, it may seem odd that I would do the 
same. If resilience is not general, specified, ecological or engineering, why is it 
“quantum”? First, note that quantum resilience is a title and not a “kind” of resilience. 
Second, it demonstrates what I believe to be a more fundamental idea of resilience 
around which most of the research hovers while not specifically discovering it. Instead of 
the ongoing expansion of the idea, it suggests contraction to a more focused idea is 
required. It makes resilience something that can be understood, managed, and 
characterized instead of simply talked about. Quantum is a useful word to employ in 
expressing that fundamental idea. Third, the idea of a “quantum” suggests there is a level 
at which we can productively design and operationalize resilience. If left diffuse and 
expansively defined, there is little hope the idea can actually be put into specific use. 
Fourth, this forces engineers, analysts, and managers to be less casual about the concept. 
Quantum resilience forces quantification of the concept and demands rigor in its 
characterization. Once observed at the levels we can actually impact it, resilience is easily 
seen as a quantum concept. Resilience increases or decreases by the quanta of valued 
function delivered by participating systems. 
 First and foremost, quantum resilience forces analysis of the system. Engineers 
and managers must not assume the system is understood. Instead they must focus on the 
valued functions it delivers and allow those functions to scope and scale the system. 
Second, focus on known or projected disturbances is ultimately distracting and must be 
avoided (see the section on robustness). Instead, focus must be on the parts of the system 
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that contribute to the valued function and their interfaces and dependencies. Third, 
engineers and managers must avoid creating proxies for resilience. It is frequently 
observed that poorly scoped systems have led to discussions where resilience is simply 
another word for what is perceived to be pristine Nature, or measures of something 
specific in the environment (e.g., Phosphorous). Instead, focus must be placed on 
quantifying the productivity of the system vis-à-vis the valued functions identified. 
Identifying valued functions reminds us why we care about the system in the first place. 
Finally, analogies and oversimplifications of the system must be avoided. If it is a real 
system, there is no need to analogize. Instead, the system must be faithfully documented 
through analysis in order to codify its structural and relational complexity. Only then can 
its resilience be characterized. 
 The following sections provide some philosophical underpinnings for quantum 
resilience. Throughout, the rationale for my operationalized definition is revealed and 
then the characterization formulation is discussed. The practical nature of the approach 
should be evident throughout (and has already been presaged in the précis). 
 
Valued Function – Systems “For All They’re Worth” 
 
 While quantum resilience emphasizes system function, it is important that valued 
function has been chosen as a defining phrase (note well, however, it is not “value 
function” or “values function”). Valued function is used because it directly calls attention 
to the observer-based position of all science, and reminds each analyst of their position 
within the system (Ahl & Allen, 1996, p. 71, 196; Allenby, 2012, p. 361). Varela makes 
this quite clear: 
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…the presence of the observer (of the observer-community, the tradition) 
becomes more and more tangible to the extent that we have to build upon 
a style of thinking where the description reveals the properties of the 
observer rather than obscuring them (Varela, 1979, p. xvi). 
 
 Though there is likely to be significant overlap, different observers may value 
different functions and quantum resilience forces these to be specifically identified and 
included in the analysis. Once identified, even conflicting valued functions can be 
employed in characterizing the resilience of a system. Focusing on valued functions and 
appropriate quanta is a vital first step to operationalizing resilience. 
 Scholars have suggested resilience is a scientifically defined and measurable 
quantity: “the size of the basin of attraction” (Holling, 1973, p. 20; Carpenter et al., 2001) 
or the “distance to a threshold” (Walker & Salt, 2006, p. 63) but the terminology remains 
metaphorical and has yet to be demonstrated with empirical measures. In fact, Carpenter 
et al. (2001) confess to the difficulty of empirically measuring resilience and remind us of 
the different approaches and variety of system-specific outcomes. Resilience, then, is a 
notion we find desirable, but not something we can specifically measure. Interestingly, 
Rapoport points out that “terms derived from introspection often defy operationalization” 
(Rapoport, 1986, pp. 31-32) while Gould reminds us that “metaphors can be liberating 
and enlightening, but new scientific theories must supply new statements about causality” 
(Gould, 1991, p. 339). Unfortunately, resilience research remains fairly solidly locked in 
introspection, metaphor and analogy. Resilience has defied operationalization because we 
have not properly characterized it by first recognizing and quantifying the functions we 
value. Quantum resilience resolves that by specifically requiring valued functions to be 
quantified. 
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 There are certainly hints in the literature that suggest “values” should be 
appreciated. For example, Gunderson speaks of “social benefits” and “desirable stability 
domain” (Gunderson, 2000, p. 432). This language is clearly value-laden. The Resilience 
Alliance (2010) speaks of “issues,” and issues only arise when expectations based on 
values are not being achieved. While their efforts fall short of acknowledging valued 
functions, codification of issues can be a good first step toward identifying the underlying 
values and outlining what services are important in resolving the issues. Once these 
services and functions are more clearly defined, they can be quantified. 
 Observer-dependent valuation can be illustrated by the way Carpenter et al. 
(2001) speak of a lake’s “turbid” state as having “low utility” (p. 770). Their point is that 
humans value clear lakes for recreational use and real estate assessment. Turbid lakes are 
generally thought “ugly” or less appealing. This is a clear superimposition of human 
values. Later they specifically talk about “socially preferred ecosystem state” and suggest 
“indicators of resilience that are appropriate for the current regime may become useless 
as ecological structures and social expectations shift” (p. 779, emphasis added). For this 
reason, they define “net social benefit” as a goal that establishes what they value. What is 
required next is that they quantify this “net social benefit”. 
 Interestingly, when Carpenter et al. (2001) speak of a lake’s “turbid” state as 
having “low utility” they continue by suggesting “low utility but high resilience” (p. 770, 
emphasis added). This comment requires some unpacking. How can such language be 
justified within a quantum resilience framework which suggests resilience starts with 
definition of the function or service we value? That is, when would we ever value the 
“low utility” of a turbid lake system? To answer this we must first, and perhaps 
80 
superficially, ask: “low utility” according to what or whom? Recall, since values are 
observer dependent, for all we know, there is some person or species which values 
turbidity and prefers the cloudy water. The overall thrust of their discussion, however, is 
to specifically identify a turbid lake as qualitatively bad. Referring to a turbid lake system 
as “resilient” reflects their (problematic) definition and is simply a way these authors 
acknowledge the difficulty that Nature and/or humans would have in recovering a clear 
system from it. The real implication of their statement is that apparently the system can 
become stuck in the turbid state. They conflate this stuck-ness with resilience because it 
seems like a permanent and enduring state. Note that this can only be superficially 
referred to as resilient—and only if dynamical “stability” is conflated with resilience (see 
discussion of robustness above). If the “design goal” of that lake system was to be turbid 
(which they would vehemently deny) then it could be suggested that the lake was robust 
in its ability to maintain that state (for a while), but this is not resilience unless the valued 
function of the lake was turbidity. 
 Even if, in a backhanded sort of way, a turbid lake system is valued because of the 
way it anchors the opposite end of the spectrum from “clear” in someone’s notional 
conceptualization, it is the “clear” system toward which all management activity is 
focused. Not only does this clarify the human values, but it clarifies how we stand in 
proxy for Nature with those values—and this is important to the goal of operationalizing 
resilience. The functions we (and, presumably, Nature) value from a lake system can be 
delivered when the lake is clear, not when it is turbid. We would (most likely) never 
purposefully manage a lake system into turbidity because we simply do not value that 
condition—but we absolutely could do it (if we valued it). So, while herein I will not 
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refer to systems in undesirable states as being resilient, it must be understood that such 
terminology is casual and accommodating and is not in conflict with the principles of 
quantum resilience. For example, similar comments were made about a “resilient” 
dictatorship as being “undesirable” (p. 766). But again, this ignores the fact that all such 
value assignments are observer dependent and that, at the very least, the dictator desires 
and values his dictatorship. 
 Using the same dictator example which, despite near-universal repudiation, very 
definitely remains in the realm of observer dependent valuation, Anderies et al. (2013, p. 
11) suggest resilience is “not normative” and makes no “specific choices” about what is 
right. Technically this is correct. That is, if we can truly “measure” resilience, it can 
become one among many empirical measurements used in decision-making processes. 
But it must be acknowledged that the intent of most of the resilience literature is focused 
on enabling management toward what humans have determined is a better state. This is 
highly normative. So, while Anderies et al. might never make the choice to manage 
toward a more enduring dictatorship, they certainly understand that others might make 
that choice, and that dictatorships can therefore be resilient. 
 Quantum resilience holds that resilience is not about a system until it is first about 
a valued function. This may seem a clever feint, or it might be suggested that a focus on 
“function” instead of “system” belies a sort of “wave-particle duality” for resilience, but 
this is not the case. In fact, to a great extent it is complex systems which garner our 
interest, and these are generally beyond our ken to completely understand and fully 
characterize (cf. Flood, 1988). Conversely, functions we care about and value are 
generally well understood. While most talk about “resilient systems,” (see, for example, 
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Walker & Salt, 2006, p. 11) it is usually a very soft idea of the particular system of 
interest; unbounded, ill-defined, and amorphous (this, despite pretense that such 
ambiguities must be resolved). But it is important that while we acknowledge complexity, 
we do not hide behind it. In the absence of specifically identified valued functions, it is 
too easy to develop a romanticized idea of the system of interest that results in unhelpful 
generalizations. In many cases, this leads to a failure to see that the functions we value 
are delivered by systems other than we are envisioning. Starting with identification of 
valued functions is not just another way to approach resilience analysis; it is the only way 
to appropriately address system scale and identity on the way to characterizing resilience. 
 It can help to consider “valued function” as a way to elucidate Aristotle’s “final 
cause” for a system. For example, it is perfectly valid to value “wind resistance” for an 
office building or “immune response” in a human, but it is not valid to suggest these are 
the reason buildings and humans exist. That is, they are not “final” causes. We do not, for 
example, build office buildings in order to resist wind and humans do not exist in order to 
have immune responses. Both of these are examples of protections against the 
environment in which the systems operate. Instead, for example, buildings exist to 
provide climate-controlled workplaces for humans. Thus, the idea of final cause can help 
in distinguishing and defining valued function. This can also assist in determining scale. 
That is, it is valid to “decompose” the human system into a variety of subsystems that 
include an immune system. So while at the human scale it would be incorrect to model 
immune response as a valued function, in the case of an immune system, immune 
response might indeed qualify as a valued function. Similarly, if there was a “wind 
resistance system” for a building, its valued functions would necessarily be different than 
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those of the building itself. Note that while it is possible to model any function at any 
level, it is vital that consensus be established among analysts to ensure rational results. 
 Note as well that the “system” of interest must provide the function over a time 
scale in which it can be usefully valued (whether by humans or by those for whom we 
stand in proxy). For example, a chair that transforms into a table and back into a chair 
over a one minute period is an interesting novelty, but it cannot provide a function that 
could be valued in any sense that relates to the way we think of a chair or a table. In fact, 
in this case, such system behavior would be considered only a novelty (or perhaps “flaky” 
or “broken”). If for some reason the valued function was specifically “to provide 
novelty,” then the analysis of resilience can proceed on that basis and quanta can be 
identified for that valued function. If, however, the valued function was to “reliably 
provide seating for one” (or some such), then the described chimeric system would be 
inadequate and its resilience characterized accordingly (e.g., as “zero” or a similarly low 
number). 
 With this in mind, Holling’s proposed adaptive cycle (cf. Gunderson & Holling, 
2002, p. 25ff.) might be viewed as an important analogy and model for some biotic 
systems, but the concepts of collapse and reconfiguration for a system (phases Ω to α to 
r) must be applied with care to socio-ecological systems. Recall that, according to 
Holling, resilience waxes and wanes during the cycle—it is not that going through the 
cycle demonstrates resilience. Especially for systems on which humans rely, functions 
provided in the productive and conservative K phase are those which are most likely to be 
valued. Hence, humans would appear to demand “high resilience” for such systems while 
they operate in the K phase where Holling suggests resilience is waning. For this reason 
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(and contra Walker & Salt, 2006) assumption of the inevitability of the cycle must be 
carefully considered, and application of the adaptive cycle as an explanatory tool must be 
moderated. The section above provides more complete coverage of this topic. 
 Part of the problem addressed by quantum resilience is that resilience is defined 
with words like “absorb disturbance and maintain function” (Walker & Salt, 2006, cover) 
but then immediately the focus is diverted by considerations of adaptive cycles and other 
metaphors. Specific functions are largely forgotten or given only passing attention. This 
has resulted in an inability to characterize and operationalize resilience as researchers 
become distracted with important but ultimately unresolved discussions about complex 
systems, adaptive behaviors, and basins of attraction. Once resilience has been conflated 
and confused with ideas like adaptation and transformation, the very reasons for caring 
about system resilience are forgotten. Adaptation, evolution, and learning, are powerful 
concepts worthy of exploration, but these concepts must remain distinct from resilience. 
The section above provides more complete coverage of this topic. 
 The literature has metaphorically described resilience as a domain or basin 
surrounding an attractor (Holling, 1973). For this analogy to be successfully employed, 
the size of the basin must somehow become a measurement of resilience for that system. 
If this is the case, then it is important that there be a way to characterize the basin. 
Unfortunately, most literature neglects this requirement. Quantum resilience fills this gap 
by reminding us that the functions the system provides while it operates “within” that 
desired basin are what are important in characterizing that system’s resilience. Obviously, 
any and all “basins of attraction” into which a system can “flip” can be characterized by 
their respective valued functions. That basins with lower social utility can also be 
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characterized simply reinforces the point that quantum resilience properly addresses 
complex systems by first identifying the valued functions they provide. Obviously, the 
“basin” metaphor must also be reified by the specific system structure out of which the 
valued functions are provided. This is discussed in the section on system identity. 
 It might be wondered if parts of a system that actively detract from valued 
function delivery should also be considered and included in the resilience 
characterization formulation. In short, the answer is no. Recall first that detractors from 
valued function are specifically not valued. Second, remember that if the detractors are a 
bona fide part of the system, they must be considered in the analysis and the valued 
function output will be attenuated by whatever extent the detractors are successful. Third, 
again remembering that the detractors must be considered part of the system, it becomes 
clear that they contribute to the complexity calculation in the denominator. Fourth, if 
“detractors” are determined to be outside the system, the system probably contains 
robustness features that protect against such detraction. These robustness features may or 
may not contribute to valued function, but they will certainly be included in the system 
complexity calculation (if they are found to be within the system). So, “detractors” are 
already taken into consideration in a thorough system analysis. 
 A specific example of “detractors” might be hard to find, but consider the 
possibility that fiery debate or filibuster might be thought to “detract” from a productive 
legislative progress. In this instance, valued function might be progress as measured in 
bills passed per year (or whatever) and disagreement will clearly impact that throughput. 
Recall, however, that debate is an integral part of the parliamentary procedure and is built 
into the system to allow for all perspectives to be represented. An accurate model of the 
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system will include this relational complexity and its (negative) contribution will be 
expressed in the denominator of the resilience characterization. 
 
Scale – Systems “To a Certain Extent” 
 
 Since the quantum of resilience is a unitized output of a valued function and not a 
system, it leads to a very clear definition of how resilience can be operationalized. 
Further, it necessarily identifies the actual extent of the system that is required to deliver 
the valued function. Though a system provides the function, the system cannot be the 
starting point for the analysis because that would a priori bound the system. Instead, 
quantum resilience recognizes that resilience is not about a system until it is first about a 
valued function. Discovering the system that provides the valued function is part of the 
analysis effort. 
 Many scholars address the need to properly scope a system for analysis. The 
system boundary selection process is often driven by the particular question you are 
asking and the assumptions you are making (Allenby, 2012, p. 183). Holling (1995, p. 8) 
outlines the potential for failure by reminding us that as managers of SESs we sometimes 
pretend to be outside the system, and hence forget that we are changing along with the 
system as we manage it. This implies that frequently we must consider the system at a 
larger scale that includes its managers. Allenby makes this a specific principle of Earth 
Systems Engineering and Management (ESEM) by insisting that we remember we are 
“part of the system” (Allenby, 2005, p. 187). Quantum resilience takes this into 
consideration by specifically acknowledging that delivery of valued functions is what 
ultimately defines boundaries for a particular system. Quantum resilience does not require 
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(or suggest) that any system be a priori bounded or understandable. In fact, it makes a 
step toward acknowledging complexity by focusing first on the valued function and only 
then on the system that delivers it. Identifying the valued function frequently leads to a 
discovery of system scale that is unexpected or even surprising. 
 In forcing the issue of system scale, quantum resilience analysis does not over-
focus on thinking physically. Thinking functionally permits appropriate scoping of 
system size. If a particular system, subsystem, component, etc. is implicated in delivery 
of the valued function, it must necessarily be included in system scope—whether or not it 
initially came to mind. For example, it is tempting to think we want a power generation 
plant to be resilient when the actual function we care about is provision of electrical 
power to the grid. This forces specific notice of the boundary at the grid and results in a 
quantum of resilience that is perhaps some incremental delivery of electricity. If the 
valued function is properly specified, quantum resilience demonstrates that instead of 
designing robust and resilient power plants, the incremental provision of electricity 
comes from a turbine and generator combination and suggests a different place to focus 
effort at “design for resilience”. Depending on the ultimate scale under consideration, this 
might imply that there is little point in suggesting a power plant be resilient. Obviously, if 
the goal is a resilient grid, the valued functions might include “available energy to homes 
and businesses”. This leads to a different system scale and a different analysis. 
 Note that the same approach applies even if someone insists that the system really 
is a specific power plant. We still must, however, be honest about the valued function that 
is important to us. Since no plant exists for its own purposes it would be disingenuous to 
suggest “electricity output” is the valued function for a standalone, unconnected power 
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plant. Eventually someone might suggest we value the employment offered by a specific 
plant. Now that a valued function has been honestly specified, we are free to notice that a 
power plant is just one more redundant means to provide jobs for people. That is, the 
“employment system” is more extensive than the power plant alone (likewise for the auto 
industry, or computer manufacturing, etc.). Addressing the valued function is what 
ensures proper system scale is analyzed. Obviously, we can value both electrical output 
and jobs and quanta can be specified for each of these during a more complete analysis. 
 Most agree that complex systems emerge from both purposeful and accidental 
networking of other systems, both complex and simple. If this is the case, then it is a 
mistake to think we can characterize the resilience of a whole complex system. As the 
discussion of urban resilience revealed, however, nothing is lost because it would not 
likely be useful in any sense. In fact, completely defining and characterizing the complex 
system would seem to remove the system’s complex standing. Instead, focus must be 
placed on the system as it is revealed through the analysis (that is, the scale determined 
by valued function identification) as opposed to the system as it was envisioned or 
romanticized. By thinking first of valued function (certainly, all of them), the system 
scale can be formally defined. Once the scale at which important operations occur has 
been defined, it is less important that the identified system exists within a system of 
greater complexity. Solid systems engineering practice allows focus to be placed on the 
parts that impact delivery of valued function. Resilience must be pragmatic enough to not 
allow us to hide behind complexity. 
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Identity – Systems “As They Really Are” 
 
 Holling’s seminal discussion of resilience suffices to clarify the need to speak of 
system identity: 
Resilience determines the persistence of relationships within a system and 
is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state 
variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still persist (Holling, 
1973, p. 17, emphasis added). 
 
 Though Holling did not take the necessary step and include valued functions in 
his definition, he makes it abundantly clear that the persistence of a system and its 
relationships is vital if systems are to be considered resilient. Failure to acknowledge the 
requirement for continuity in system identity is where much discussion of resilience 
enters non-productive territory. When a system is allowed to become anything and be 
termed resilient, it neglects the important requirement of persistence. 
 Rapoport discusses system identity from two angles: preservation and recognition 
(Rapoport, 1986, p. 79). The implication, to which I will return later, is that system-ness 
is captured in both internal structures and external interfaces. Even when considering 
systems as black boxes (i.e., where external interfaces alone are important), there must be 
something inside the box that is creating a recognizable output. Though preservation of 
identity is vital as Rapoport suggests, this need not imply that all systems must be active 
homeostats or living. In fact, at the timeframes for which the functions of a system are 
valued, the black box may be considered static or unchanging. Certainly for resilience 
considerations, the idea of preservation need not be active. For example, bridges and 
buildings can be resilient without active homeostasis, but their identity is clearly 
preserved over the periods they deliver their valued function. 
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 This is important in discussions of resilience because (if it is thought of at all) 
analysts might think preservation refers to how a system reacts to protect itself in the face 
of perturbation. Recall from above, however, that system functions that permit the system 
to operate in its intended environment are part of a robustness analysis. Certainly such 
protectionist features serve to preserve system identity and are also part of its identity 
since they are part of the system. Further, it could be thought that identity preservation 
involves how a system adapts over time, but care must be taken in employing the word 
“adaptation” since that might mean a new system has emerged. This is vital in discussing 
resilience because there is a cavalier inclusion of the word “identity” in popularized 
“adaptationist” definitions of resilience where adaptation clearly means different systems 
(cf. Folke et al., 2010; Walker & Salt, 2006, p. 113). The inclusion of the word identity 
seems to serve only as a preemptive defense against those who find system identity 
important. The inclusion is, however, disingenuous given the phrases employed, i.e., 
“capacity to change in order to maintain the same identity” (Folke et al., 2010, Table 1). 
If restraints are placed on what change is allowed, this definition might work, but it is 
forced and unnecessary. Inserting a non-specific “capacity to change” in a definition 
requires further definitional work which is never done. There is, however, no reason to 
include “capacity to change” in a definition of resilience. As discussed above, significant 
care must be used in applying the idea of adaptation to resilience. 
 Cumming et al. (2005) highlight system identity in their definition of resilience. 
They suggest resilience is “the ability of the system to maintain its identity in the face of 
internal change and external shocks and disturbances” (p. 976). Despite a squirrelly 
allowance for some undefined degree of “internal change,” this is a step in the right 
91 
direction because identity is vital to resilience. Later, they even suggest that if a system 
has “no scope for the maintenance of system identity, the system clearly lacks resilience” 
(p. 982). However, the definition falls short because they fail to highlight that a large part 
of maintaining identity is remaining recognizable to other systems. Fortunately, this may 
simply be an oversight because Cumming et al.’s characterization of identity involves 
what they refer to as “four essential system attributes (structural components, functional 
relationships, innovation, and continuity)” (p. 980, emphasis added). Again, it is difficult 
to understand why they list “innovation” among the essential system attributes. The 
requirement that all systems be innovative is unrealistic and unnecessarily limiting for a 
definition of system. Still, acknowledging “functional relationships” as a part of identity 
is a vital step toward understanding that resilient systems must continue to provide their 
valued functions. 
 How then is identity best defined? Varela (1979) suggests identity consists of 
structure and organization. To him, system structure is a current configuration of system 
parts and the connections that represent relationships between those parts. Organization 
consists of the rules that define and maintain the parts and their relationships. This is 
roughly equivalent to Rapoport’s ideas of recognition (structure) and preservation 
(organization), though there is no specific need to press that equivalence. Varela’s 
conceptualization of identity clearly maps to phenotype and genotype as might be 
expected of a biologist. In a nearly identical approach, Simon (1962) suggests that “state 
descriptions” and “process descriptions” constitute system identity. State descriptions 
describe what is, and process descriptions describe how to create and maintain it. Ahl and 
Allen (1996) poetically refer to the identity of the system as “context” (i.e., configuration, 
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p. 101ff) and stress the need to identify system “surfaces” (i.e., interfaces, p. 139ff). 
While Ahl and Allen may deemphasize how a system arrives at its configuration, 
importantly they highlight the external “shape” of a system as critical to its identity. 
 Quantum resilience adopts Varela’s notion of identity (though emphasizing 
“structure” over “organization”) but clarifies and extends it by including the idea of 
function as a way to acknowledge Rapoport’s recognition idea. That is, identity is not 
simply what the system is, but includes what it does. Importantly, quantum resilience 
always stresses that identity is as much about structure as it is about function, since it is in 
the delivery of functions and services that a system remains recognizable to other 
systems. Vitally, this makes resilience phenotypic and not genotypic. This important 
contrast will be elucidated later because it serves to further distinguish resilience from 
adaptation and fitness which clearly involve ideas related to system genotype (see also 
discussion above). 
 Importantly, the identity principle also reinforces redundancy concepts (see next 
section). In a system of many parts, there may indeed be different parts that provide the 
same valued function. These parts need not be structured similarly or even operate the 
same way (see discussion of redundancy below). For example, in mammalian cells, 
adenosine triphosphate (ATP) is the primary energy currency used as fuel for biotic 
processes (and, incidentally, this molecule is an exemplary “quantum of resilience”). 
Oxidative phosphorylation, glycolysis, and the Krebs (or, citric acid) cycle provide most 
of the ATP production in the cell (Champe & Harvey, 1994; Campbell & Farrell, 2003). 
These structures and processes are wildly different, interdependent, and show tremendous 
diversity, but for the valued function of extracting energy from sugars and turning it into 
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usable fuel, they are ultimately redundant. Further, in delivering the function, they 
provide a unified interface in the form of ATP molecules. 
 Quantum resilience supports the idea that system structure and function can be 
changed, but stresses the requirement that the new system have its resilience re-
characterized. This is because the altered system is a new phenotype. This allows a 
manager or engineer to identify targets of opportunity for system maintenance, 
augmentation, or abandonment and experiment with alternative deployments. Note that a 
proposed alternative deployment might be configured to provide incrementally more 
delivery of the valued function. Superficially it is tempting to conclude that such a change 
confers higher resilience, but this conclusion would be premature. Since identity also 
involves structure, the altered system’s resilience must be re-characterized, because the 
change may have introduced significantly different structure (higher complexity) that 
results in decreased resilience. In either case, however, system identity must be 
maintained. Bridges that morph into coffee makers and salt marshes that morph into coral 
reefs cannot be termed resilient, notwithstanding the importance and utility of the 
outcomes. If a system’s identity has changed dramatically, the resilience of the “before 
configuration” and the “after configuration” may not even be comparable. 
 Carpenter et al. (2001) suggest “resistance” is important in assessing long-term 
system persistence. Resistance, they suggest, is both a “complementary aspect of 
persistence” and “the complementary attribute of resilience” (p. 766). Though the 
conflation of terms makes it difficult to understand their goal, it is certainly reasonable to 
assume these could be viewed as contributing to identity maintenance. As described 
above, this is just another term for robustness. Learning how a system defends itself 
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against its environment is an important pursuit, but it should be remembered that such 
defenses contribute to the system structure and only in that way do they impact resilience 
characterization (in the denominator). If there are functions performed by the system that 
render it “resistant” to certain perturbations (like an immune system), then it might be 
thought that these functions can be valued and serve to augment the resilience of the 
system. This is certainly possible, but in most cases defensive features should be 
acknowledged as elements of good design that allow the system to do what it was 
designed to do in its intended environment. For the most part they should not be 
considered as separately valued functions. 
 The identity of the system, its organization and structure is vital. This is the key 
contributor to the complexity of the system. Demonstrating or witnessing resilience is a 
simple matter of observing function delivery, but characterizing resilience (so systems 
can be compared) requires some insight into the structure. This will be made clear in the 
characterization formulation discussed below. 
 
Redundancy – Systems “Pure and Degenerate” 
 
 Quantum resilience specifically employs the term “redundancy” instead of 
“diversity” since diversity does not necessarily always imply duplicated function. 
Because function is paramount, this selection of terminology is vital. Redundancy is 
sometimes disparaged as simplistic, wasteful, or reductionist, but it is actually a rich 
concept. Quantum resilience recognizes several deployment options for redundancy that 
are sometimes confused and misunderstood. The first is pure redundancy where both 
structure and function are replicated. This kind of redundancy—sometimes mislabeled 
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“engineering redundancy”—is the easiest to track when characterizing resilience. It is 
certainly an approach employed by engineers, but is actually something learned from 
nature (e.g., humans have two carotid arteries). The second is degeneracy where structure 
may differ but function is duplicated (Tononi, Sporns & Edelman, 1999; Edelman & 
Gally, 2001). This kind of redundancy is ubiquitous in nature and is also frequently seen 
in human-engineered systems from surveillance to telecommunications to healthcare. A 
third kind of redundancy has been termed imbricated redundancy but is simply an 
umbrella term for the preceding two options. It has been suggested that imbricated 
redundancy of function is provided at different system “scales” (Holling, Gunderson & 
Peterson, 2002, p. 84ff). This is certainly possible, but is not specifically required. 
 Since quantum resilience supports an array of redundancy options, diversity can 
be viewed as just another way of saying redundancy when the focus is on the outcome: 
the delivered function or service. If diversity is doing something a different way, then 
redundancy simply reminds us that it is not the “different way” that is really important. It 
is the “something” being done that is important. The vital requirement is that the valued 
function be delivered. It can certainly be provided in a diverse and variety-filled manner. 
For example, if the valued function is electricity to a residential outlet, then assuming all 
the proper mechanisms are in place, it can be provided from the grid, directly from solar 
panels on the roof, from a gasoline-powered generator, or even by someone pumping 
pedals on a bicycle. This is marvelous diversity, but the output is identical. 
 Peterson, Allen and Holling (2010[1998]) suggest that ecological resilience 
“derives from overlapping function within scales and reinforcement of function across 
scales” (p. 182). They further clarify that “when a functional group consists of species 
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that operate at different scales, that group provides cross-scale functional reinforcement 
that greatly increases the resilience of its function” (p. 185). And finally they summarize 
with “ecological resilience is generated by diverse, but overlapping function within a 
scale and by apparently redundant species that operate at different scales” (p. 189). Later, 
Gunderson and Holling (2002) refer to this concept as “imbricated redundancy” (Holling, 
Gunderson & Peterson, 2002, p. 84ff). They discuss the idea of imbricated redundancy 
with the analogy of a theater where actors are “waiting in the wings” ready to go on stage 
when “change is required.” Their theory is that extra actors (spares) can be used to 
“change the pace” or add variety to the plot. Though obviously Nature would not 
“orchestrate” such a change (it cannot detect that “change is required” and insert new 
actors to “change the pace”), it is clear that—if there was a plot—such extras might 
contribute unexpected twists. Still, their example is insufficient since the proposed spare 
parts “waiting in the wings” are actors, which means all redundancy is pure and occurs at 
the same system scale (e.g., the play or production). This illustration can be improved. 
 Consider instead a theater where an actor falls ill and is replaced by an 
understudy. This demonstrates how pure redundancy perfectly (and expensively) allows 
the show to go on (some may refer to this as “engineering resilience”). Now consider, 
given the diversity of jobs at a theater, that instead of the actor, a ticket salesperson, 
usher, or concessions attendant gets sick and fails to report for duty. These roles could 
also be filled by the understudy, though less perfectly (and likely with a great deal of 
whining). This is degeneracy since it emphasizes that while identical function is 
ultimately delivered (ushering or selling) the structure is different (i.e., it is an actor not 
an usher). Note as well that this is closer to imbricated redundancy since the function 
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replacement is occurring at a theater scale instead of the production scale. To push the 
example a bit farther, assume there is no understudy. Now, if an actor falls ill, the actor 
could be replaced by a ticket salesperson that has seen the play a few times. This is an 
interesting example of degeneracy and imbricated redundancy because it illustrates high 
variation role-filling given that the ticket salesperson has not rehearsed the role. Since 
this is not complete functional redundancy, this vignette could result in a tragedy 
evolving into a comedy (or vice-versa) or larger system impacts like production failure 
leading to bad reviews, refunds, unemployment, and other social implications. Obviously 
a ticket salesperson confers little resilience to the production, while the redundant actor 
leads to increased theater resilience at some cost. 
 Figure 2 illustrates this idea but with a very important addition: functions have 
been identified to demonstrate how this can be operationalized by quantum resilience. 
Following Holling, multiple scales are shown (S1-S4), though the number of scales in the 
figure is only illustrative and will be system-specific. Whether or not the scales shown 
become larger or smaller as the identifying numbers increase is also merely illustrative 
and (eco)system specific (that is, even “scales” can overlap and need not be construed as 
implying strict containment). At each scale, a certain number of species (subsystems) are 
found. Each performs certain functions and it can be seen that there is overlap in the 
functions provided by species (subsystems) within and across scales. As depicted here, 
each species (subsystem) at scale S1 performs fewer (eco)system functions than those at 
S2 and this trend is consistent in this figure, though it need not be in a real (eco)system 
where distribution of function and degree of overlap are unplanned (and, in fact, may be 
disputed by different experts). At the right, it is notionally shown that overall (eco)system 
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function is the sum of all the functions performed within the (eco)system. The choice of 
“sum,” though logical, is also a simplifying feature. In reality, quantifying overall 
function is likely more complicated, but importantly may not be necessary. 
 
 
Figure 2. System-of-Systems Providing Functional Redundancy Across Scales 
 
 While Holling et al. (2002) allow for “imbricated redundancy” in natural 
ecosystems, it must be recognized that such a concept applies to—and is evidenced in—
most socio-ecological systems and large-scale systems of human design. Of course, 
superimposing such functions on nature is a completely human activity which reflects 
human values and is usually derived ex post facto simply because “it is there” (as 
opposed to because “it is required” for achieving some “better” state). Humans will tend 
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fabrication. We know for example that nature does not care if a species providing some 
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progressing toward an even “better” future state and that, by preserving that function and 
its attendant species, humankind is risking a qualitatively diminished end game. 
 Despite the fact that human values determine the functions, it is clear from Figure 
2 that resilience is simply a matter of redundancy (pure and degenerate). Resilience is 
redundancy writ large—reflecting the portfolio approach adopted by nature as its 
mechanism of endurance. In fact, pure redundancy and degeneracy are exactly the kinds 
of redundancy that system engineers use to ensure robust systems in many domains from 
law enforcement to surveillance to telecommunications to health claims processing. If 
cost and schedule were not an issue, such resilience could easily be exhibited in many 
more human-engineered systems. Engineers, however, are taught to deliver verifiable 
function, reduce costs, and balance the benefit of redundancy with careful scoping of 
system requirements as they are held in delicate tension by cost/benefit trades. 
 Importantly, among the reasons natural ecosystems have settled on redundancy as 
an approach to resilience is because it was accidental and Nature had no intention (or 
driving reason) to be frugal. Among the reasons researchers have (until recently) 
denigrated redundancy is because humans are interested in being wise with resource use 
(usually driven by economic considerations) and redundancy just seems extravagant and 
wasteful. Even the concept of “diversified financial portfolio” demonstrates and 
reinforces that redundancy (in this case, through degeneracy) leads to resilience. If the 
valued function we seek from an investment strategy is income, growth, or preservation 
of capital in a capricious market, then a diversified portfolio is what provides this (it is, 
after all, a probability game). However, if our goal is growth and we have insider trading 
information that guarantees a significant return on investment, it is counter-productive to 
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diversify. In this case, it makes sense to focus our strategy on what we know will be a 
high payoff investment. In general, since neither we nor Nature has such insider trading 
information, we find degeneracy to be the winning ticket. 
 Gunderson (2000) is one of only a few scholars who will go on record with 
specific recommendations on how to improve resilience. Despite later offering some 
highly conflicting conclusions (cf. p. 435), he suggests “In order to add resilience to 
managed systems, at least three strategies are employed: increasing the buffering capacity 
of the system, managing for processes at multiple scales, and nurturing sources of 
renewal” (p.434). Each of these emphasizes redundancy. Buffering capacity is increased 
through redundant structures (p. 434), processes are duplicated at a variety of scales, and 
multiple sources of capital and skills (p. 436) are employed in nurturing renewal.
2
 
 As shown, the idea that redundancy is a primary mechanism for operationalizing 
resilience has not been missed in the literature, but to date, it has not generally been 
exploited by practitioners. Lately, there is a cautious change in the scholarship though it 
has still not reached a level that allows resilience to be operationalized. With a goal of 
elucidating specific principles for enhancing the resilience of ecosystem services, Biggs 
et al. (2012) have unsurprisingly suggested that redundancy must head the list. Setting 
redundancy as principle #1 is a nod toward finally understanding the power of 
redundancy. 
                                                     
2
 Gunderson’s conclusions are repeated in Gunderson, Pritchard, Holling, et al. (2002) with equally 
problematic surrounding discussion in which resilience is said to be “generated by destroying and renewing 
systems at smaller, faster scales” (p. 264). In this conclusion alone, language like “resilience is defined 
as...”, “resilience is reestablished by…”, “resilience is maintained by…”, “resilience is generated by…”, 
and “strategies… contribute to resilience” is employed with a significant amount of euphemism. While it is 
beyond the scope of this work to address this in full, it must be pointed out that such casual language—
even when presented in summary conclusions—is not helpful to the discourse. Much more precision is 
required if resilience is to be operationalized. 
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 Low et al. (2002) call for the development of a “grounded theoretical approach to 
the study of redundancy, for efficient and responsive management depends on matching 
optimal levels of redundancy to the appropriate conditions” (p. 108). Quantum resilience 
provides this grounded theoretical approach and through its focus on valued function and 
incremental delivery of quanta of resilience demonstrates that value of redundancy in 
designing for resilience. 
 
Defining Resilience 
 
 The quantum resilience approach stems from pragmatism. Resilience is only a 
useful idea if it can be characterized and operationalized. My focus is pragmatic because 
I am endeavoring to operationalize a concept so that management can occur. Ultimately, 
we care about resilience because we want systems that are useful and enduring. Hence, 
resilience is not an end in itself. Unfortunately it is treated as such in much of the 
literature. Resilience is frequently the goal. Resilience has become the Holy Grail du 
jour; elevated and idolized as if we forget there is a reason we pursue it. Instead, 
resilience must be viewed as an idea which, when properly operationalized, defines the 
character of systems that can deliver what we really want: functions we value. After 
reviewing some alternative definitions, this section defines what resilience is and 
operationalizes it for effective use across all disciplines. 
 Scholars argue resilience is a well-defined mathematical concept (Holling, 1973; 
Fiering & Holling, 1974), but there has been little progress in calculating resilience. 
Using the language of dynamical systems theory, Holling (1973) suggests it is like a 
domain or basin of attraction around an attractor. Carpenter et al. (2001) suggest 
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resilience is the size of that domain or basin of attraction. To date, however, little has 
been done to make inroads into the difficult effort of characterizing or quantifying the 
idea for specific systems. Hence, while resilience is acknowledged as a desirable notion, 
it has little operational value and the definitions remain broad and soft—perpetuating this 
dilemma. 
 Being able to compare such deployment options is vital since for decades Holling 
(1986, 1995, 2002, 2010) has been reminding us that when we try to “manage” 
ecosystems we tend to make them more fragile and less resilient: 
Because of the initial success in reducing the variability of the target 
variable, features of the biophysical environment which were implicitly 
viewed as constants began to change to produce a system that was 
structurally different and more fragile…. The biophysical environment 
became more fragile and more dependent on vigilance and error-free 
management.... the ecosystems simplified into less resilient ones as a 
consequent of man’s success in reducing variability (Holling, 2010[1986], 
p. 102). 
 
More recently Holling refers to it as a “puzzle” of success and reminds us: 
 
Any attempt to manage ecological variables (e.g. fish, trees, water, cattle) 
inexorably led to less resilient ecosystems, more rigid management 
institutions, and more dependent societies (Holling, 1995, p.6). 
 
 Even if such assessments are notional and supported by scant empirical data, it is 
not my intent to argue the conclusions. Instead, I want to suggest that these failures might 
have led us to more fruitful ways of looking at resilience. Unfortunately, a huge literature 
has evolved that defines resilience with analogies and examples that have led to its 
dilution and conflation with adaptation, transformation, reliability, robustness, etc. (see 
extended discussion above). At best, we know we want resilience, but seem only barely 
to “know it when we see it.” At worst, operationalizing resilience leads to 
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recommendations to decrease human involvement because by reducing human impacts 
we can “increase” or “restore” resilience. “All natural” seems to be the recipe for “highly 
resilient” systems. In many cases “resilience thinking” has become the face of a new 
conservationism. Despite many good intentions, there are no definitive marching orders 
on operationalizing resilience. Quantum resilience is intended to provide some clarity in 
this expansive discourse and to operationalize resilience for use in system study. 
 Sometimes resilience is simply used as a euphemism for “environmental quality” 
where such quality was assumed to be maximized in pristine Nature that is untouched by 
humans. As such it stands as a new science behind conservationism and the normative 
values espoused therein. For example, by suggesting that “resilience has declined since 
colonization,” Walker et al. (2009, p. 17) assume that prior to colonization, the Goulburn-
Broken catchment in Victoria Australia had “higher” resilience. This, however, is 
impossible to assert since the catchment today is an entirely different system than it was 
in pre-colonial times. This tendency to assume untouched nature is the exemplar of high 
resilience is evident throughout the literature (see also, Walker & Salt, 2006) and it is 
usually stated as a matter of acknowledged fact with no supporting quantification. In light 
of the fact that scholars have not produced a characterization of resilience that can be 
used to compare across (or even within) systems, this can only be recognized as an 
assumption that what Nature had done was somehow “best” and that if we want high 
resilience we must restore it. Quantum resilience provides a mechanism whereby such 
assumptions can be avoided and real comparisons can be made. 
 Especially in the ecological literature, resilience sometimes becomes a proxy for 
“fitness” of a system. So, a push for resilience in socio-ecological systems becomes a 
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push for optimum fitness of these systems. We want certain systems in perpetuity, so they 
must be resilient in order to survive through “thick and thin” (or however it is 
euphemized). This seems like a simple observation but usually the ramifications are not 
considered. Resilience may contribute to fitness, but fitness can only be observed after 
the fact, for a given system (phenotype), on a given landscape. Fitness is an after the fact 
measure of adaptation (or, adapted-ness). The trouble with this casual equation of fitness 
and resilience is that we have limited knowledge of how the landscape might change in 
the future and cannot wait that long to determine if our important systems are actually 
resilient. Resilience, however, must actually mean something here and now. By forcing 
focus on delivery of valued function, quantum resilience ensures this. Perhaps the best 
way to navigate the issue of resilience conflation with the idea of fitness is to think of 
resilience as phenotypic “fitness” while “real fitness” is genotypic. When it comes to 
valued functions and resilience, it is a phenotype (a particular system) that is implicated. 
As described at length above, adaptation and fitness are best left as research areas distinct 
from resilience. 
 Recall as well that a system’s resilience must be able to be characterized in the 
absence of perturbations and disturbances. Most authors do this tacitly by suggesting that 
resilience is degraded after a disturbance of some sort (e.g., a reef’s resilience is 
degraded by years of pollution, or a catchment’s resilience is degraded by years of 
industrial agriculture, etc.). This casual language implies that resilience stood at some 
higher value prior to the disturbance. Obviously this implies that resilience can be 
characterized without reference to specific perturbations so it is very odd that most 
definitions of resilience have perturbations or disturbances in them. Thinking specifically 
105 
of resilience “to what” as suggested by Carpenter et al. (2001) is not a mechanism by 
which we can extend resilience theory—it is not a way forward. 
 Fiksel (2003) defines resilience as the capacity of a system to tolerate 
disturbances while retaining its structure and function. This is very close to being a useful 
definition, as long as “tolerating” and “retaining” are given operational value. 
Unfortunately, Fiksel does not provide an operational way forward. Worse, he teases: 
Traditional systems-engineering practices have tried to anticipate and 
resist disruptions, but may be vulnerable to unforeseen factors. An 
alternative is to design systems with inherent resilience by taking 
advantage of fundamental properties such as diversity, efficiency, 
adaptability, and cohesion (Fiksel, 2003, p. 5330; Fiksel, 2006, p. 16). 
 
 While it is easy to casually state the need to design “inherent resilience” it is 
unhelpful to actual working engineers and SES managers. Comments like these clearly 
exemplify the manner in which resilience has become diluted and ill-defined. The trouble 
with his comment is that it is impossible to operationalize. For example, both diversity (if 
he means functional redundancy) and efficiency are what engineers already do and are 
frequently reminded how it will not work for the more complex systems of today (cf. 
Walker & Salt, 2006, pp. 7-8). To recommend engineers take advantage of “adaptability” 
after accosting them for trying to anticipate disruptions and leaving their systems 
vulnerable is contradictory. Further, since adaptability can only be observed after the fact, 
Fiksel is likely talking about designed-in system features that allow responses to known 
or projected environment changes, which are again, what engineers already do. Finally, 
proposing that “cohesion” (however defined) be employed just seems uninformed since 
(1) no system engineer wants his system to fall apart, (2) too much cohesion increases 
vulnerability, and (3) it flies in the face of the requested efficiency. Instead, engineers 
106 
must be taught to target something else: a quantum of resilience that is meaningful, 
measurable, and productive. 
 Zolli (2012) aggressively proposes that resilience requires a system’s “core 
purpose and integrity” to be maintained “in the face of dramatically changed 
circumstances” (p. 7). He stresses two essential aspects: continuity and recovery in the 
face of dramatic change. Unfortunately, great concepts like “purpose” and “integrity” are 
left for the reader to define and operationalize. Importantly, quantum resilience provides 
the solution in both cases. When identity is specifically codified, and purpose is defined 
according to valued function, operationalizing resilience becomes an accomplishable 
task. 
 Walker et al. (2004, p. 4) define resilience as “the capacity of a system to absorb 
disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the 
same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks.” But if a system is to retain its 
“function, structure, identity and feedbacks” it is very difficult to understand what it 
means that it can also “reorganize while undergoing change.” This definition contains an 
assortment of interesting sounding words with enough equivocation to allow them to 
mean just about anything. This is problematic and indicative of the expanding softness of 
the concept in the literature. Adding a word like “essentially” does not eliminate the fact 
that words have meanings and that meanings are important. Obviously more must be said 
for this kind of definition to be operationalized. 
 As if recognizing this, Walker tightens the previous definition and suggests 
resilience is “the ability of a system to absorb disturbance and still retain its basic 
function and structure” (Walker & Salt, 2006, p. 1). With the exception of the part about 
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absorbing disturbance, this is much better. Unfortunately it is difficult to know which 
definition is real since Walker and Salt define resilience in at least four different ways in 
their little book (cf. pp. xiii, 1, 12, 32, 37, 62, 63, etc.). One of the definitions (p. 32) very 
nearly reverts to the originally problematic Walker et al. (2004) definition. Additionally, 
resilience is still defined in terms of an “ability” which is never characterized. 
Surprisingly, toward the end of the book (p. 113) they employ the word “identity” and 
offer their best definition. Unfortunately, this solid definition is immediately diluted with 
the requirement that many largely metaphorical concepts like thresholds, forces, regimes, 
basins, and adaptive cycles, be used to analyze resilience. The valued functions a system 
may provide are ignored. This is not a step toward operationalizing resilience. 
 Carpenter et al. (2001) propose that 
In any study of resilience, we are concerned with the magnitude of 
disturbance that can be tolerated before a system moves into a different 
region of state space and a different set of controls (p. 766). 
 
 But they neither offer a way to characterize the magnitude of disturbance nor 
provide insight into the list of disturbances that might be implicated. Quantum resilience 
suggests that the magnitude of a disturbance can only be characterized by observing the 
decrease in delivery of the valued function as quantified by the established quantum of 
resilience. Note how little it has to do with the disturbance: no matter what strikes, the 
question is “how much less function is being delivered?” In fact, without some notion of 
the valued function, there is no way to define what it means to “tolerate” or move “into a 
different region of state space.” 
 The resilience literature is failing to converge because nobody has identified 
mechanisms to operationalize the concept. To be a useful system concept, resilience must 
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be characterized for each system. This is a specific word choice that defines resilience as 
a system “character”. That is, resilience is not an ability, capacity, function, or feature 
(that is, it is not something a system does). Further, resilience is not a property or 
attribute (that is, it is not something a system has). Instead, “resilient” is something a 
system is. Quantum resilience provides the mechanism for characterizing the extent to 
which a system is resilient. 
 With this in mind, I suggest there are two angles from which the idea of resilience 
must be defined. The first is oriented toward the fact that resilience is a “character” of 
systems: Systems that persist in their identifiable form (structure and function) are 
generally termed resilient, so resilience is the idea that a system’s identity persists. 
The second definition is operational and measurement-oriented: Resilience is the extent 
to which a system delivers its valued function. A longer form of the operationalized 
definition is: When properly characterized in accordance with its identity, resilience 
quantifies (or, “is a measure of”) the extent to which a system delivers its valued 
function. 
 As discussed at length above, there is a lot implied in the word “system” and 
those hidden parts of the definition are important. As a quick review, recall: 
 System identity is defined in terms of structure and function. For a system to be 
resilient it must persist and be recognizable in some meaningful way—usually by 
continuing to provide its function as facilitated by its structure. 
 In order to properly establish appropriate scale and to characterize the resilience 
of the system, structure is defined in terms of system-of-systems nearly 
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decomposable hierarchies (Simon, 1962) and their relationships (interfaces and 
dependencies between systems). This is discussed at length below. 
 Function is defined as that valued behavior that a system performs or output that 
it generates (usually within some acceptable tolerances according to a service 
level agreement) and is generally observed at a system interface (e.g., an output or 
influence, etc.). 
 Perturbation is specifically not involved in either the definition or 
characterization of resilience. 
 With the foregoing in mind, resilience can be characterized on a per-system basis. 
Such characterization should permit comparison of similar (homologous) systems or 
alternative system configurations, but confirms that resilience cannot be reduced to a 
universally absolute value. Neither would it make sense to do this. Consider, for example, 
what it would mean to say that a lake-agriculture socio-ecological system is more (or 
less) resilient than the Internet. Such comparisons are nonsensical. What this 
characterization does illustrate is that resilience can be bolstered in systems only in 
increments. That is, resilience grows as each quantum of a valued function is 
incrementally delivered by redundancies in the system. In this way, resilience is a 
quantum concept. 
 
Characterizing Resilience 
 
 Characterizing the resilience of a system is done following a thorough system 
analysis. System analysis is an iterative process that coalesces as knowledge about the 
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system grows. The resilience characterization process has the following major 
components: 
1. Enumeration of valued functions/services and identification of the quanta of 
resilience. As indicated, valued functions drive the analysis and must be 
elucidated first. 
2. Enumeration of systems implicated in the function delivery. Here, the functions 
determine the scale of the system as the real system emerges. 
3. Explication of the structure, the connectivity, and ultimately the identity of the 
system. This analysis phase completely characterizes the system to a level 
acceptable to participating domain experts. 
4. Assignment of valued functions and quanta of resilience to implicated systems. 
5. Calculation of apparent complexity and connectedness of the value delivery 
system. With the previously specified function quanta these values can be used in 
characterization of resilience. 
6. Once characterized, resilience of alternative system configurations can be 
compared and contrasted in decision frameworks. 
 Systems engineers have long employed Simon’s idea of nearly decomposable 
systems in their analysis work. In general, it is suggested that analysis start with that 
idea: 
The fact, then, that many complex systems have a nearly decomposable, 
hierarchic structure is a major facilitating factor enabling us to understand, 
to describe, and even to “see” such systems and their parts. Or perhaps the 
proposition should be put the other way round. If there are important 
systems in the world that are complex without being hierarchic, they may 
to a considerable extent escape our observation and our understanding 
(Simon, 1962, p. 477). 
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 Simon allows for complex systems to be incomprehensible, but he stands fairly 
firmly in the hierarchy camp: 
I have already given some reasons for supposing that the former is at least 
half the truth—that evolving complexity would tend to be hierarchic—but 
it may not be the whole truth (Simon, 1962, p. 478). 
 
 Systems should be decomposed as necessary for the given context/domain of 
discourse. System decomposition can proceed along lines of system engineering best 
practices with consensus-building among domain-cognizant engineers. While consensus 
can be construed as a low bar for success, it does not free engineers to be less rigorous in 
the approach taken. Since definitional rigor is missing from the literature, quantum 
resilience demands “accurate” models, but this does not mean that a given complex 
system does not admit to multiple unique “correct” models. As with any boundary 
decision or modeling choice, consistency is required, and if experts disagree, 
transparency is enforced by tools so there are no murky system definitions. For example, 
when you step on the scale to check your weight, few will care what you are wearing or 
carrying since that is a matter of personal taste or convenience. No matter what your 
choice is, the scale will provide the actual weight of whatever is on it. If, however, you 
want to compare your body weight from day to day, the experts will demand consistency. 
They will come to some consensus that if you choose to carry your cat and computer onto 
the scale (as a matter of taste), that you must do so every day. This illustrates the need to 
understand that, though system definition is a matter of choice and consensus, the system 
being characterized is very real and must be treated with consistency. 
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 To ensure proper identification of relationships, it is important to be fair and 
realistic in representation of where variables are available (i.e., for measurement) and 
where they are controlled. The resulting decomposition should garner general agreement 
among experts. If disagreement on system decomposition occurs, systems can be 
represented as black boxes as long as consensus can be gained on the decomposition 
depth at which the analysis is to proceed. Such system summarization will likely add a 
measure of uncertainty to the analysis (discussed below), but it will be completely 
transparent since it is captured in the tools. The degree of connectedness of the systems 
involved in valued function delivery will lead to some idea of the level of independence 
of the implicated systems. 
 There is much that goes into any measure of complexity (cf. Gell-Mann & Lloyd, 
1996; McShea, 2001; Erdi, 2008, pp. 201ff; Farnsworth, Lyashevska & Fung, 2012; 
Tamaskar, Neema & DeLaurentis, 2014; see also Parrott, 2010 for a serviceable overview 
of measuring ecological complexity). Such measures generally include the number of 
system parts and how they are connected. Frequently, important system traits are ignored 
like the number moving parts, their cost, their provenance and pedigree (i.e., lineage or 
depth of supply chain), the nature of the connections (information, matter), etc. Generally 
such omissions can be shown to not greatly impact the value of the resulting metric, but 
each can be important in specific applications. The complexity measures used in 
characterization of resilience can be adjusted to garner approval by collaborators in the 
analysis, but it must be consistently applied. Herein, I recommend an approach that is 
both tractable and generalized. It not only recognizes hierarchical and relational 
complexity, but it enforces its use with transparency and consistency. 
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 Kolmogorov (1963) complexity is generally defined as the minimum length of a 
program written in a description language required to produce a desired system (cf. Page, 
2011, p. 29). For system analysis of the kind required for characterizing quantum 
resilience, any formal specification language would suffice. For example, this can be 
demonstrated to be a computable outcome of systems described according to the ITU-T 
SDL Z.100 specification (itu.int/en/publications), IDEF (NIST, 1993), or UML/SysML 
(uml.org), and many complexity metrics have been proposed and demonstrated. Gell-
Mann and Lloyd (1996) coin the term “effective complexity” because 
The meaning of the term ‘complexity’ that corresponds most closely to its 
use in ordinary conversation and in scientific discourse corresponds to 
effective complexity, the length of a concise description not of the entity 
but of its identified regularities…. Effective complexity measures 
knowledge, in the sense that it quantifies the extent to which an entity is 
taken to be regular, nonrandom, and hence predictable (p. 49, emphasis 
added). 
 
 Extending Simon, and following Gell-Mann and Lloyd in focusing on regularities, 
I define a system’s apparent complexity (Ca) as that complexity that we can actually 
manage and that impacts the function of our system. It is a function of system 
hierarchical structure, relational inter-connectedness, and dependence on other systems: 
Ca = f(s,c,d) 
 
 For use in resilience characterization, apparent complexity consists of the total 
number of decomposed systems (s) implicated in delivery of valued functions, the total 
number of connections (internal and external) among those systems (c), and the in-degree 
of those systems. In-degree of a system (a.k.a. network node “fan-in”) is a well-known 
network science concept (cf. Borner et al., 2007) that is the total number of inputs to a 
particular system (“node”). It is used herein to represent the level of dependence systems 
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have on other systems. Note that the size of the state/phase space, i.e., the number of 
system states and supported transitions (which are obviously less apparent), may be 
added to this metric if it is determined to be an important driver of complexity. Generally, 
and as Simon would likely argue, deeper hierarchical complexity will subsume phase 
space complexity and permits black box treatment of systems. The formulation for 
apparent complexity is recursively calculated through the system hierarchy as follows: 
𝐶𝑎  =  𝑠 +  ∑(𝑐𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖)
𝑠
𝑖=1
 
 
 Note that the number of decomposed systems will be driven by the specific 
requirements of the analysis and may differ between experts (cf. Simon, 1962). What is 
required is that the decomposition is sufficient to adequately model the function and this 
will require consensus (thus enters the balance of structure and function). Note that 
connections are formed from known flows (both material and immaterial) between 
systems as well as shared measurable variables. For example, a local environment 
temperature that is employed in state definitions by two otherwise isolated systems 
contained within that environment constitutes a connection. 
 System productivity (Ps) vis-à-vis the valued functions is a function of the number 
of redundant systems (n) providing each unique valued function and the overall number 
of quanta of each valued function provided (q): 
Ps = f(n,q) 
 
 Each system’s contribution to delivery of the valued function is measured in the 
specified quanta and contributes to the quanta delivered by the overall system. For 
quantum resilience, overall system productivity is given by summing the product of the 
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total number of systems that provide each unique function and the total number of quanta 
of each function provided: 
𝑃 =  ∑ (𝑛𝑖 × ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
)
𝑓
𝑖=1
 
 
 Resilience (R) is characterized as a function of overall system productivity and 
apparent complexity: R = f(Ps,Ca) as shown in the following equation: 
𝑅 =  
𝑃𝑠
𝐶𝑎
 =  
∑(𝑛𝑖 × ∑ 𝑞𝑗)
∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑖
 
 
 Note that resulting resilience characterizations are not comparable across 
dissimilar systems—as described above, such comparisons are not meaningful—but can 
be used to compare similar systems or multiple deployment options for the same kind of 
system (one that delivers similar valued functions). 
 This characterization suggests that resilience is improved by increasing the 
redundancy of systems (n) that deliver the valued function (q), but it also supports the 
intuition that the complexity of the systems and their interdependence might diminish the 
resilience of the overall system. 
 As an example, Figure 3 depicts a hypothetical system of systems (S0) that has 
been deduced from a hypothetical analysis process. This is known as the canonical 
example and can be used as a test case for future implementations in other tools. Note 
that S0 is neither required to be a “real” system nor must it be a “complete” system. 
Instead, it is the boundary chosen by analysts to best assess the list of agreed-to valued 
functions. As a simplifying assumption for the example, one valued function (f) has been 
identified (Ps is simplified to n x q). As shown, the valued function is redundantly 
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delivered by three systems (SA, SB, and SC). For purposes of this example assume each 
provides a different quanta of that function: SA provides 2 quanta of f, while SB delivers 3 
quanta and SC offers 1. Note that while SD does not directly provide the valued function, 
it is indirectly implicated in the delivery of the valued function because it provides inputs 
to SA and SB. Note as well that SC relies on inputs from SA and SB. 
 
 
Figure 3. Canonical Example: System-of-Systems with One Valued Function 
 
 By hypothetical analysis, SA was determined to be decomposed into systems S1 
and S2 which work together to deliver 2 quanta of the valued function f. Hence (since the 
“parent” system is always counted in the decomposition), the number of decomposed 
systems s for SA is 3. As shown, S1 and S2 are similar, each having a decomposition of 
one with one input connection and one output connection. In addition to its internal 
structure, SA also has two output connections and one input connection for a total c of 13. 
f (2 quanta)
SA
f (1 quanta)
f (3 quanta)
S1
S2
SD
SB
S3
S5
S6
SC
S4
S0 (the system resulting from analysis)
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Hence, apparent complexity (Ca = s + c + d) for SA is 13. The remaining systems are 
similarly characterized. 
 Table 7 shows pertinent values and system resilience as characterized using the 
method discussed above. 
 
Table 7 
R-characterization: Canonical S0 
 SA SB SC SD S0 
Delivered quanta (q) 2 3 1 0 n=3, ∑ 𝑞 = 6 
In-degree (d) 3 5 2 0 ∑ 𝑑 = 10 
Systems (s) 3 5 1 1 ∑ 𝑠 = 10 
Connections (c) 7 11 3 2 ∑ 𝑐 = 23 
Resilience (R)     R = (3x6)/(23+10+10) = 0.4186 
 
 The example of Figure 3 shows that SD provides inputs to both SA and SB. Hence, 
despite the redundant delivery of f by three separate systems, two of these (SA and SB) are 
directly dependent on input from SD. Depending on the importance of its contribution in 
the overall delivery of f, this might suggest SD is highly critical to system performance 
and function delivery. Intuitively, this should decrease resilience. Its criticality to the 
overall system can be demonstrated by removing it from the system and re-characterizing 
resilience as if it were not involved. Table 8 demonstrates the difference in resilience if 
SD is not part of S0 and hence not involved in delivering the valued function. 
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Table 8 
R-characterization: S0 without SD 
 SA SB SC S0 
Delivered quanta (q) 2 3 1 n=3, ∑ 𝑞 = 6 
In-degree (d) 2 4 2 ∑ 𝑑 = 8 
Systems (s) 3 5 1 ∑ 𝑠 = 9 
Connections (c) 6 10 3 ∑ 𝑐 = 19 
Resilience (R)    R = (3x6)/(19+9+8) = 0.5 
 
 Note the significant increase in resilience (+19%) when delivery of f is less highly 
dependent on one system (SD). 
 Similarly, it also seems intuitive that high complexity in a specific subsystem 
might contribute to lower resilience values. Obviously, SB is the most complex system in 
S0 so it would be instructive to see the impact if that system were uninvolved. Note that 
removing SB also removes 3 quanta of delivered valued function and one redundant 
provider of the function, reducing q to 3 and n to 2. Table 9 shows resilience 
characterization assuming SB was not part of the overall system. 
 
Table 9 
R-characterization: S0 without SB 
 SA SC SD S0 
Delivered quanta (q) 2 1 0 n=2, ∑ 𝑞 = 3 
In-degree (d) 3 1 0 ∑ 𝑑 = 4 
Systems (s) 3 1 1 ∑ 𝑠 = 5 
Connections (c) 7 2 1 ∑ 𝑐 = 10 
Resilience (R)    R = (2x3)/(10+5+4) = 0.3158 
 
 Here, comparing the result with that of Table 7, it is shown that the reduction in 
complexity does not fully compensate (~25% lower) for the reduction in functional 
redundancy and quanta in delivery of the valued function. 
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 Alternatively, it would be interesting to perform a direct comparison by 
decreasing the complexity of SB while leaving it in the system. Table 10 shows the 
outcome when SB is hypothetically given the same decomposition and complexity as SA. 
 
Table 10 
R-characterization: S0 with Reduced Complexity SB 
 SA SB SC SD S0 
Delivered quanta (q) 2 3 1 0 n=3, ∑ 𝑞 = 6 
In-degree (d) 3 3 2 0 ∑ 𝑑 = 8 
Systems (s) 3 3 (as in SA) 1 1 ∑ 𝑠 = 8 
Connections (c) 7 7 (as in SA) 3 2 ∑ 𝑐 = 19 
Resilience (R)     R = (3x6)/(19+8+8) = 0.5143 
 
 Comparing the resilience characterization of Table 10 (0.5143) with that of Table 
7 (0.4186, where SB was included with its full complexity) demonstrates a trade between 
complexity and resilience (lower complexity results in a resilience increase of 
approximately ~23%). Of course, this hypothetical example assumes SB could still 
deliver 3 quanta of the valued function without its additional complexity and this is likely 
to be impossible in a real system. If the reduction in complexity of SB resulted in a 
reduction of valued function delivery (for example, to 2 quanta, like SA), the same 
comparison can be made with q=5, resulting in R=0.4286 which is very close (~2%) to 
the original resilience characterization shown in Table 7. This demonstrates the trade 
space of complexity, function, and resilience. 
 As earlier alluded, the decomposition of the system must be fair and accurate. 
Even if system modeling compromises are required in order to gain consensus among 
experts, this should not ultimately be deleterious to the characterization of resilience (that 
is, system models will not necessarily be decomposed to a level that is acceptable to all, 
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but should still render useful values). Table 11, Table 12, and Table 13 demonstrate 
resilience characterization given the assumption that none of the systems in Figure 3 had 
any decomposition (that is, imagine SA and SB are “simple” systems like SC and SD). 
 
Table 11 
R-characterization: Full S0 (No Decomposition) 
 SA SB SC SD S0 
Delivered quanta (q) 2 3 1 0 n=3, ∑ 𝑞 = 6 
In-degree (d) 1 1 2 0 ∑ 𝑑 = 4 
Systems (s) 1 1 1 1 ∑ 𝑠 = 4 
Connections (c) 3 3 3 2 ∑ 𝑐 = 11 
Resilience (R)     R = (3x6)/(11+4+4) = 0.9474 
 
 If this result is compared to the result of Table 7, it can be seen that the relative 
simplicity of the systems increases the resilience of the overall system. 
 
Table 12 
R-characterization: S0 without SD (No Decomposition) 
 SA SB SC S0 
Delivered quanta (q) 2 3 1 n=3, ∑ 𝑞 = 6 
In-degree (d) 0 0 2 ∑ 𝑑 = 2 
Systems (s) 1 1 1 ∑ 𝑠 = 3 
Connections (c) 2 2 3 ∑ 𝑐 = 7 
Resilience (R)    R = (3x6)/(7+3+2) = 1.5 
 
 
Table 13 
R-characterization: S0 without SB (No Decomposition) 
 SA SC SD S0 
Delivered quanta (q) 2 1 0 n=2, ∑ 𝑞 = 3 
In-degree (d) 1 1 0 ∑ 𝑑 = 2 
Systems (s) 1 1 1 ∑ 𝑠 = 3 
Connections (c) 3 2 1 ∑ 𝑐 = 6 
Resilience (R)    R = (2x3)/(6+3+2) = 0.5455 
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 Obviously, when all subsystems share similar complexity, any resilience gain 
expected from eliminating SB (formerly of high complexity) is further attenuated because 
the impact from losing the quanta of valued function is far greater. This can be observed 
by comparing the difference in characterized resilience from Table 7 and Table 9 (where 
removing SB reduces resilience by approximately 25%) with the difference in Table 11 
and Table 13 (where removing SB reduces resilience by approximately 42%). 
 
Quantum Resilience, Reductionism, and Complexity 
 
 There do seem to be many “systems” that seem to fit the cliché phrase: “the whole 
is more than the sum of its parts.” For example, it is obvious that somehow “intelligence” 
emerges from the interaction of 100 billion (or so) neurons in a human brain. As a valued 
function, intelligence will prove notoriously difficult to quantify, but if quantifying such 
an idea becomes important, ultimately consensus (or at least grudging concession) will 
materialize. What is not debated is the connectionist structure of the underlying 
“intelligence delivery system” and its interfaces to the “real world” via sensory stimulus. 
What is also clear is that unless a particular “critical mass” of neuron count and 
connectedness is achieved, intelligence will not emerge. This is where the worlds of 
complexity and reductionism collide. That there is a physical system, with an actual 
structure, and with actual connectedness, is unquestioned. That intelligence is a valued 
function that emerges from it is unquestioned. How such a function emerges from such a 
system may continue to be an open question, but if we wish such a function to persist, the 
specific structure and organization that provides it must be codified in any 
characterization of that system’s resilience. 
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 Quantum resilience could be considered reductionist since it starts with a 
hierarchical approach to quantifying system complexity. The “reductionist” epithet is 
sometimes intended as a stinging blow, but recall that reductionism is not a dirty word to 
engineers and they are to a great extent immune to the indictment. Engineers are required 
to make things work and they have an excellent track record of doing so within the 
paradigm of reductionism. Plus, while complexity theories are still brewing, reductionism 
is the only available paradigm. In this regard, if quantum resilience is reductionist, it is 
unapologetically so. 
 Nevertheless, any assertion that quantum resilience is merely reductionist is also 
easily deflected. Note first that quantum resilience specifically recognizes complexity in 
the denominator of the resilience characterization formulation. This is no accident. 
Quantum resilience amalgamates a number of approaches to calculating complexity in its 
formulation. Recognizing Kolmogorov, Gell-Mann, and Simon, as well as understanding 
systems as having a “fractal” dimension makes quantum resilience the most obviously 
complexity-oriented resilience theory available. In measuring hierarchical decomposition 
and intersystem relationships, quantum resilience has the best opportunity to correctly 
represent system complexity. Quantum resilience specifically acknowledges the “limits” 
of reductionism (though, note well, these limits rarely impact the ability to offer practical 
solutions to common problems) and specifically includes system relationships and 
dependencies in the formulation. Further, quantum resilience absolutely forces 
transparency and consistency in system modeling and permits it to be done with 
commercially available tools to ensure repeatable results. This ensures that engineers are 
not hiding behind complexity. 
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 In addition to its firm grounding in general systems theory, development of 
quantum resilience purposefully considered complexity ideas. In fact, not only does 
quantum resilience take a large step to actually measuring complexity, it is architected to 
employ “true” complexity measures should any ever be invented (and assuming they are 
demonstrably better than the current approach). Further, if complexity is ever shown to 
impact the definition or quantification of valued functions it can be easily retrofitted in 
the numerator. While a future theory of complexity may contribute to “better” values for 
resilience characterization, is unlikely to further clarify the idea of resilience. 
 Again, note that most engineers happily and successfully solve problems using the 
reductionist paradigm, while a few have the luxury of indulging their interests and 
participating in the development of a complexity paradigm. Only a few researchers can 
afford to explore deeply esoteric notions that are only somewhat related to solving actual 
problems. Such exploration is vital and ensures continued progress as new ideas are 
brought to light, but for the rest of us, complexity is an aggregation of assorted and only 
somewhat related ideas that are not quite ready for application. To the extent they are, I 
have included them in the characterization formulated above. 
 Importantly, quantum resilience reminds us that we must not hide behind 
complexity. We must focus on the system discovered through analysis (where the scale is 
determined by the valued functions) as opposed to the system as we envision or 
romanticize it. Once we determine the scale at which we must operate, it becomes clear 
what can be accomplished whether or not the system is complex. The system is what it is 
and we need to focus on the parts that impact valued function. For resilience to be a 
meaningful concept, it must also be at some level pragmatic and operationalized. 
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Quantum resilience offers such a theory for now, and provides a way forward that allows 
future extension of its complexity measures. 
 
Resilience and the Time Domain 
 
 As the backdrop against which all systems operate, interest in the concept of time 
is counterintuitively intensified by the fact that humans need stability from systems that 
are frequently very dynamic. In general, humans want systems that deliver their valued 
function(s) over long periods of time. For example, systems of government should be 
“stable.” A revolution every hundred years or so is about all humans can tolerate while 
expecting to remain productive (observation of current events is enough to demonstrate 
this). At a different, but still “long” time scale, telecommunications systems should be 
stable enough for frequent users to continue to exploit regular features even while new 
features are added. It is no secret that 4G LTE (fourth generation long-term evolution) is 
an attempt to provide such stability in the face of migration of significant underlying 
technologies. For ongoing maintenance of structures that evolve (like the law, or ethics, 
etc.) these “state changes” can be accommodated while stability is maintained (e.g., think 
of the impact of the anti-slavery or women’s suffrage movements which resulted in the 
13
th
 and 19
th
 amendments to the US constitution). These systems can be viewed as stable 
but that doesn’t mean they are static. 
 Still, the need to consider time implies there might be important changes-over-
time that must enter the analysis. Importantly, there are three separate ideas of such 
“movement” in a system: 
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1. System dynamics “happen” while a system is delivering its function. Such 
dynamics can be quite complicated depending on the function. For example, think 
of the dynamics that occur when you turn on a radio, or a printing press. As 
described below, the system analysis approach encapsulates (and sometimes 
hides) the dynamics in human-superimposed definitions of system states. For 
example, it is superficially easy to argue that all the dynamics of the system occur 
while it is delivering its function in a “working” or “operational” state. On the 
other hand, the dynamics would not be occurring when the system is in a 
“broken” or “off” state. Obviously, meaningful analysis involves deeper 
decomposition and greater granularity. As discussed below, required granularity 
of state definition can be determined on a system-by-system basis. 
2. System evolution is part of the “adaptation” argument that I suggest should be 
beyond the scope of resilience theory and research. It is an important research 
area, but it must not be conflated with resilience. Note again that for quantum 
resilience it is the valued function that drives the analysis. The terminology is 
important here. Consider that if “values” surrounding a system change over time, 
these can lead to new functional demands on the system (as in the 
telecommunications example where what is valued now is far different than what 
was valued 20 years ago). This may compel an important and desirable system 
“evolution,” (whether internally or externally facilitated—with appropriate 
cautions about the teleology in the anticipated new system structure or function) 
but where resilience is concerned it is vital that system identity is considered. This 
is because if the valued functions change (in keeping with new “values”), the 
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resilience characterization must also change. In this way, resilience must be 
characterized for instances of system design (i.e., phenotypes). Evolved systems 
are generally new phenotypes and it is an important engineering challenge to 
determine whether or not they are homologous to the extent they can be compared 
to prior systems. Obviously, as artifacts, “designs” themselves can be considered 
as evolving systems, but this is a very different thing than the systems those 
designs represent. 
3. System decay occurs for all systems over time. This sort of movement might be 
noticed as system changes result in diminishing functional delivery. Whether 
system decay is real or anticipated, quantum resilience is not ignorant of such 
movement. Though there are likely more efficient measures of such decay, if real 
trajectories are deemed desirable and useful, quantum resilience allows such 
decay to be tracked by changes in resilience characterization over time. That is, at 
periodic intervals the current system phenotype can be assessed for its current 
resilience characterization. If decay can be projected (e.g., in an anticipatory 
model), quantum resilience can serve in the same manner based on projected 
phenotypes. System decay is implicated in most discussions of thresholds found 
in the literature. In general, the literature takes an anticipatory position and warns 
of tipping points after which a system might fail. Sometimes the literature warns 
of cascading threshold effects. Because the importance of the system is 
understood, realistic approaches to such decay typically involve bolstering 
whatever part of the system is decaying. This places most discussion of thresholds 
and decay in the robustness space—protecting the system against anticipated 
127 
perturbations or projected future environments. Those scholars who anticipate 
unavoidable tipping points, or understand they can only be avoided at prohibitive 
cost, will fall back on planning for “transformation.” Of course, transformation 
results in a new system—which can be analyzed for its resilience as needed. 
 
 To fix the differences in the reader’s mind, consider that with, for example, the 
human slavery issue in the US, “the Law” (as a system; its identity; the system’s 
structure, relationships, etc.) did not change, but “laws” (operating parameters, possible 
configurations, etc.) changed. In this regard, one could argue there were significant 
“dynamics” but limited “evolution” in the formal sense. That “the law” was organized to 
support such revision was a matter of good design. Obviously casual use of phrases, e.g., 
“the law evolved,” is acceptable, but must be recognized as casual and colloquial. These 
are important distinctions when considering the time domain. The law did not decay and 
face a tipping point. Instead, society as the larger containing system forced changes. That 
is, societal values surrounding certain aspects of the system changed until eventually 
society directed system updates. After such updates, proper characterization of the 
resilience of the “law” as a system may or may not reflect improvements in resilience. 
Importantly, depending upon how societal productivity is quantified, a real increment in 
societal resilience might have occurred with these minor changes in the law. For 
example, if human capital was measured as part of the productivity numerator, it 
certainly can be shown to increase, or if “equity” can be somehow construed as a valued 
function, one could argue it was “increased” at a fairly minor cost in system complexity. 
Note well, however, that the changes in law (a “subsystem” of US society) contributed to 
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the complexity (even if minimally). Looking back on the transition, we can acknowledge 
that low complexity changes that result in high productivity outcomes and hence higher 
resilience are certainly adaptive, but it must be stressed that this is retrospective. 
 The “issue” of proper management of the time domain (or, more specifically, 
“system dynamics”) is dispelled by understanding that a system can be defined as having 
a (potentially large) collection of discrete configurations or states. Obviously, the 
granularity of state definitions will generally be an artifact of the fidelity chosen for a 
given system model. More will be said later but again, consider the extensive dynamics in 
play when a radio is turned on. While the dynamics are evident to engineers and can 
certainly be modeled as needed, most users would agree that a radio provides its valued 
function in the “on” state. The parameters and variables used to define states will usually 
have some tolerance (due to measurement accuracy and error), but these fluctuations can 
also generally be ignored once a given state is reached. 
 Assume a hypothetical system is in state #1 at some discrete time. As time 
elapses, “things change” and (depending on the granularity of the states and measured 
variables) eventually the system might enter state #2, and then, state #3 (or, it might 
revert back to state #1), and so on. Such analysis and modeling continues until the analyst 
is satisfied all the states are adequately codified for the level of fidelity agreed upon by 
the experts. This sequence of state transitions obviously shows a progression of time, but 
it is in discrete steps that reflect the discrete states of the system. In each of these discrete 
states, there may be a significant level of activity (system dynamics) by which the system 
will perform its valued function or functions (with whatever fidelity has been determined 
to be interesting or important). In many cases, however, such micro-dynamics are 
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unimportant to the overall character of the system (see example below). Resilience 
characterization requires that “system dynamics” be modeled only at the level it impacts 
delivery of valued function—only at the level the function can be valued. 
 It could be argued that this makes the chosen granularity an aspect of analyst 
“choice” or “art” and, hence, arbitrary and “not very scientific.” If “arbitrary” means a 
hard-won decision achieved through scientific and engineering consensus among experts, 
then this is true. But this is always so in any system analysis. For example, if in a 
particular system analysis we concern ourselves with dynamics at a period of one day, 
why did we not select one hour? And, had we chosen one hour, why not two minutes, or 
two milliseconds? In general, the level of granularity is selected at the lowest level 
humans can feasibly care about the system state, not at the lowest level they can assess 
and codify system state (this is somewhat akin to what control systems engineers 
consider the difference between knowledge and control). Some might argue that there is a 
“real” granularity, but it is easy to dispel that myth. If, for example, temperature is being 
measured and used in a control system, it is likely to be accomplished with a thermistor 
and an analog-to-digital converter that is sampled at some (humanly speaking) very fast 
rate. Can we track the temperature at 5 minute intervals, or must we model the system at 
the granularity of that very fast A/D conversion rate? If so, how does our decision change 
when the engineer reminds us that the A/D converter actually oversamples and averages 
its output before reporting it? And if we decide to consider that and alter our period to 
include some kind of averaging, what happens when the engineer reminds us that the 
transistors involved in the A/D conversion have their own dynamics which are faster 
still? Must we consider our system dynamics at that level? And what if the engineer 
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reminds us that the thermistor material itself is undergoing physical stresses that are 
impacting its own internal dynamics at the molecular and atomic levels? Or, that the 
silicon of the transistors has electron flow at yet a different rate? Must we consider that? 
The obvious answer is no. The idea of system dynamics has always been and will always 
be a matter of analyst choice. The choice made should certainly be defensible and agreed-
to by the team of experts that are performing the analysis, but it will always be a choice. 
 The important point about the time domain is that we must realize we cannot 
glibly speak of resilience without any idea of why we care about a system’s resilience. So 
it is not so much that resilience is static or dynamic, it is more that resilience is quantum. 
Analysts must be able to characterize system resilience no matter what state a system is 
in, or what activity it is performing. Resilience is increased or decreased based on how 
we tweak the subsystems that provide valued function. Note that this is logical given the 
emphasis on “structure” when resilience is characterized. Following Varela (see above), 
if structure is the “snapshot” of the system at a given time, then the resilience applies to 
the structure at that time (an instance of a design, or a phenotype). Systems can morph 
and change (with careful attention to identity maintenance), but resilience must mean 
something at a given time, so it must be defined over time scales for which it matters to 
those who value system functions. 
 Note well that discussions of system decay are actually discussions of 
perturbations and hence fall into the robustness space. But it is fair to consider this in 
light of a generalized theory of resilience. Here, “time” (or, if you will, “the whips and 
scorns of time”) serves as the perturbation. In a “three little pigs” example, an analysis 
might show that a straw house is less resilient than a brick house if “huff and puff 
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resistance” is the only valued function. In this analysis perhaps it can be shown that the 
extra complexity of a brick house is easily overcome by its extraordinary wind resistance. 
Intuitively, it is also apparent that a straw house built 20 years ago and subjected to 20 
years of wet and dry seasons might be far easier for the wolf to blow down than it was 
when originally erected. Recall that while as onlookers we might know that corrosion and 
decay has resulted in reduced function, to a resilience analysis, it is merely an instance of 
a new phenotype that delivers less function. Resilience might be measurably decreasing, 
but the only way to know that is to re-characterize the resilience in light of the decreased 
output of the valued function. In this case the complexity remains the same while the 
productivity decreases. 
 Also note that resilience is not about predicting precipitous failures at some future 
time. That is what the probabilistic risk analyses do. Monitoring trends is obviously 
important when we admit to human interest in maintaining (or improving) the status quo, 
but projections of tipping points will typically result in three human responses: (1) fix it, 
ensure enduring stability, and avoid the decay, (2) milk it for all its worth, and (3) cut and 
run. Given individual agency, purview, and hopefulness, these approaches are not 
mutually exclusive and all may be found on a given landscape at a variety of scales. No 
matter how a system phenotype is deployed (on purpose, by changes in state, or by partial 
or total failure of some previously productive system) resilience analysis must proceed by 
honestly assessing the productivity vis-à-vis valued function and by accurately 
documenting system complexity. 
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Management of Units in the Numerator 
 
 Quantum resilience is formulated to characterize resilience at any and all system 
scales. It is also formulated to permit multiple valued functions at any given scale. 
Because individual valued functions are usually expressed in different units, there is 
likely to be some concern over the management of units in the numerator of the quantum 
resilience characterization. That is, in calculating system productivity (the numerator) it 
is valid to sum numbers that have different units. This section demonstrates that, while 
this is true, it is not problematic, but if philosophical issues remain, it can be easily 
avoided by normalizing productivity values to percentages of total function, or rethinking 
the analysis to isolate functions at more appropriate levels. 
 Note first that resilience is a notion invented by humans. It is an idea we 
superimpose on systems. That is, you cannot locate resilience in a system and weigh it or 
measure its length. A system cannot be squeezed until its resilience drains into a 
graduated cylinder. This does not, however, make resilience a useless idea. Instead, 
resilience has become an important way humans talk about a specific character of a 
system. This is true for many calculated metrics that attempt to describe a character of a 
system. Since it is a human-defined concept, quantum resilience asserts that as a system 
character, resilience can be represented with scale free and unit free values that are 
comparable only among consistently modeled homologous systems. Since quantum 
resilience enforces transparency and demands consistency in its modeling approach, the 
characterization does not specifically require units. Units are used for their explanatory 
value to humans and to ensure consistency and consensus. 
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 Quantum resilience characterization involves quantification of system 
productivity in the numerator. Note that system productivity is also a notion contrived to 
allow us to quantify the valued function of a system. Hence, even though quantum 
resilience requires units for quanta of valued functions, the valued functions are really 
just “productivity indicators” that are supplied for transparency so engineers can agree 
and come to consensus about how to measure the valued function of a system. It is 
perhaps obvious that units are used only when they are available so that consistency can 
be achieved both within and across models. Note well that sometimes units are 
unavailable (e.g., when indicating psycho-social elements of human resilience on a Likert 
scale). To be sure, use of quantities with definite units facilitates more rapid consensus 
and more accurate comparisons, but they are not specifically required. 
 It is best to think of the numerator as sums of quanta of functional productivity 
instead of sums of materials or other physical entities. In this way, a power plant that has 
two disparate valued functions (e.g., energy to the grid and employees in the job market) 
is quantized first by identifying the units (e.g., MW and head count) and second by 
identifying the quanta of each valued function provided by the power plant (e.g., 300 and 
30). Both are important for transparency and consistency because, for example, it will 
prevent another engineer from assuming the units for energy are kW. The specific units, 
however, are unimportant once consistency is ensured because the results will only be 
comparable to a similarly modeled homologous system. 
 It is therefore somewhat important to understand that as long as consistency is 
employed, the units do not actually matter though, as mentioned, they provide important 
transparency which is vital in gaining consensus. It is not, therefore, illegitimate to 
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suggest that a power plant can offer 300 MW of energy to the grid and 30 employees to 
the job market and sum these for a “productivity” of 330. Engineers, however, are likely 
to be uncomfortable with such a sum for several reasons: (1) adding MW to employee 
count seems like bad engineering practice, and (2) it seems odd to glibly combine 
numbers of different orders of magnitude. The “skew” that results is sometimes difficult 
to swallow (i.e., does 30 employees really only constitute 9% of the overall valued 
function of 330?). Again, what must be stressed is that consistency matters. No numbers 
are lost in the calculations, and the resulting characterizations are only useful in 
comparison to other values that are similarly calculated. 
 If, however, engineering purity is required there are three approaches that can be 
taken. Two are simple changes to the algorithms and software, while one actually forces 
deeper understanding of the system. First, the software algorithms and tools can be 
configured to normalize all valued function contributions to percentages so that units 
disappear. Second, resilience characterization can be reported on a per-valued-function 
basis. That is, it is easy to report, for example, the resilience of the power plant in terms 
of only the energy provided to the grid, or only in terms of employees in the job market. 
Such an individual reporting makes sense in light of the (probable) fact that it is unlikely 
any team of engineers will ever fully exhaust a list of valued functions to the satisfaction 
of another team (that is, if we keep adding to our list, the numbers keep changing 
anyway). Both of these options are available in current versions of the software. 
 Third, sometimes such a dilemma is an indicator that the assignment of function 
to a specific system must be rethought. That is, it could be argued that employment is not 
a function of the power plant, but is instead a valued function of a larger employer that 
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operates multiple power plants. In this case, the engineers characterizing resilience might 
elect to remove employment from the list of valued functions offered by the plant, 
resolving the “units” dilemma. Note however that this decision must be consistently 
applied if comparisons are to be made between power plants. 
 Note that weighting certain functions as more important than others is certainly 
possible (e.g., using an analytical hierarchy process, cf. Saaty, 1980), but as long as 
consistency is used in comparisons, relative weights among valued functions do not 
matter. In fact, such weighting is not recommended because management of weights 
introduces yet another complication that must be tracked to ensure consistent treatment 
across system models. 
 Importantly, it should also be noted that the denominator makes some simplifying 
assumptions as well. For example, when the apparent complexity calculation adds 
number of subsystems in the decomposed hierarchy to number of dependencies between 
those systems, it can seem like adding apples and oranges. While specifically true, it must 
be observed that these are simple counts that are being added and no units are involved. 
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Resilient Design 
 
 Is there an archetypically “resilient” system—a system “shape” that regularly 
proves to be resilient? At this point it is certainly fair to propose that resilient systems are 
comprised of subsystems which follow three well-defined protocols: belonging (to the 
“parent”), contribution (toward the function of the overall system), and connection (with 
other sibling systems). Further, since connection between subsystems increases system 
complexity, each subsystem in an archetypically “resilient” system would be expected to 
exhibit low per-member contribution (and loss) to the valued function(s) of the system. 
 “Belonging” involves determining how and why a certain system fits into an 
overall system. In general, a “well-defined belonging protocol” simply “makes sense” 
and does not leave the observer wondering why a particular system should be a part of 
another. For example, it “makes sense” that a fuel supply chain like that employed by 
Phoenix has a West line and an East line, each of which provides about half of the fuel 
required by Phoenix (this example is discussed below). These are clearly redundant 
subsystems that comprise the larger system. It does not make sense, however, to suggest 
someone’s residence or the Phoenix Zoo be added to the Phoenix fuel supply chain. Any 
such inclusion would only lead to contrived arguments to defend such a system structure. 
Further, addition of a particular residence to the fuel supply chain can be met with the 
question “why not other (or all) residences?” or “is the contribution meaningful?” So the 
belonging question can be approached from both angles: why and why not. This is a vital 
step in system analysis as it permits scope and scale to be transparently selected. 
 “Contribution” usually makes it clear why a system belongs in another. A 
system’s membership in the overall system will be defined to some extent by what it 
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contributes to overall system function(s), but it might also be defined by the protections it 
brings, or the way it enables a system to survive in a given environment. Such 
contribution should be uncontrived, obvious, and measureable. For example, it is obvious 
that both the East and West lines of the Phoenix fuel supply chain make contributions to 
the overall system. This is obvious, uncontrived, and measurable. If a particular residence 
makes a contribution, then it can be included as well, if the engineers determine it is 
important to the overall system. 
 “Connection” between sibling systems is generally observed through direct 
interfaces, though in rare occasions can also occur indirectly or through feedback. 
Sometimes connections result from material exchanges and sometimes simply from 
sharing an environment variable (e.g., an environment temperature is an indirect 
connection). Other times coordinated parallelisms in sibling systems can be observed. For 
example, if the East line of the Phoenix fuel supply chain fails, operators can get on the 
phone (direct connection) to their counterparts in the West line and request increased 
delivery rates. Alternatively, a supervisory control system (indirect connection through 
another sibling system) can determine that the West line must increase delivery rates. 
Connections obviously contribute to the complexity of the system and are (in keeping 
with Simon’s nearly decomposable hierarchies) expected to diminish as the system is 
decomposed down to the level at which valued function is delivered. 
 Low per-member contribution (and loss) simply shows that the less a system 
contributes to the overall system function, the less it will be missed if it fails, and the 
more likely it is to be easily replaceable. With two “subsystems,” the percentage 
contribution of each line in the Phoenix fuel supply chain is fairly significant (e.g., 60-
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40). It might seem intuitively obvious that adding more supply pipelines (hypothetically 
an additional East and West line or even a North and South line) would make the system 
more resilient (even if rather expensive). However, since this would also increase the 
complexity of the system in both number of subsystems and their interconnectivity, care 
must be taken before making a deployment decision based on intuition. 
 This important point can now be formalized. As described above, resilience is 
characterized as system productivity divided by system complexity: 
𝑅 =  
𝑃
𝐶
 
 
As above, overall complexity is calculated as follows: 
 
𝐶 =  𝑠 +  ∑(𝑐𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖)
𝑠
𝑖=1
 
 
and overall productivity is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑃 =  ∑ (𝑛𝑖 × ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
)
𝑓
𝑖=1
 
 
where n (as before) is the number of systems providing a specific valued function. 
 Assuming system S is comprised of function-contributing subsystems s such that 
the complexity of each function-contributing subsystem is the same (or nearly so): 
𝐶𝑠𝑖 ≅ 𝐶𝑠𝑗  
 
And assuming that each of these subsystems contributes similar incremental quanta of 
valued function to the overall productivity measure such that: 
𝑞𝑠𝑖 ≅ 𝑞𝑠𝑗 
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Then, it is clear that each similar constituent subsystem contributes to resilience in equal 
ratios, that is, with similar numerators and denominators. Hence (noting that the second 
productivity sum below stops at n-1), for large n the following near equivalence holds 
true: 
𝑅 =  
𝑃
𝐶
 =  
∑ (𝑚𝑖 × ∑ 𝑞𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐶𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 ≅  
∑ (𝑚𝑖 × ∑ 𝑞𝑖)
𝑛−1
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐶𝑠𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=1
 
 
This demonstrates that when there are many systems which incrementally contribute 
similar quanta of the valued function, loss of a single system is not significantly 
deleterious to overall system resilience. This is illustrated in many of the examples that 
will follow. 
 This leads to the conclusion that the only practical design principle that comes 
from resilience analysis is that highest resilience results when small increments of valued 
function are provided by each of many redundant systems which are isolated in nearly 
decomposable hierarchies. If these findings are obvious and intuitive, it stems from two 
reasons. First, engineers learn from Nature which accomplishes its resilience in exactly 
that manner, and second, disapproving remarks about untoward focus on functional 
redundancy as the mechanism for resilience are unfounded.  
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INSTRUMENTING QUANTUM RESILIENCE 
 
 I invested a significant portion of my industry career developing, integrating, and 
using commercial model-based system engineering (MBSE) tools. For this reason, I 
thought it important to point out that commercial tools are already available and can 
easily be configured to perform the quantum resilience characterization I have proposed. 
This section demonstrates the ease with which two very complete and extremely capable 
commercially available system modeling tools were configured to perform quantum 
resilience characterization. Systems engineers who are familiar with tools will find these 
sections familiar and intuitive. Those who are not can easily skip these sections without 
missing anything that is particular to quantum resilience. 
 There are two overarching principles guiding this approach: 
1. As much as possible, the default (as-shipped) data model (schema) of the 
commercial tool is used. This makes it easily understood by both new and 
experienced users of the tool. 
2. As much as possible, the interface is kept simple and intuitive. There should be 
nothing contrived about the implementation. Any additions to data model 
elements should be “obvious” and use of default elements should not be forced. 
 Once minor schema updates were completed, all that remained was 
implementation of the characterization algorithm discussed above. This was done with 
under 500 lines of code in Java or C# (as needed) to exploit the vendor-published 
application programming interfaces (API) of the commercial tools. Both vendors expose 
a complete and powerful API that permitted the code to be nearly identical with only 
minor modifications. 
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 Finally, this section demonstrates how my own FractalSys MBSE was easily 
adapted to support quantum resilience characterization. Importantly, it must be stressed 
that tools exist and can be easily adapted to implement quantum resilience. No custom 
tools are required. 
 
Genesys
TM
 for Quantum Resilience 
 
 The Genesys™ MBSE is offered by Vitech Corporation of Blacksburg, VA. This 
section outlines the approach taken for implementing quantum resilience in the Genesys 
tool and can serve as an appendix to most systems engineering specification practices 
guides. 
 
 Elements 
 
 Component 
 
 Components represent the physical “systems” being modeled. A component is 
“built from” other components (which are “built in” parent components). This is how the 
system hierarchy is modeled (see Figure 4). Genesys allows these hierarchies to be 
created easily in the user interface. 
 Special accommodations: 
 Component has an optional “multiplicity” parameter added that allows for system 
boundary modeling (see Figure 5). A component with a multiplicity of zero is not 
included in the decomposition and complexity calculations. Instead, it is 
considered to be only an organizational entity. Components with multiplicity 
greater than one are counted as many times as indicated in the parameter value. 
 Component also has its “resilience” parameter exposed. 
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Figure 4. Genesys Representation of Canonical S0 Decomposition 
 
 
Figure 5. Parameters Added to "Component" 
 
 Function 
 
 Functions provide transformations and do the work of the components. Functions 
are “allocated to” components, and components “perform” functions. Also, a function 
“outputs” and “inputs” an Item and “services” a Link (see below). 
 Special accommodations: 
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 Function has been augmented in the schema to have a “quanta” parameter (visible 
to the user as “Quanta of Valued Function”, see Figure 6) which must be updated 
to contain the number of quanta of the valued function provided by the function. 
Though all functions are valued, not all functions are considered “valued 
functions” in the quantum resilience sense. Only those with values assigned to the 
parameters will be used in resilience characterization calculations. Additionally, a 
parameter called “valuedFunction” (visible to the user as “Name of Valued 
Function”) has been added where the “valued function” identifier (in the quantum 
resilience sense) is specified. 
 
 
Figure 6. Parameters Added to "Function" 
 
 Item 
 
 Items represent data or material that traverses an interface between two systems. 
As long as good system engineering practices are used, it is not necessary to model 
specific interfaces or links (see Figure 7 and Figure 8) for full characterization of 
resilience (though it is perfectly fine to model them). An item is “input to” or “output 
from” a function. An Item’s input and output functions are adequate to serve as source 
and destination of interfaces. 
 It is possible that only “item” needs to be augmented by creating a new subclass 
called “Valued Function Output” (or similar). Then, any function can be used and 
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instances of that new class could have particular “valued function names” and “quanta” 
associated with them. For now, however, it seems simpler to merely augment the extant 
data model entities with parameters. 
 
 
Figure 7. Block Diagram Showing Links between S0 Subsystems 
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Figure 8. Decomposition of SB (into S3 and S4) and of S4 (into S5 and S6) 
 
 Interface (optional) 
 
 Interfaces are logical connections between components. Note that an Interface is 
“comprised of” Links (see below) which are more typically the physical instantiation of 
an interface. 
 
 Link (optional) 
 
 Links are physical interfaces between two components. A link “connects to” a 
component and a link “transfers” an item. Complete system engineering approaches will 
require Links to be created (see Figure 7 and Figure 8). 
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 Outputs 
 
 The calculations for quantum resilience characterization were implemented in C# 
for the GENESYS data model. The canonical hypothetical example discussed above 
results in the following outcomes: 
 
--------------------------- 
R-characterization: <S0> 
--------------------------- 
<SB> in-degree: <SB rcv from SD> inputs <sd -> sb> 
<S3> in-degree: <S3 rcv from S4> inputs <s4 -> s3> 
<S4> in-degree: <S4 rcv from S3> inputs <s3 -> s4> 
<S5> in-degree: <S5 rcv from S6> inputs <s6 -> s5> 
<S6> in-degree: <S6 rcv from S5> inputs <s5 -> s6> 
<S3> connection: <S3 rcv from S4> inputs <s4 -> s3> 
<S3> connection: <S3 snd to S4> outputs <s3 -> s4> 
<S5> connection: <S5 snd to S6> outputs <s5 -> s6> 
<S5> connection: <S5 rcv from S6> inputs <s6 -> s5> 
<S6> connection: <S6 rcv from S5> inputs <s5 -> s6> 
<S6> connection: <S6 snd to S5> outputs <s6 -> s5> 
<S4> connection: <S4 snd to S3> outputs <s4 -> s3> 
<S4> connection: <S4 rcv from S3> inputs <s3 -> s4> 
<SB> connection (from valued function): <f(SB)> quanta: <3> 
<SB> connection: <SB rcv from SD> inputs <sd -> sb> 
<SB> connection: <SB snd to SC> outputs <sb -> sc> 
SB indegree: 5, decomp: 5, connec: 11, complexity: 21 
 
<SD> connection: <SD snd to SA> outputs <sd -> sa> 
<SD> connection: <SD snd to SB> outputs <sd -> sb> 
SD indegree: 0, decomp: 1, connec: 2, complexity: 3 
 
<SA> in-degree: <SA rcv from SD> inputs <sd -> sa> 
<S2> in-degree: <S2 rcv from S1> inputs <s1 -> s2> 
<S1> in-degree: <S1 rcv from S2> inputs <s2 -> s1> 
<S2> connection: <S2 snd to S1> outputs <s2 -> s1> 
<S2> connection: <S2 rcv from S1> inputs <s1 -> s2> 
<S1> connection: <S1 rcv from S2> inputs <s2 -> s1> 
<S1> connection: <S1 snd to S2> outputs <s1 -> s2> 
<SA> connection (from valued function): <f(SA)> quanta: <2> 
<SA> connection: <SA snd to SC> outputs <sa -> sc> 
<SA> connection: <SA rcv from SD> inputs <sd -> sa> 
SA indegree: 3, decomp: 3, connec: 7, complexity: 13 
 
<SC> in-degree: <SC rcv from SB> inputs <sb -> sc> 
<SC> in-degree: <SC rcv from SA> inputs <sa -> sc> 
<SC> connection (from valued function): <f(SC)> quanta: <1> 
<SC> connection: <SC rcv from SB> inputs <sb -> sc> 
<SC> connection: <SC rcv from SA> inputs <sa -> sc> 
SC indegree: 2, decomp: 1, connec: 3, complexity: 6 
 
System: <SB>, Function: <f>, quanta: 3 
System: <SA>, Function: <f>, quanta: 2 
System: <SC>, Function: <f>, quanta: 1 
 
S0 R-characterization: 0.4186, quanta: 6, numsys: 3, complexity: 43 
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System complexity contribution: 
 SB: 48.8372% 
 SD: 6.9767% 
 SA: 30.2326% 
 SC: 13.9535% 
System productivity contribution: 
 SB: 50.0000% 
 SA: 33.3333% 
 SC: 16.6667% 
Function productivity contribution: 
 f: 100.0000% 
 
 Though the canonical example is quite simple—the intent was to allow the 
illustrative calculations to be accomplished mentally—it is clear that it establishes a 
baseline for resilience characterization. Larger systems quickly become impossible to 
manage, thus requiring a modeling tool. Once modeled, system engineers interested in 
changing parts of the system, adding interfaces, decomposing systems, etc., would very 
quickly understand how such changes impact the overall resilience of their system. 
 
Innoslate
TM
 for Quantum Resilience 
 
 The Innoslate™ MBSE is offered by SPEC Innovations of Manassas, VA. This 
section outlines the approach taken for implementing quantum resilience in Innoslate and 
can serve as an appendix to most systems engineering specification practices guides.  
 
 Elements 
 
 Asset 
 
 Assets represent the physical “systems” being modeled. An asset is “decomposed 
by” other assets. This is how the system hierarchy is modeled (see Figure 9). Innoslate 
allows these hierarchies to be created easily in the user interface. 
 Special accommodations: 
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 Asset has an optional “multiplicity” property/attribute added that allows for 
system boundary modeling (see Figure 10). An asset with a multiplicity of zero is 
not included in the decomposition and complexity calculations. Instead, it is 
considered to be only an organizational entity. Assets with multiplicity greater 
than one are counted as many times as indicated in the parameter value. 
 Asset also has a “resilience” attribute added to store the characterization value 
(see Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 9. Innoslate Representation of Canonical S0 Decomposition 
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Figure 10. Attributes Added to "Asset" 
 
 Action 
 
 Actions provide transformations and do the work of the assets. Actions are 
“performed by” assets, and assets “perform” actions. Also, an action “generates” and 
“receives” an Input/Output item. 
 Special accommodations: 
 Action has been augmented in the schema to have a “quanta” attribute (visible to 
the user as “Quanta of Valued Function”, see Figure 11) which must be updated 
to contain the number of quanta of the valued function provided by the action. 
Though all actions are valued, not all actions necessarily deliver “valued 
functions” in the quantum resilience sense. Only those with values assigned to the 
attributes will be used in resilience characterization calculations. Additionally, an 
attribute called “Valued Function Name” has been added where a string 
identifying the “valued function” (in the quantum resilience sense) is specified. 
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Figure 11. Attributes Added to "Action" 
 
 Input/Output 
 
 I/O items represent data or material that traverses an interface between two 
systems. As long as good system engineering practices are used, it is not necessary to 
model specific interfaces or links (see below) for full characterization of resilience. An 
action “generates” and “receives” I/O items. Since actions are performed by assets, an 
input/output item’s source and destination serve to anchor both sides of the interface. 
Figure 12 shows an I
2
 chart of the interfaces and the I/O items in the canonical example. 
 
 Logical Connection (optional) 
 
 Interfaces are logical connections between components. Note that a Logical 
connection “connects to” Assets. 
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 Conduit Connection (optional) 
 
 Conduits are physical interfaces between two components. A conduit “connects 
to” an asset and “transfers” Input/Output items. Complete system engineering approaches 
will require Conduits to be created. 
 
 
Figure 12. I
2
 Chart of Input/Output Items 
 
 Outputs 
 
 The calculations for quantum resilience characterization were implemented in 
Java for the Innoslate data model. The canonical hypothetical example results in the 
following outcomes: 
<SC> in-degree: <SC rcv from SB> inputs <sb->sc> 
<SC> in-degree: <SC rcv from SA> inputs <sa->sc> 
<SC> connection (from valued function): <f(SC)> quanta: <1.0> 
<SC> connection: <SC rcv from SB> inputs <sb->sc> 
<SC> connection: <SC rcv from SA> inputs <sa->sc> 
SC indegree: 2, decomp: 1, connec: 3, complexity: 6 
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<SD> connection: <SD snd to SA> outputs <sd->sa> 
<SD> connection: <SD snd to SB> outputs <sd->sb> 
SD indegree: 0, decomp: 1, connec: 2, complexity: 3 
 
<SA> in-degree: <SA rcv from SD> inputs <sd->sa> 
<S1> in-degree: <S1 rcv from S2> inputs <s2->s1> 
<S2> in-degree: <S2 rcv from S1> inputs <s1->s2> 
<S1> connection: <S1 snd to S2> outputs <s1->s2> 
<S1> connection: <S1 rcv from S2> inputs <s2->s1> 
<S2> connection: <S2 snd to S1> outputs <s2->s1> 
<S2> connection: <S2 rcv from S1> inputs <s1->s2> 
<SA> connection (from valued function): <f(SA)> quanta: <2.0> 
<SA> connection: <SA rcv from SD> inputs <sd->sa> 
<SA> connection: <SA snd to SC> outputs <sa->sc> 
SA indegree: 3, decomp: 3, connec: 7, complexity: 13 
 
<SB> in-degree: <SB rcv from SD> inputs <sd->sb> 
<S3> in-degree: <S3 rcv from S4> inputs <s4->s3> 
<S4> in-degree: <S4 rcv from S3> inputs <s3->s4> 
<S5> in-degree: <S5 rcv from S6> inputs <s6->s5> 
<S6> in-degree: <S6 rcv from S5> inputs <s5->s6> 
<S3> connection: <S3 rcv from S4> inputs <s4->s3> 
<S3> connection: <S3 snd to S4> outputs <s3->s4> 
<S5> connection: <S5 rcv from S6> inputs <s6->s5> 
<S5> connection: <S5 snd to S6> outputs <s5->s6> 
<S6> connection: <S6 snd to S5> outputs <s6->s5> 
<S6> connection: <S6 rcv from S5> inputs <s5->s6> 
<S4> connection: <S4 snd to S3> outputs <s4->s3> 
<S4> connection: <S4 rcv from S3> inputs <s3->s4> 
<SB> connection (from valued function): <f(SB)> quanta: <3.0> 
<SB> connection: <SB rcv from SD> inputs <sd->sb> 
<SB> connection: <SB snd to SC> outputs <sb->sc> 
SB indegree: 5, decomp: 5, connec: 11, complexity: 21 
 
System: <SC>, Function: <f>, quanta: 1.0 
System: <SA>, Function: <f>, quanta: 2.0 
System: <SB>, Function: <f>, quanta: 3.0 
 
R-characterization: 0.4186, quanta: 6.0, numsys: 3, complexity: 43 
System complexity contribution: 
 SC: 13.9535% 
 SD: 6.9767% 
 SA: 30.2326% 
 SB: 48.8372% 
System productivity contribution: 
 SC: 16.6667% 
 SA: 33.3333% 
 SB: 50.0% 
Function productivity contribution: 
 f: 100.0% 
 
FractalSys for Quantum Resilience 
 
 FractalSys is the author’s model-based system engineering tool, a brief overview 
of which is contained in Appendix A. This section outlines the augmentation of 
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FractalSys to support quantum resilience characterization. It not only lists the changes 
made to instrument the calculation of system complexity (in-degree, connections, and 
decomposition) and tracking of system productivity vis-à-vis valued function and output 
quanta, but also demonstrates its use. With a few simple adjustments and methodological 
constraints, FractalSys can be used to characterize and compare resilience of modeled 
systems. Impact to FractalSys is discussed below as it pertains to Systems, States, 
Transitions, and Variables. Though not strictly required, Functions have been added to 
FractalSys to support quantum resilience more clearly. This is discussed below. The 
FractalSys overview (see Appendix A) should be consulted to clarify assumptions made 
herein. 
 It is important to remember that resilience is characterized as a function of system 
complexity and productivity as described by quantum resilience. System complexity is a 
function of system decomposition into subsystems, in-degree as a measure of dependence 
on other systems, and connectivity (in-degree and out-degree) with other systems. 
Measured this way, quantum resilience acknowledges both hierarchical and relational 
complexity. System productivity is calculated based on the valued function and the total 
output of the system as measured in quanta of the valued function. This document 
outlines how these key concepts (italicized) are managed in FractalSys. 
 
 Systems 
 
 The way systems are managed directly impacts the calculation of decomposition 
which contributes to system complexity. System hierarchies are adequately managed by 
FractalSys, but the overall containing system for which resilience characterization will be 
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done should be thought of as an “analysis boundary” (instead of—strictly speaking—a 
real “parent” system) though the distinction is somewhat moot. As shown in the 
canonical example above, the analysis boundary (S0) is drawn with a dotted-line to 
indicate it is an analysis choice instead of a “real” system. S0 effectively contains all 
systems the analyst deemed important to providing the valued function(s). Note that since 
quantum resilience expects “real” parent systems to be included in complexity measures, 
such a choice allows the artificial system boundary to not be implicated in the 
“decomposition” part of the complexity calculation. This can be accomplished by 
assigning the purely “organizational” systems a multiplicity of 0 in FractalSys. 
 
 
Figure 13. FractalSys Representation of Canonical S0 Decomposition 
 Figure 13 illustrates how the hypothetical system in the canonical example would 
be represented in FractalSys. Note that S0 appears as a typical system in a typical 
hierarchy. By counting the number of systems in the hierarchy, its decomposition (self-
included) is easily seen to be 11. Since S0 is an artificial analysis boundary, however, it 
should not be counted in the analysis. FractalSys supports this as shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. Clarification of “System Boundary” and “Parent System” 
 
 Note that FractalSys accurately reflects the decomposition of S0 (in Figure 14) 
and only the decomposition of the systems implicated in the delivery of the valued 
function is counted in the complexity metric which is the sum of the in-degree, 
decomposition, and connectivity values (10+10+23=43). 
 
 States 
 
 Recognizing that system “state” can be an adequate proxy for “function” is 
important (see FractalSys overview). This is a fairly logical assumption considering that 
when a system is in a certain state (as indicated by the values of state variables selected 
and defined by human observers) it is likely to be undergoing certain dynamics in 
performing a certain function or functions. Since quantum resilience emphasizes valued 
function, FractalSys will allow identification of a particular system state as the one in 
which the system delivers its valued function. This does not mean a “state” can be 
resilient and, in fact, it is incorrect to refer to a “state” as resilient. This terminology has 
been casually employed in the literature, but it is vital to remember the “system” is what 
will be characterized for resilience, not a state. 
Systems marked with a 
multiplicity of 0 are assumed 
to be for organizational 
purposes (e.g., for a 
functional decomposition) 
and hence not “real.” Such 
systems do not impact the 
resilience characterization.
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 Functions have been added to FractalSys to support the “valued function” concept 
(see Figure 15). Each system can support an arbitrary number of functions, but in 
practice, these are generally short lists. When a system state is defined, the user specifies 
the number of quanta provided for each function. These can remain zero as necessary. As 
shown in Figure 15, system SB, provides 3 quanta of function f while operating in a state 
that has been arbitrarily named “providing f.” 
 
 
Figure 15. FractalSys State Panel Showing Provision of Valued Function 
 
 Note also that provision of a valued function is considered to be one external 
connection that contributes to the complexity measure. This is because, in general, the 
valued function will be consumed by some external system and does, in that way, 
introduce another connection to the system. 
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 Variables 
 
 FractalSys assumes the extent to which variables are shared by systems defines 
the connectedness of those systems. Setting a variable that is used by another system 
increases connections for both systems. Using a variable which is set or controlled by 
another system increases in-degree for the using system. FractalSys also recognizes 
indirect connectivity. That is, if two otherwise independent systems use a variable set by 
a third system, they are indirectly connected through that variable. Such indirect 
connectivity is not currently exploited in resilience characterization though it is certainly 
within reach of FractalSys to measure this if it is deemed important. At this stage, since it 
creates no real connection or dependency, it is ignored.  
 FractalSys variables are used to ensure proper allocation of in-degree and 
connections in system complexity calculations. Obviously, any variable sharing between 
systems constitutes a connection (and recall that data sharing in FractalSys can represent 
material or non-material exchanges). Such connections will be counted based on unique 
variable names and multiple uses of the same variable between the same systems do not 
increase the overall count (though obviously this can be adjusted as necessary). 
 As discussed in the FractalSys overview, any state or transition that uses a 
variable defined in an external scope (that is, inherited, see FractalSys overview) 
indicates a system dependency. This serves to increment in-degree for that system. 
Similar to connection counting, variables incrementing in-degree will count only once per 
unique variable. The FractalSys overview also suggests that FractalSys does not care 
about directionality of interfaces since there was no driving reason to support such ideas 
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at its design. Since this is the case, an “incoming” data item would also serve to 
artificially inflate “out-degree” for the receiving system. This would result in situation in 
which in-degree and overall connections were always equivalent. To avoid this, a specific 
mechanism will be used to properly manage in-degree for resilience characterization. 
This is discussed in the next section. 
 Since resilience characterization requires the idea of “in-degree” to identify 
system dependencies, it may be easier on the user if they could specify interface 
directionality in FractalSys. This update can be considered as more experience is gained. 
 
 Transitions 
 
 To properly manage in-degree, a specific transition (and transition entry) must be 
created that “sets” the variable in the system which “owns” the variable within its scope. 
In a properly modeled system, such a mechanism will generally emerge as a matter of 
course (that is, there is nothing forced about it), but since it is specifically implicated in 
calculation of in-degree, it merits an example. The canonical example provides an 
adequate demonstration. 
 Figure 16 shows the S0 decomposition and the specific implementation of the SA-
SC interface. For ease of discussion, the data (or material) sent from SA to SC is referred to 
by the variable sa-sc. The hypothetical system proposed in the example shows this to be a 
unidirectional output from SA that is presumably required by SC in generating a valued 
function (otherwise it would not be modeled). The interface implied by the sa-sc 
exchange constitutes a connection for both SA and SC. As expected, this exchange will 
increment the total number of connections for these systems. 
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 Since SC uses a variable that comes from an external scope (see bottom center of 
Figure 16 where the SA variables are listed and variable sa-sc is shown to be within the S0 
scope), it also constitutes an input connection that increments in-degree for SC. Hence, 
from this exchange (and as expected), SC has a connection, and an additional in-degree. 
Note that since FractalSys interfaces are bidirectional, the same would be true for SA. 
This would clearly go against the intent of the system engineer who (based on the 
directional arrow) specifically intended a unidirectional interface from SA to SC. To 
resolve this confusion, SA can assert the direction of the interface by explicitly using the 
FractalSys “SET” keyword. 
 
 
Figure 16. Example of Interface Modeling 
 
Note the scope of 
sa-sc is S0 since it 
is shared between 
SA and SC.
Since SA provides input to SC, SA “sets” the sa-sc
variable in a transition. This allows FractalSys to 
properly treat this interface as unidirectional, from 
SA to SC (assuming, of course, there is no similar 
but opposite entry in the SC system).
S0 is shown here in 
its decomposition 
as depicted in the 
canonical example.
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 “SET” is a reserved keyword in FractalSys that facilitates system simulation when 
FractalSys is not integrated with real systems that externally control variable value 
updates. To use SET to update a variable, it must be placed in a transition entry (and 
therefore, within a transition). As shown in the upper right panel of Figure 16, a transition 
and entry have been created for SA in which the sa-sc variable is specifically “SET” to a 
value in the transition vector. For this example, though “1” is used, the actual value is 
inconsequential, but will likely make more sense for a real modeled system. Since SA 
asserts control over this variable update with a SET keyword, FractalSys does not include 
this in its counting of in-degree for SA. Hence, for SC, both overall connection count and 
in-degree are incremented, while for SA, only the overall connection count is 
incremented. 
 In this hypothetical example, such an approach may appear to be an onerous 
burden on the system modeler, but in practice, such interfaces are managed as a matter of 
course during a complete system analysis. Variables are set and used as needed and 
FractalSys manages the bookkeeping. Further, as indicated above, future modifications to 
FractalSys can be considered that specifically allow the specification of unidirectional 
interfaces. 
 
 Other Notes 
 
 System identity can be rigorously controlled (modeled and enforced) in 
FractalSys. Significant nuance can be shown since an arbitrarily large number of states 
and relationships are supported. Note that when multiple states are defined, a system is 
required to be in one of the states. If no defined state matches current variable values or 
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subsystem configurations, resolution of the unknown state is required. A model wherein a 
system can be in an unknown state is considered incomplete or underspecified and must 
be more fully defined. This also includes the enforcement of managing transitions 
between states based on changes in variables (i.e., “measurables” or telemetry). While 
transitions are not an adequate proxy for “function”, it can readily be seen that regular or 
periodic transitions between states can be a way to model (or even simulate) larger 
“functions.” The engineer is warned, however, that the need for such contrivances may 
actually be suggesting that a more “firm” state be specified for a parent system. 
 FractalSys variables can represent what Holling (and others) would suggest are 
the handful of fast- and slow-moving variables that drive most system states. Importantly, 
however, contrary to the literature, we need not be forced to limit them to a handful, or 
classify them as “fast” or “slow” a priori. Instead, if such a classification is deemed 
important, variables should be observed over timeframes of interest and then can be 
determined to be fast or slow-moving. It is important to moderate the tendency to too 
quickly assume what is fast and what is slow and to avoid making decisions based on 
such assumptions. Further, when tools like FractalSys are available to manage system 
models of significant size and complexity, it is unnecessary to be frugal in assignment or 
tracking of variables. Only when the system has been adequately codified can assessment 
of major driving variables and consolidation for simplicity be done. 
 Note that it is unlikely to be important that FractalSys is a tool for development of 
Anticipatory Systems (sensu Rosen, 1985). This might become interesting or useful in the 
future, but as currently envisioned, these features are not intended for use in quantum 
resilience characterization work. 
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 An argument could be made that quantum resilience only characterizes resilience 
with respect to specifically identified valued functions/services and does not fully 
characterize a system. This is only true to the extent that the analysis (1) has not fully 
documented the system, and (2) has not fully identified all of the functions of value. If a 
system analysis is incomplete, the resilience characterization may be incomplete (but 
likely will still be very useful). This is not, however, an argument against quantum 
resilience. Instead it is an argument that suggests analyses must be completed and 
properly vetted. If a variety of valued functions are not identified, then yes, the 
characterization of the system will be more directly tied to those that are identified and it 
may discount those functions that are underrepresented. Again, an incomplete model can 
still be useful, but the applicability might be limited by the failure to acknowledge other 
valued functions or other contributing systems. Tools like FractalSys make it very easy to 
incrementally embellish models as needed and ensure transparency throughout the entire 
process. System modeling has a long history of balancing fidelity with cost/benefit trades. 
A similar “sweet-spot” is likely to be found with resilience characterization modeling. 
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ILLUSTRATING QUANTUM RESILIENCE 
 
 As a generalized theory, quantum resilience can be applied to all system regimes 
and all disciplines. Obviously, some systems are more physical than others, and gaining 
consensus among experts over the methods of modeling and measurement is more easily 
achieved. Some systems (especially psycho-social systems that are predominately about 
human resilience) will require more work to gain consensus. Importantly, quantum 
resilience ensures transparency and consistency in managing these systems. System 
regimes remain loosely defined, but involve the following rough delineations: 
1. Mostly-human-engineered systems (e.g., the Internet, intelligence surveillance, 
infrastructure), 
2. Mostly-natural systems (e.g., ecosystems like salt marshes, boreal forests), 
3. Mixed socio-ecological systems (e.g., catchments and basins with economies 
based on mixed grazing and agriculture), and, 
4. Mostly-human systems (e.g., organizations, governments). 
 The brief examples below serve to not only introduce a variety of system classes 
and illustrations on approach but also will instruct and sometimes correct intuition about 
resilience. In general, these examples are too simplistic to provide usable data, but they 
can facilitate discussion and provide fodder for future work. These examples are intended 
to build confidence in the method and tools and do not necessarily offer solutions. 
 Though they could easily be replicated in any of the aforementioned model-based 
systems engineering tools, all the examples documented herein have been modeled and 
characterized using the author’s FractalSys tool. 
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Lake-Agriculture System 
 
 The history outlined by Carpenter et al. (2001) for a representative lake-
agriculture system is a litany of protecting a natural lake from an onslaught of events it 
was not “designed” to withstand. In fact, from the analysis, the only conclusion that can 
be drawn is that the lake is not resilient and hence needs human-designed protection. 
Throughout, the degradation of the lake system away from its pristine condition is 
conflated with a degradation of resilience. This positions a former “state of nature” as the 
ideal high mark for resilience, which Carpenter et al. suggest was available in 1840. It is 
fairly typical for the eco-resilience literature to make this tenuous equation, so it must be 
made clear that they are speaking of ecological health and not resilience. 
 Instead of a notional analysis based on the adaptive cycle, the lake-agriculture 
system proposed by Carpenter et al. (2001) can be more completely assessed by quantum 
resilience. First, quantum resilience requires us to recognize that based on their 
discussion there are (at least) two valued functions: (1) incremental economic gain from 
agricultural production near the lake, and (2) some presumably measurable social utility 
of the lake based on (perhaps) recreational and aesthetic value (and perhaps a few 
vacation rentals). Note that for this particular example, management efforts were focused 
on restoring the clarity of the water by controlling the Phosphorous content. After 
redirecting sewage effluent away from the lake, the principle contributor to the nutrient 
increase in the lake was agricultural runoff. Note that while the lake must remain 
“environmentally healthy” to support aesthetic and recreational goals, its value is 
ultimately derived from functions that can be reduced to economic values as indicated in 
the proposed list of valued functions: 
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1. Agricultural production 
2. Fishing licenses 
3. Cabin rentals 
4. Boat rentals 
5. Boat launch fees 
 Obviously, the list can be argued and extended as necessary—including, if 
desired, specific valuation of low Phosphorous. Recall, however, that high P will be 
reflected in low economic return from recreation. Valuation of biophysical aspects is 
exemplified in the extended example of the Goulburn-Broken Catchment. 
 Note that “agricultural production” is forced here. If the real interest is to earn 
money from the real estate surrounding the lake, other options for land use are available 
(e.g., a housing development) and the valued function can be adjusted accordingly. 
Obviously, this might reveal other social dimensions that lead to other valued functions, 
but these can be formulated in a set of scenarios as needed. Once these valued functions 
have been elucidated to an extent satisfactory to the analysis team, quanta of resilience 
can be established and assigned (e.g., how much economic gain from agriculture over 
what periods and how much enjoyment of the clear water, etc.). Even with these first 
steps driven by quantum resilience analysis, it is clear that an actual system is being 
addressed and not simply a romanticized idea of a healthy lake. Certainly, subsystems 
can receive focused attention if desirable, but first the whole system must be properly 
acknowledged. 
 Second, observation of the scale of the system that delivers these functions can 
now occur. Just because, for example, economics is implicated in the valued function, 
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does not imply it is necessary to expand the system to include the entire global economy. 
If the quantum of resilience is something like net revenue per growing season from the 
land in the lake’s vicinity, it can remain scoped fairly tightly. As suggested above, 
however, it must be admitted that this opens the doors to many alternative mechanisms 
for generating revenue, some of which do not even require that agriculture be the 
technology of choice. Still, if the valued function includes agriculture, alternative crops 
or alternative approaches to agriculture might be considered and might expand or contract 
the system scope (e.g., an orchard has different impact than an industrial wheat field). 
Further, since system structure is an important consideration, alternative protections for 
the lake could be envisioned that might expand the scale of the system at costs that must 
be acknowledged (e.g., if all runoff were captured by retaining walls and routed to a 
wastewater treatment plant this would change the scope to include the municipal water 
and sewer system). In that case, retaining walls and additional plumbing must be 
acknowledged to be protection-oriented and contributing to the robustness of the system 
in a way that may not be specifically measurable as valued function. Instead, it is a 
contributor to system complexity that is specifically required in order to gain the other 
valued functions that are closely related to the clarity of the water in the lake. Such 
protections do not necessarily increase resilience as much as they allow the system to do 
what it was designed to do. 
 Third, clear identification of systems and subsystems that are implicated in the 
valued function delivery can be accomplished. Once the systems that provide the function 
are identified it is easy to see how they can be required to maintain their identity. It is 
also easy to see how much they can change without impacting reliable delivery of the 
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function. Recall that it is disingenuous to suggest that the system can show its resilience 
by delivering different functions. A lake-agriculture system cannot reasonably be 
changed into a parking lot if recreational use of the water is one of the valued functions. 
For example, if agricultural production on surrounding land is non-negotiable, the 
aforementioned retaining walls could deflect or control dangerous runoff events, or a 
higher rate of lake water replacement could be established, but you cannot simply tell 
farmers to not use fertilizer. Obviously costs must be carefully considered and sometimes 
management costs will serve to moderate just how much value there is placed on specific 
valued functions. Note “maintaining a pristine natural environment” is a valid valued 
function, but it greatly limits what can be done if economic return remains a valued 
function. Balance must be sought through traditional cost-benefit analysis. 
 Fourth and finally, it can be determined how the valued functions are (or can be) 
redundantly supplied. Carpenter et al. (2001) recognize a few redundant approaches and 
this is a step in the right direction. For example, they recognize how bio-manipulation of 
the lake’s food web could improve water quality. Or, as previously stated, management 
may involve a more delicate balance of agriculture. After considering important warnings 
about focusing solely on technological fixes (cf. Allenby, 2012, p. 357), managers should 
certainly not preclude the possibility of employing elaborate and expensive technological 
remediation. Though costly, there is no reason technology could not be put in place to 
prevent all agriculture run-off from entering the lake. Sometimes SES managers are 
hesitant to include expensive technological fixes in their solution spaces, however, it is 
unfair to assume that their lamented socio-political “tumult of confusion” (Carpenter et 
al., 2001, p. 770) is without significant cost. 
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 A simplified lake-agriculture system is depicted in Figure 17. It is understood that 
a real system is far more complex than this, but this will provide several talking points. 
For the simple example one farm is assumed to own and operate all surrounding land. 
They have installed an attractive stone wall to prevent erosion and protect the lake from 
runoff from a part of the farm, but runoff continues to happen in other areas. A local real 
estate manager rents two cabins on one corner of the lake. There is an access road, a dock 
with rental boats and a launching ramp. Fishing licenses are sold and catch fees collected. 
A small economy is generated in managing recreational use of the lake. 
 
 
Figure 17. Simple Lake-Agriculture System 
 
 Based on the list of valued functions above, Table 14 summarizes the resilience of 
the system. Note that this is effectively an economic system and that its resilience is 
Agriculture system
Lake-Agriculture system
$/year
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based on the ability to generate economic value in a variety of ways. Obviously, if the 
lake becomes turbid, the economic value from recreation is diminished. 
 
Table 14 
R-characterization: Lake-Agriculture System 
System (Function) $K/year 
Agriculture (Economic Output) 200 
Cabin 1 (Economic Output) 20 
Cabin 2 (Economic Output) 20 
Licensing Bureau (Economic Output) 1.5 
Launch Management (Economic Output) 2.5 
Boat Rental (Economic Output) 5 
  
Productivity 1494.00 
Complexity 19 
R-characterization 78.6316 
 
 This provides a baseline resilience characterization for the simple system. Now 
assume that for some reason, the non-agricultural economic production ceased. Note 
well, this can be caused by any number of disturbances including eutrophication after the 
farmers carelessly dumped 100 tons of fertilizer into the lake, ten consecutive years of 
uncontrolled flooding and unrestrained runoff, a labor union strike in the recreation 
sector, or a bomb scare at the dock. The particular disturbance does not matter, but 
assume that eventually, all non-agriculture economic production disappears. This 
constitutes an alternative system deployment and the resilience can be reassessed with the 
results depicted in Table 15. 
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Table 15 
R-characterization: Lake-Agriculture System (Ag Only) 
System (Function) $K/year 
Agriculture (Economic Output) 200 
  
Productivity 200.00 
Complexity 14 
R-characterization 14.2857 
 
 Despite the marginal contribution (~20%) of the non-agricultural economic 
production in the original assessment, the resilience is dramatically reduced by the loss of 
the recreation sector. Though in this case, it is clearly an artifact of the way the system is 
modeled, it is a good example of how incremental delivery of valued function contributes 
to resilience. In a more thoroughly modeled system, the negative impact of the non-
agricultural productivity loss might not have been so dramatic, or it might have been 
worse. This reiterates the importance of gaining consensus on the system modeling but 
also demonstrates the power of the approach in instructing engineers about resilience and 
intuition. 
 Importantly, this example also demonstrates how quantum resilience reverses the 
equation on disturbances. As discussed at length above, the resilience of a system cannot 
be based on disturbances, but once the resilience is characterized, it can be used to 
“measure” the size of a disturbance. With this simple lake-agriculture system, no matter 
how the new system configuration came about, the difference in the pre- and post- 
resilience characterizations can be used to measure the impact in terms of resilience. 
 Hence, the magnitude of a “lake eutrophication event” or a “labor union strike” 
can be measured in diminished resilience. As always, caution must be used to ensure that 
homologous systems are being compared. 
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Simple Desk 
 
 A trivial “desk system” with a top, four drawers, one file drawer and four legs 
might offer valued functions of work surface (sq. ft.), locked storage in drawers (cu. ft.), 
and filing space (feet of standard file width). Table 16 depicts the resilience 
characterization for the simple desk. 
 
Table 16 
R-characterization: Desk 
System (Function) Productivity Multiplicity 
Top (Level Work Surface) 20 1 
Drawer (Storage) 1 4 
File Drawer (Filing) 2 1 
Productivity 39.00  
Complexity 16  
R-characterization 2.4375  
 
 As alluded above, a desk is manufactured to operate in a given environment (e.g., 
the level floor of a climate-controlled office building), so it would be ludicrous to expect 
it to function properly when positioned on the stairs in a stairwell. It therefore makes no 
sense to suggest it is not resilient to that particular disturbance. Recall that resilience 
characterization is unconcerned with specific perturbations, so it cannot matter why the 
desk is deployed in an unleveled environment. It matters only that its valued function is 
impacted. Once the desk’s resilience has been properly characterized, positioning the 
desk precariously on the stairs can be visualized as an alternative system deployment and 
then resilience can be re-characterized. In this case, the contents of the drawers might be 
a bit jumbled, but only the 20 sq. ft. of “Level Work Surface” would be lost, resulting in a 
new resilience characterization of 1.267. The same kind of re-characterization can be 
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done if, say, somebody attacked the desk with a chain saw and removed a corner, 
destroying two sq. ft. of work surface and one of the drawers. In this case, the new 
resilience characterization is: 2.143. 
 The important thing to understand about this is that quantum resilience changes 
the equation on perturbations. Instead of attempting to define resilience by corralling an 
infinite number of perturbations, specific perturbation impacts can be “measured” by 
changes in resilience characterization. This properly focuses resilience analysis on the 
system instead of its environment. 
 
Imbricated Theater 
 
 When the show must go on, it might be important that a theater is resilient. 
Imagine a simple theater with some physical offices, dressing rooms, entry foyer for 
concessions sales, and a stage. This theater will obviously have some management, 
concessions staff, production staff, and a troupe of actors. Hierarchically, the theater 
system might be arranged as depicted in Figure 18. The concessions staff and the 
production staff report to the manager but form separate organizations within the theater. 
 Note that for this example the concessions staff contains three normal “sellers” 
and one “special” seller. This is because, in a pinch, this sales attendant can also act. The 
theater demonstrates redundancy in its degenerate form because even though the sales 
staff are differently trained and have different “structure” than the actors, one can 
apparently substitute and provide the acting function if the need arises. This also 
demonstrates the way degeneracy can lead to imbricated redundancy since the sales 
attendant reports to a different organization than the actors. In this illustration, the larger 
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“containing” system (the entire theater organization) is getting involved in providing the 
function when the specific sub-organization (the acting troupe) cannot deliver it. Such 
functional redundancy may seem inconsequential until the resilience of the system is 
characterized. 
 
 
Figure 18. Simple Theater System 
 
 For this simple system, assume each actor produces one unit of performing, while 
each concessions attendant produces one unit of selling. Additionally, the special sales 
person also contributes her capacity to act. While we may not understand the “magic” 
behind a person who can sell concessions and perform, Table 17 shows that it confers 
added resilience on the system. 
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Table 17 
R-characterization: Simple Theater 
System (Function) Special Salesperson 
can Act 
Productivity 
(Multiplicity) 
Salesperson 
cannot Act 
Productivity 
(Multiplicity) 
Generic Sales Persons (Sell) 1 (3) 1 (3) 
Special Sales Persons (Perform) 1 (1)  
Special Sales Persons (Sell) 1 (1) 1 (1) 
Support Staff (Support) 1 (3) 1 (3) 
Actors (Perform) 1 (5) 1 (5) 
   
Productivity 61.00 50 
Complexity 40 39 
R-characterization 1.5250 1.2821 
 
 This example also presents a way to think of human and social capital. Here, if 
human capital is measured by training (perhaps she is attending acting school), exposure 
(has seen the play several times), experience (has been called on to fill in before), and 
daring (no fears about being on stage), the special sales person clearly demonstrates 
higher human capital than a typical seller who has no interest in expanding her horizons 
and stepping on stage. It is clearly the human capital of the theater that contributes to its 
higher resilience in this case. 
 
Electric Power Plant/Grid 
 
 After I heard it suggested that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant “should 
have been resilient” in the face of the 2012 earthquake and tsunami I realized that 
resilience is apparently a tricky concept. Though quantum resilience takes a different 
tack, some scholars argue that resilience might imply the ability of a system to bounce 
back to typical function after it is perturbed in some manner. Since there is a huge 
literature supporting that idea, this is most likely what was intended in that casual remark, 
175 
though it is anybody’s guess what they might have envisioned. Other scholars imply 
resilience instills the ability to do even more than bounce back, perhaps even allowing for 
adaptation to be an important aspect of the response (cf. Holling, 1973). Typically, 
desirable adaptations are not elucidated and, in the context of a submerged and 
earthquake-toppled nuclear power plant, could scarcely be envisioned. Recently, 
however, scholars seem to be standardizing on the concept that adaptation is either 
requisite for resilience or a close cousin (Folke et al., 2010). Quantum resilience proposes 
a different and more practical approach and the specific industrial example of Fukushima 
will help to make this clear. 
 The earthquake and tsunami that destroyed the Fukushima nuclear power plant 
and forced Japan out of the nuclear power industry provides an excellent example to 
which the tenets of quantum resilience can be applied. Many would argue that the power 
plant is the system that should be resilient. But what might “resilience” have looked like 
in the Fukushima nuclear power plant? Recall that back when Fukushima was designed 
and built, “fault tolerant” and “ultra-dependable” were the precursors to “resilience” that 
implied there were designed-in problem management features that included something 
more sophisticated than simple redundancy. Engineering teams spent significant time in 
failure modes effects analysis and the FMEAs done for Fukushima (though obviously 
done over 40 years ago), were very likely as sound as anything going at the time. This 
resulted in a highly robust system that was augmented with some redundancy and some 
assorted system performance degradation options. The plant was built to withstand 
magnitude 9 earthquakes and be failsafe, which it managed to do (Braun, 2011). It was 
designed to lose power and shutdown gracefully, which it was in the process of doing, 
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when the over 7 meter tsunami struck (it was designed to withstand 6.5 meter tsunamis). 
Does this qualify as resilient? It would certainly qualify given the current literature about 
projecting and planning for disturbances. If so, why did Fukushima fail to survive the 
tsunami? And if Fukushima’s many defenses did not qualify it as resilient, could it have 
been done better? This provides a hint that resilience is being misinterpreted. 
 There are two reasons to consider this in the context of quantum resilience. The 
first is to point out that what is typically considered resilient is really more about 
robustness (see above). Obviously, making a system robust can only go so far in ensuring 
its survivability. But in this case, not only did Fukushima operate well in its designed-for 
environment it also resisted an extreme environment for a time. Second, we must ask if 
we are thinking about “resilience” at the right scale. Can a standalone power plant really 
be expected to be resilient? What would the valued functions be in that case? Consider 
that Japan’s energy infrastructure was very resilient to the disaster (in fact, so resilient 
that they quickly phased-out nuclear power generation entirely and are consequently less 
resilient now because of the removal of this functional redundancy). Consider that it was 
only the areas that were hit by the disaster at Fukushima that were impacted by power 
outages—and even in that region portable generators were available fairly quickly to 
provide necessary power. Even if a few weeks or months were required to restore power 
where infrastructure was damaged, that is an impressive “bounce-back” capability 
considering the many years required to do the initial configuration. So perhaps resilience 
must be considered at a larger system level. For Japan, their energy infrastructure 
resilience was instrumented by significant levels of redundancy and broad distribution of 
generating capability, so it exhibited significant resilience. 
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 While a given power plant cannot be effectively “resilient against” a tsunami 
(recalling that quantum resilience suggests that phraseology is meaningless), each plant 
contributes to the resilience of the larger energy production system because of the 
redundant incremental contributions each makes. In this particular example (and in the 
energy industry at large), the valued function is electrical power generation, and an 
ability to provide incremental power to the grid is the quantum of resilience. For this 
reason, while we may be interested (because of cost) in hardening each plant against a 
long list of disturbances, it makes no sense to design them for resilience beyond their own 
local redundancy. Can more be done to make the plants robust? Sure. For example, 
backup power systems (for pumps and supervisory control systems) can be wired from 
distant generating plants, ensuring that only physical severance of power cables could 
dissociate the power from the need—but such solutions are costly and subject to their 
own failure modes. Further, increasing robustness in this manner greatly increases the 
complexity of the grid while only marginally contributing to its resilience. 
 Assume an electric power grid is supported by several power plants offering two 
valued functions: energy to the grid (MW) and employees to the job market. Table 18 
provides a summary resilience characterization of a grid with six power plants with 
varying outputs and employment. Note that these numbers are notional and resilience 
characterization is high because none of the real complexity is modeled. Obviously, if 
one plant is removed (e.g., for maintenance or because of a tsunami, see 5-Plant column), 
resilience characterization will be lower because of less overall productivity. Table 18 
shows a ~15% decrease in resilience for this alternative system deployment. This might 
be expected given that Plant 1-1 was one of 6 and was one of the smaller ones. 
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Table 18 
R-characterization: Multi-operator Grid 
System (Function) 6-Plant Productivity 5-Plant Productivity 
Plant 1-1 (Energy) 200 - 
Plant 1-1 (Employment) 20 - 
Plant 1-2 (Energy) 150 150 
Plant 1-2 (Employment) 15 15 
Plant 1-3 (Energy) 350 350 
Plant 1-3 (Employment) 30 30 
Plant 1-4 (Energy) 250 250 
Plant 1-4 (Employment) 20 20 
Plant 2-1 (Energy) 400 400 
Plant 2-1 (Employment) 30 30 
Plant 2-2 (Energy) 400 400 
Plant 2-2 (Employment) 25 25 
   
Productivity 11340.00 8350.00 
Complexity 20 17 
R-characterization 567.0000 491.1765 
 
 Clearly, removing one plant from the grid shows obvious impact but the 
redundant plants allow it to not be crippling. Table 19 shows that if the system were 
further (if trivially) decomposed to have multiple turbine/generators providing the energy 
for each plant, the same impact (loss of plant 1-1) would only impact resilience by 12%. 
Such simple examples reinforce the intuition that incremental delivery of valued function 
from redundant systems contributes to resilience. 
 
Table 19 
R-characterization: Multi-operator/Multi-turbine Grid 
System (Function) 6-Plant Productivity 5-Plant Productivity 
Turbine/Generator 1-1-1 (Energy) 100 - 
Turbine/Generator 1-1-2 (Energy) 100 - 
Plant 1-1 (Employment) 20 - 
Turbine/Generator 1-2-1 (Energy) 50 50 
Turbine/Generator 1-2-2 (Energy) 50 50 
Turbine/Generator 1-2-3 (Energy) 50 50 
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System (Function) 6-Plant Productivity 5-Plant Productivity 
Plant 1-2 (Employment) 15 15 
Turbine/Generator 1-3-1 (Energy) 100 100 
Turbine/Generator 1-3-2 (Energy) 100 100 
Turbine/Generator 1-3-3 (Energy) 150 150 
Plant 1-3 (Employment) 30 30 
Turbine/Generator 1-4-1 (Energy) 100 100 
Turbine/Generator 1-4-2 (Energy) 150 150 
Plant 1-4 (Employment) 20 20 
Turbine/Generator 2-1-1 (Energy) 100 100 
Turbine/Generator 2-1-2 (Energy) 100 100 
Turbine/Generator 2-1-3 (Energy) 100 100 
Turbine/Generator 2-1-4 (Energy) 100 100 
Plant 2-1 (Employment) 30 30 
Turbine/Generator 2-2-1 (Energy) 100 100 
Turbine/Generator 2-2-2 (Energy) 100 100 
Turbine/Generator 2-2-3 (Energy) 100 100 
Turbine/Generator 2-2-4 (Energy) 100 100 
Plant 2-2 (Employment) 25 25 
   
Productivity 32340.00 25400.00 
Complexity 50 44 
R-characterization 646.8000 577.2727 
 
 This illustration also demonstrates that a specific power plant’s resilience is 
attributable to its redundant energy supply capacity (i.e., more turbines and generators), 
and that it is difficult to otherwise increment the resilience of a specific power plant. In 
general, it makes sense to increase the robustness of an individual power plant (as was 
done with Fukushima) but to understand energy resilience at a broader system level. 
 
Pipe System 
 
 Intuition can be tested by considering a simplistic pipe system where the valued 
function of the system is delivery of some fluid. In this simple case assume one pipe 
delivers 100 units of liquid from one place to another (pressure, pipe size, and flow rate 
are all ignored). Table 20 depicts the resilience characterization results (Single Pipe 
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column). It seems intuitive that adding a redundant pipe will increase the resilience of the 
delivery system. Note, however, that unless the volume of fluid delivered is also 
increased, adding another pipe simply increases the system complexity (and cost). 
 
Table 20 
R-characterization: Simple Pipe System 
System (Function) Single Pipe Dual Pipe Shared Dual Pipe 
Pipe 1 (Fluid Flow) 100 100 50 
Pipe 2 (Fluid Flow) - 0 50 
    
Productivity 100.00 100.00 200.00 
Complexity 2 3 4 
R-characterization 50.0 33.33 50.0 
 
 Consider two alternative configurations with a redundant pipe, and note that 
neither increases resilience. First, if the backup pipe is added and left empty (see Dual 
Pipe column), it is merely a backup, and provides no function—only complexity and cost. 
This actually reduces resilience. Second, if the “backup” pipe is used to provide half the 
valued function (i.e., 50 units flowing through each pipe, see Shared Dual Pipe column), 
the redundancy can be thought of as a “wet” backup. Still, this only matches the 
resilience of the original configuration because now two systems (with their attendant 
complexity) are used to perform the same overall function (delivering 100 units) that one 
system previously provided. 
 In the two latter cases, the redundant pipe might only be added if it is considered 
critical infrastructure where limited downtime is permitted. In the “dry” backup case, 
there may be a delay while the empty pipe takes over for the first (depending on pressure 
and distance), but it might be deemed a reasonable delay when repair times are 
considered. Importantly, however, it must not be glibly assumed that resilience from 
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redundancy will always be cost effective. If the mean time to repair (MTTR) for the 
failed pipe warrants the additional cost for a hot backup, clearly the third configuration 
provides the best choice in spite of the fact that its resilience is identical to the single pipe 
configuration. 
 Note, however, that multiple valued functions could be considered. If function is 
distinguished and modeled separately as “fluid flow” and “backup”, the resilience 
characterization is the same as the original characterization because now there are two 
valued functions (see Table 21). Alternatively, engineers may decide that modeling flow 
capacity (the capacity to have flow) makes more sense. This allows for both pipes to 
contribute the same valued function even if not being used (results shown in Table 22). 
 
Table 21 
R-characterization: Simple Pipe System (Differentiated Functions) 
System (Function) Dual Pipe 
Pipe 1 (Fluid Flow) 100 
Pipe 2 (Backup) 100 
  
Productivity 200 
Complexity 4 
R-characterization 50 
 
 
Table 22 
R-characterization: Simple Pipe System (Combined Function) 
System (Function) Dual Pipe 
Pipe 1 (Flow Capacity) 100 
Pipe 2 (Flow Capacity) 100 
  
Productivity 400 
Complexity 4 
R-characterization 100 
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 Importantly, quantum resilience does not force a specific approach, and leaves the 
domain-specific modeling decisions to the experts involved. Quantum resilience does, 
however, enforce transparency and calls attention to the consensus required while at the 
same time enforcing consistency for any models that might be compared among 
homologous systems. Any of these approaches could be appropriate and each reinforces 
the intuition of the engineer. 
 
Referent Organizations 
 
 Trist (1983) suggests referent organizations provide vital connective tissue that 
allows organizations in specific domains (e.g., energy or water delivery and regulation) to 
better perform their functions as the problems they face become increasingly complex. 
Trist refers to these as “meta-problems” while Rittel and Webber (1973) would call them 
“wicked.” Referent organizations contribute not by providing delivery of domain-related 
functions (e.g., they do not produce energy or pump water), but by filling the inter-
organizational space by clarifying values and rules, facilitating communication and 
information flow, tracking emerging trends, and identifying alternative futures. 
 In terms of resilience, the “value” of referent organizations is buried in the 
complexity they add to the structure of the system. This makes the trade between 
complexity and productivity obvious while pointing out that it is sometimes difficult to 
observe, putting significant pressure on the analysis team to thoroughly understand and 
document the systems for which they are characterizing resilience. More specifically, in 
terms of quantum resilience, the referent organization makes the system more complex 
without providing a specific increment to productivity by exporting a valued function. 
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Instead, referent organizations are a piece in the background that increases the 
productivity of other organizations that are actually producing the valued function. While 
their overall effect is multiplicative, this can only be through productivity that is 
increased in another organization. 
 Figure 19a imagines two isolated organizations generating their valued functions 
(f) while Figure 19b imagines the insertion of a referent organization which connects the 
two organizations in such a way that they can both be more productive (f + ϵ). As shown, 
it is questionable whether or not the overall industry represented in Figure 19a will be 
more or less resilient than the one indicated in Figure 19b. This depends on the 
incremental value of the productivity represented by ϵ. 
 
 
Figure 19. Referent Organization as Productivity Enhancer 
f f
f + ε f + ε
Referent 
Organization
(a)
(b)
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 For this simple example, assume two identical organizations each with a 
supervisor, an assistant, and two departments with 10 workers. Both organizations have 
the same output in terms of valued function (e.g., 100 units of something). Their baseline 
complexity allows resilience for the overall “industry” (consisting of two organizations) 
to be characterized as shown in Table 23 (“Two Orgs” column). Adding a referent 
organization with five workers that connects the two organizations together (similar to 
what is shown in Figure 19b) without increasing the functional output of the industry 
results in a lower resilience due to the increased complexity of the industry (“Two Orgs 
with Ref” column). As discussed however, referent organizations are supposed to 
increase output of the organizations with whom they interface. In the last column of 
Table 23, productivity has been increased to demonstrate the restoration of the original 
resilience of the simple system. Note that for this particular referent organization to be an 
effective addition to the landscape, it must make each of the other organizations more 
than 50% more productive in delivering their valued function. 
 
Table 23 
R-characterization: Two Organizations with Referent Organization 
System (Function) Two Orgs Two Orgs 
with Ref 
Two Orgs with Ref and 
Increased Productivity 
Organization 1 (Industry Output) 100 100 155 
Organization 2 (Industry Output) 100 100 155 
    
Productivity 400.00 400.00 620.00 
Complexity 52 79 79 
R-characterization 7.6923 5.0633 7.8481 
 
 Optionally, a referent organization can be modeled as providing unique valued 
functions which would contribute to the overall productivity of the system. This would 
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serve to counteract their complexity in the overall resilience characterization. While not 
wrong, such an approach would not be recommended since it assumes the value of the 
referent organization instead of forcing that it be proven through actual productivity 
increases in other organizations. Once again, this stresses the need for consensus to be 
established among the experts modeling the systems. 
 Importantly, though it is not done in this simple example, there is significant 
human capital that can be modeled for organizations (such valuation is demonstrated in 
the extended example of the Goulburn-Broken catchment below). In this simple example, 
if human capital were modeled as a valued function, this would allow referent 
organizations to contribute to overall system productivity without contributing 
specifically to the “Industry Output” valued function. The point of this specific example 
is not to be exhaustive but to isolate the important idea that sometimes hidden complexity 
indirectly contributes to system productivity. 
 
Urban Foraging 
 
 Though scholars differ on the degree to which they are willing to acknowledge 
cultural differences between foraging and agro-urban societies, there is at least one 
consistent observation: agrarian societies store things; foraging societies (because of their 
nomadic and transitory existence) do not. Ultimately, it must be acknowledged that agro-
urban societies “stock” their local environments and make them target rich for “urban 
foraging” while foraging societies depend on nature to stock the environment and 
sometimes must migrate in order to best exploit the much slower processes of nature. 
Clearly, hunter-gatherers follow the food, but less obviously, urban foragers also follow 
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the food. For them, however, food is regularly replenished in their cupboards and on their 
market shelves. 
 Though the systems are not perfectly homologous, in general, urban food systems 
are more resilient than hunter-gatherer approaches because of their adoption of storing. 
Storing operationalizes resilience through redundancy. This is especially true if food 
accessibility, availability, and variety are considered among the valued functions of a 
food system. From a natural landscape you can harvest what is in season, when storage is 
brought to bear, seasonal supply is less controlling. The availability of multiple stocks of 
goods has allowed significant food resilience in urban populations. Cities provide means 
for storage of large and redundant quantities of food and goods. Foraging in a 
supermarket is easier than in the forest due to the density and variety of the goods in a 
small space (not to mention the ease). Further, because of the redundancy, there is 
enough food in a supermarket for many people, and should one market be exhausted, 
others are readily available until resupply happens. 
 Kelly (1995) makes it clear that foraging as a lifeway is a spectrum and that there 
can be no generalized hunter-gatherer society which eventually gave way to a generalized 
agrarian society. He also speaks of the way tribal intermarriage provided a mechanism for 
access to a larger quantity of foraging and hunting grounds (Kelly, 1995, p. 274). 
Intermarriage permitted bi-locality to emerge as an effective response to fluctuating 
environments since safe and uncontested migration becomes a simple solution when there 
are inadequate food resources in the current locale. Kelly’s summary is that such cultural 
evolutions “decrease long-term variance in returns and reduce risk.” In fact, bi-locality 
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effectively increases the redundancy of available food sources and enhances the 
resilience of the foraging food system. 
 It may have started on the savanna with intermarriage and exploitative family 
relationships, but exploitation of redundant food sources was mastered in the city. Urban 
humans still participate in a foraging lifeway. Cities are a depot of goods that provide a 
target-rich environment for foraging. In the developed world, it has been a very long time 
since humankind has been predominately involved in food production. Even those who 
work in agro-business seldom “live off the land.” Instead, humans forage in markets that 
have been stocked by other humans who focus on growing or husbanding. The trade and 
supply networks that have evolved over time have contributed greatly to the resilience of 
the human food system. 
 
 
Figure 20. Simplistic Foraging Supply Chains 
 
 Figure 20 depicts highly simplified foraging supply networks. Figure 20a 
represents hunter-gatherer foraging from one or several natural locales while Figure 20b 
shows a more modern supply chain for food provisioning. In each case a valued function 
of food provisioning is proposed (as suggested above, a more complete list might include 
accessibility, availability, variety, nutritional value, reliability, etc.). In each case assume 
Foraging 
Locales
Food
Sellers FoodGrowers Processors
(a)
(b)
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that 100 units of food are provided. Note that for this simple example only supply is 
being addressed since demand (or, need) is more properly thought of as a perturbation on 
the system. Table 24 shows a comparison of some simple functional allocations based on 
Figure 20a. These include a minimalist environment of one locale (Single Locale), a 
situation where two locales are accessible, and a situation where two locales are 
available, each providing 50 units of food. 
 
Table 24 
R-characterization: Urban Foraging 
System (Function) Single Locale Split-Multi-Locale Multi-Locale 
Foraging Locale 1 (Food) 100 50 100 
Foraging Locale 2 (Food) - 50 100 
    
Productivity 100.0 200.0 400.0 
Complexity 2 4 4 
R-characterization 50.0 50.0 100.0 
 
 As shown above with the trivial pipe system example, it can be observed that 
redundant access to a food supply increases resilience. 
 Figure 20b depicts a simplified food supply network. Since each of the nodes can 
be multiplied, care must be taken in reviewing the following tables. Note as well that I 
am not specifically arguing that modern food supply networks are comparable and 
homologous with natural foraging locales, but the numbers provided are intended to 
demonstrate the higher resilience of the urban foraging approach since these simple 
examples are about intuition. 
 Table 25 shows a simple progression of complexity increases in urban food 
supply chains. Column I shows resilience with one grower, one processor, and one seller. 
Column II assumes a single grower and processor but expands to 10 sellers. This 
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demonstrates how, with the same food volume and some supply chain complexity 
increases, the resilience is still greater because of the redundancy in sellers who provide 
access to the food consumers. Column III expands the network to 10 individual supply 
chains (10 of each; growers, processors, sellers) but maintains the original volume of 
food. Note how in this case the complexity “catches up” with the constant productivity 
values and effectively cancels the gains in resilience. Finally, column IV recognizes that 
it is not realistic to assume the volume of food will remain the same if the network is 
expanded like that, so restoring each seller’s volume to 100 (and assuming the growers 
and processors can support that volume), the dramatic increase in resilience can be seen. 
 Supporting intuition, this simple example demonstrates increasing resilience with 
increasing supply redundancy. 
 
Table 25 
R-Characterization: Urban Foraging Simple Progression 
System (Function) I 
Function 
(Multiplicity) 
II 
Function 
(Multiplicity) 
III 
Function 
(Multiplicity) 
IV 
Function 
(Multiplicity) 
Seller (Food) 100 (1) 10 (10) 10 (10) 100 (10) 
     
Productivity 100.00 1000.00 1000.00 10000.00 
Complexity 10 46 100 100 
R-characterization 10.0000 21.7391 10.0000 100.0000 
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RESILIENCE IN THE GOULBURN-BROKEN CATCHMENT 
 
Introduction 
 
 It has recently become fashionable to be concerned about the resilience of cities 
and large socio-ecological systems (SESs). Such concern seems warranted since cities 
and SESs provide livelihoods for most people, and we are interested in understanding 
how enduring they might be. Further, current approaches to resilience tend to lead us to 
believe that such assessments are doable, meaningful, and actionable. While quantum 
resilience enables such assessments, it is unclear that resilience characterization at such 
scales is actually meaningful—especially if performed from the top-down. This is, in 
part, due to the broad (and sometimes conflicting) list of perceived valued functions 
associated with such scales. It is also in part due to the tendency to want to compare the 
outcomes of specific resilience characterizations and suggest why, say, one city is more 
resilient than another. Quantum resilience asserts that such comparisons are meaningless 
since resilience characterizations are only comparable between homologous systems. The 
section on urban resilience above provides an alternative view and explains why analysis 
at such scales may not be as meaningful as hoped. 
 The Goulburn-Broken Catchment (GBC) in Victoria, Australia is a region that 
provides a suitable example of the power of quantum resilience to characterize the 
resilience of a socio-ecological system (SES), though it makes no statements as to the 
value of such assessments beyond their ability to compare alternative deployments of the 
same system. The GBC has significant complexity including important economic 
productivity through agriculture production at the expense of ecological deterioration. 
This, of course, makes it difficult to address with anything less than an interdisciplinary 
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staff of scientists, but since this venue precludes that approach, the analysis will be 
representative and remain high-level where required. Still, it will provide a very complete 
demonstration of quantum resilience and illustrate its dramatically different approach to 
resilience characterization. 
 This example is facilitated by a regional assessment performed by the Resilience 
Alliance. Walker et al. (2009) provides a package that is among the more hopeful 
“resilience” reports, but not because it is about resilience, per se. To be fair, the paper 
mentions resilience, but it is more of a regional status report that recommends a particular 
way forward based on particular normative values. Specifically, they have developed an 
“approach for assessing sustainability” (p. 1) and after prominently featuring the triple 
bottom line throughout, the authors conclude the region is unsustainable and argue for 
transformation. The value of the report is found in the small step they take toward a 
“systems” approach that provides a solid segue for the introduction of quantum 
resilience. Importantly, the paper provides enough hints to serve as a springboard into a 
quantitative resilience analysis and it will provide the basis of this example. Where the 
data is incomplete or notional, it will be estimated and left for future, more rigorous 
quantification. In all cases, the simplifications made for this illustration remain 
completely transparent since quantum resilience enforces that in the system modeling 
approach. 
 The Resilience Alliance defines resilience very broadly as “a measure of a 
system’s capacity to cope with shocks and undergo change while retaining essentially the 
same structure and function” (Walker et al., 2009, p. 1). Obviously, in arguing for 
transformation, the authors have concluded the system is neither sustainable nor resilient. 
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As discussed above, “coping with shocks” is a matter for robustness analysis and would 
introduce infinities into a resilience analysis. Throughout the paper, resilience is 
conflated with robustness and it is also suggested at one point that “insurance” is “one 
aspect of resilience” (p. 13). I will return to that topic in the discussion below. 
“Undergoing change,” which is presumably a euphemism for adaptation, is simply too 
soft to consider in any definition which purports to “measure” something. Further, while 
“retaining structure and function” is appropriate, it is unclear what “essentially” might 
mean, so that word is similarly unhelpful when measures are intended. Such a broad and 
malleable definition for resilience leaves them with the ability to recommend 
“transformation” (which in this case is an externally induced change resulting in a new 
system) as a possible next step, but as described above, this clearly steps outside the idea 
of resilience. While their open-ended idea of resilience cannot provide a true 
characterization of resilience in the GBC, there are worthwhile contributions that can be 
used in a system analysis that leads to a real resilience characterization. 
 To highlight differences between quantum resilience and their approach, it is 
important to observe their plan which they outline as follows: 
First we characterize the region as a system by defining the key 
subsystems, identifying the main issues, drivers, and potential shocks 
(including changes in drivers). We then assess the capacity of the system 
to deal with these shocks based on the major benefits currently generated 
by the region and the biophysical, economic, and social sub-systems that 
underpin their continued supply. Next, we assess the resilience of the 
region… (Walker et al., 2009, p. 2). 
 
Their plan includes the following details: 
 
1. characterize the system, 
2. identify issues, drivers, and shocks, 
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3. assess capacity to manage shocks, 
4. acknowledge current benefits provided by the region, and  
5. assess the resilience. 
 As mentioned, their emphasis on “shocks” can become an important part of a 
robustness analysis and can be revisited once the resilience analysis is complete. Only 
after the system has been characterized can it be determined if robustness features that 
protect against shocks contribute to, or detract from, resilience. The promising part of the 
plan is their interest in characterizing the system as it currently is, and acknowledging its 
benefits (steps 1 and 4). This is an important step toward finally achieving a real 
resilience analysis. This is where quantum resilience proposes resilience analysis should 
start: first by identifying the valued functions (“benefits”), and then by codifying the 
system that delivers them. This will properly scope the analysis and ensure transparency 
of scope and scale. 
 Their plan, however, is only a thin veneer on their philosophical position which 
becomes clear nearly immediately as they list the “issues” that negatively impact the 
region (cf. Resilience Alliance, 2010, p. 10 for their definition of “issue”). In fact, every 
“issue” is directly related to the economic productivity of the region which comes at the 
expense of the pristine environment (Walker et al., 2009, p. 3). Land was cleared and 
fertilizers were applied so it could be productively farmed. Water is stored to manage 
seasonal fluctuations in supply and energy is generated and consumed accordingly. While 
it is not wrong to argue for the negative environmental impacts of each of these, it is not 
helpful to neglect the fact that the “issues” actually serve to define the very productivity 
of the current system. Fixing any or all of these “issues” would radically change the 
194 
system and have deleterious impacts on the economy. If a true triple bottom line 
approach is desired, it cannot start with overemphasis on the need to restore nature to 
what they might estimate to be closer to a pristine reference condition. 
 Further, in speaking of the GBC (and implicating agriculture development 
worldwide), Walker et al. (2009) suggest “its resilience has declined since colonization” 
(p. 6). Unfortunately, they offer no “before” and “after” characterizations of resilience to 
support their claim, so the claim remains notional. This assessment is clearly based on 
conservationist values since it is declared that resilience started to decline at the start of 
colonization in 1830. Their intent is to demonstrate the loss of pristine nature, but in 
establishing pristine nature as the ideal high mark for resilience, they have already 
assumed their conclusion. Further, they have skipped over important science that is, 
ironically, wrapped up in bullets 1 and 4 of their plan (as summarized above). Hence, 
their idea of resilience is nearly equal to environmental quality. Their equation is simple 
but not proven and reflects strong normative bias. Further, it makes resilience about what 
we dream it might have been, or even about what it could be once again (if nature were 
left to itself), but it completely misses the point that resilience must be about what is. 
When properly characterized, resilience represents the extent to which a system delivers 
its valued functions. If a triple bottom line is assumed, all three aspects must be included 
in the resilience characterization. Casual assertions that resilience has declined must be 
supported. Assuming only the ecological aspects, however, makes it obvious that their 
only conclusion can be “transformation” that shuts down all productive industry and 
allows the landscape to revert to pristine nature. 
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 Importantly, while these scholars want to assess the resilience of the entire 
catchment (to help with future policy initiatives, etc.), their analysis never actually 
happens at that scale. Instead, it is stated that “human capital” has “high” resilience, that 
the irrigation sector is “leaky” and has “low resilience,” that the rivers have “increased 
resilience”, etc. This is an important hint that while scholars suggest they want resilience 
characterized at the scale of entire basins or catchments they still can only manage to 
comprehend specifics at smaller scales. This hint should drive us to better analysis at 
appropriate scales. Again, just because quantum resilience can characterize resilience at 
any scale does not mean it should. 
 
System Analysis 
 
 Figure 21 shows a notional workup of an analysis of the GBC system that arises 
from reading Walker et al. (2009). In general, the authors segregate the system in 
accordance with the triple bottom line into biophysical, social, and economic sectors. 
Note that though properly contained within the “economic” system, the agricultural 
system straddles the biophysical and the economic systems and is the specific “problem” 
that forces the analysis. That is, if the catchment had not been developed for agriculture, 
the authors would agree it would have remained (closer to) pristine and (to them) 
demonstrated high resilience. Unsurprisingly, the problem devolves into a balance of 
economic production and environmental protection. Further, by reminding us of the 
values that allowed for private property rights to evolve and which ultimately led to the 
current dilemma, Walker et al. illustrate the near identity of the social dimensions with 
the economic dimensions of the sustainability discourse. That is, at least in the Western 
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mind, we might agree that “money isn’t everything” and that it “can’t buy happiness”, but 
we are also willing to agree that having a productive economy is better than not having 
one. A strong economy has significant social value. 
 
 
Figure 21. Notional Overview of Actors and Forces in the GBC 
 
 The primary concern of Walker et al. (2009) is the significant ecological impact 
of the agricultural sector on the biophysical system. A complex combination of land 
clearing, irrigation, and fertilization has resulted in a rising water table that is 
increasingly saline. Since trees and crops do not grow well in oversaturated soil, 
groundwater pumping serves to lower the water table, but also results in nutrient rich 
water discharge into the river systems. Water chemistry alterations have resulted in algal 
blooms and fish death. As the land deteriorates, it becomes a vicious cycle of fertilizing, 
irrigating, and ground water pumping in order to keep it productive. Further, water 
procurement and management has non-negligible cost and requires expensive 
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infrastructure that must also be maintained. This causes an expected spillover into the 
economic sector. As crop yields drop due to deteriorating land conditions, farms must 
borrow money in order to maintain their viability. Of course, financing becomes more 
difficult to procure with the erosion of projected future crop values. Further, since farms 
are less financially secure, market fluctuations due to recession can initiate a downward 
spiral that drives farm owners into receivership. 
 In the social sector, it is easy to understand the ensuing values conflict between 
conservationists and agriculturalists. Walker et al. (2009) applies what they call 
“resilience thinking” to the problem in order to determine and elucidate a way forward. 
After rehearsing the dilemma in which the catchment finds itself, and providing some 
notional assessments of the resilience of the systems involved, they determine the only 
way forward is transformation, effectively stating that the only winner can be the 
conservationists. As the quantum resilience analysis demonstrates, such a conclusion 
might be premature. 
 This current analysis remains high-level but is formalized, hoping to lead to 
further fidelity improvements over time. It accepts Walker et al.’s general decomposition 
of the system into agro-economic, biophysical, and social sectors, though such 
segregation is not strictly required and analysis might better proceed on a more physical 
basis that starts with a bottom-up approach. Their proposed decomposition can be 
managed in the model and it allows for reporting on what seems to be the accepted triple 
bottom line axes. For this example, there is very little system decomposition done. Figure 
22 shows the decomposition of the agro-economic sector into three sub-sectors that 
permit establishment of specific inter-sector relationships. For example, dairy farms 
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(Figure 22a) produce milk which is processed by dairy processing plants (Figure 22b). 
The infrastructure systems (Figure 22c) also maintain interfaces with many other systems 
as dictated by their role in the production system. 
 
 
Figure 22. Simple Decomposition of Agro-Economic Sector 
 
 Where systems in Figure 22 are not expanded (+ signs), this is intended to hide 
the identical duplicate systems that represent farms, orchards, ranches, processing plants, 
businesses, and other organizations that are used in the model. For this analysis, no 
specific physical decomposition of the infrastructure sectors (energy, water, irrigation, 
etc.) was performed. Ideally, the full system should be codified down to the conduits, 
pipes, and pumps to ensure an accurate complexity measure, but for this analysis simple 
connections were made between the providers and the consumers. This is tantamount to 
suggesting that, for example, the power provider has a direct connection to each farm. 
Obviously, this is a simplifying assumption that future fidelity expansions can resolve. 
 Figure 23 shows the decomposition of the biophysical and social systems. For this 
simple analysis, the biophysical sector contains only the two primary river catchments 
and the surrounding dryland acreage (which seemed particularly important to Walker et 
al.). A more complete analysis might decompose the region into specific farms in order to 
(a) (b) (c)
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emphasize the peculiarities of sub-catchment land uses. This would certainly serve to 
focus the entry of farmland runoff into the waterways and to emphasize the specific areas 
that are damaged by acidity and salinization. Since the MDBA assessments of the river 
valleys is used in the quantification of valued function (more below), this high-level 
decomposition will suffice for this example. Decomposition of social systems is similarly 
abridged and representative. Several classes of worker are employed to simulate the 
differences in human and social capital and only a few organizations are represented.  
 
 
Figure 23. Simple Decomposition of Biophysical and Social Sectors 
 
 Though the model is representative only, it can be easily expanded as needed. 
Even with the simplifications, the model contains hundreds of thousands of relationships. 
Figure 24 shows a notional idea of the interfaces added to the model. Note the 
introduction of the “biophysical” to represent impacts and externalities to rivers, etc. For 
clarity not all the individual interfaces and organizations are shown. 
 
 
(a) (b)
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Figure 24. Typical Farm Relationships 
 
 As the analyses below will show, the additional interfaces and relationships will 
dramatically increase the complexity measures and will tend to decrease the resilience 
characterization since they are implicated in the denominator of the resilience 
characterization. However, the incredible increase in social and human capital 
(represented by the many workers) will tend to counter this effect. 
 
Valued Function 
 
 As indicated above, Walker et al. approach the GBC value through a fairly 
common sustainability sieve and focus on the triple bottom line. They specifically refer to 
the ecological (biophysical), the economic, and the social aspects. From these three 
“subsystems” (p. 20) they derive GBC value, though as is fairly typical in the literature 
only the economic aspects are quantified, the rest are indicated only in the sense of 
possible thresholds that increase risk. A resilience analysis must quantify all valued 
function and quantum resilience enforces this and makes the outcomes transparent. 
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 Economic value, as always, is easy to measure and is featured prominently in 
Walker et al., so limited discussion of these measures is required. The economic 
production figures used in the simple model presented here are merely transcribed as 
estimated from Walker et al. (p. 7, figure 3). Higher fidelity or granularity can certainly 
be added to the model, but for an example analysis these will suffice. Walker et al. 
express interest in farm debt, but this does not seem to be a serious issue in that Victorian 
debt compares well to other regions. According to the Australian Bureau of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES) (Dharma & Dahl, 2013), Victorian 
dairy farms have average annual income of ~$150,000 whereas average farm debt is 
~$700,000. Approximately half of farm debt is for land purchase, and, in general, land 
values increased between 2000 and 2010. Another 10% of debt is working capital to 
manage cash flow as is expected for low margin concerns. With average equity ratios of 
greater than 70%, farm debt seemed well in line with expectations. If such diary-specific 
figures can be safely extrapolated to general farm debt, it seems reasonable to not 
consider debt in this analysis, but it can easily be added as necessary. 
 Walker et al. frequently conflate “resilience” with “environmental quality” (e.g., 
p. 6, 19-20) without any specific calculation of value. In general, pristine nature (c. 1830) 
seems to be valued as the reference condition, and this becomes clear with their 
recommendations for “transformation” away from agricultural production and toward 
conservation and (perhaps) ecotourism as a way to limit the damage done but still exploit 
nature for financial gain. They acknowledge that people “will lose from the 
transformation” (p. 21) and that “strategic new investments in social and human capital” 
(p. 21) will be required, but they offer no plan as to how such investments will be 
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financed. Instead, they “propose there is a possible tipping point between market values 
vs. preferences for non-market, intrinsic, and option values” (p. 20). The assumption 
seems to be that people will eventually be willing to give up their way of life and 
standard of living once they realize the environment is in danger. This is difficult to 
accept and is certainly not something that is actionable from a policy standpoint (i.e., you 
cannot simply recommend that people close their businesses and relocate). 
 Despite “clear evidence that transformation is needed” (p. 21), it remains unlikely 
that the economic and social goals can be met if transformation is achieved. Since the 
ecological values are in direct conflict with the economic values (as well as most 
currently held social values despite a possible “greening” of the Australian mind), three 
alternatives can be envisioned: (1) maintain a “current” (exploitative) regime that may 
result in a future crash, (2) implement a “multiple values” (balanced) regime where a 
crash might be avoided or put off for an extended period, or (3) revert to an “intact” 
(pristine) regime where the crash is effectively self-inflicted but with foreknowledge and 
hopefully some mitigation planning. Walker et al. (p. 9) outline these three regimes 
specifically for the river channels, but the ideas can easily be extrapolated and applied to 
the entire catchment. While there are no specifics offered, a “multiple values” regime 
seems to assume some moderate economic return can be gained while some specific 
conservationist goals are achieved. Again, the authors do not specifically state this 
(favoring instead the radical transformation recommendation), but it appears that an 
interim approach could be managed between now and the radical transformation. For 
example, perhaps economic output could be reduced by 10% per year over the next 20 
years while relocating people to other regions that have alternative means of production 
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and that are either less environmentally fragile or where the environment is already 
irrevocably damaged. No matter what the plans are (radical transformation or adaptive 
management in hopes of restoring pristine nature while removing the humans), an honest 
assessment of the social impact would be required. 
 In an attempt to take a rational step forward, the catchment’s ecological valuation 
could be modeled in each of the three regimes and its resilience characterized 
accordingly. Such a valuation would employ the variables of high concern including 
water table depth, salinity, soil acidity, vegetative coverage, river condition (Walker et 
al., 2009, figure 6) and project their values accordingly. In an attempt to make the 
measures as directly usable as possible, the inverse of certain measures may be used, but 
such decisions would usually be determined by consensus of the analysis team. In any 
case, the quantum resilience model makes the decisions clear and transparent. 
 Importantly, the river system’s value is obviously extremely high to the 
agriculture sector. But ecological values are measured differently (conservationist instead 
of exploitative). Because it is being exploited for agriculture development, the valuation 
of the catchment’s river systems is reflected in the economic production figures. When it 
comes to the natural values (i.e., those that would exist prior to agricultural production) 
these are codified in the biophysical sector of the model. They are separated for clarity 
and to enable them to be demonstrated in isolation. Table 26 lists values recently assessed 
by the Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) in the second Sustainable Rivers 
Assessment (SRA-2) (MDBA, 2012). The numbers shown are scores provided by a team 
of experts out of a “pristine” reference condition of 100. Assessments for the Broken and 
Goulburn river valleys are shown with the surrounding catchments. Since these items are 
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deemed important by Walker et al., valuation for fish, vegetation, and overall hydrology 
will be used in the biophysical portion of the sample GBC model. Use of the MDBA 
assessment values allows the simplifying assumption that other experts have already 
considered the important variables mentioned above (water table, salinity, acidity). 
Ideally, these values would be assigned to smaller parcels, but this will suffice for an 
example. 
 
Table 26 
Partial List of SRA-2 GBC River Valley Assessments 
MDB River Valley SRA-2 overall rating Fish Vegetation Hydrology 
Broken very poor 7 21 97 
Goulburn very poor 15 46 43 
Campaspe 
(West of GBC) 
very poor 20 18 64 
Murray Central 
(North of GBC) 
poor 20 100 56 
Ovens 
(East of GBC) 
poor 40 48 99 
 
 Walker et al. speak of human and social capital (and once, political capital) 
without clarifying or distinguishing the terms. This allows the terms to be defined for use 
herein following widely accepted scholarship. Human capital is individual knowledge, 
skills, and experience combined with a willingness to employ such attributes in 
contributing value to society (cf. Baron, 2011). A more complete and formal analysis 
might use a numerical method to measure aggregate human capital (e.g., as proposed by 
Mulligan & Sala-I-Martin, 2000). For this example, human capital will be modeled based 
on education level and skill sets of employees in given sectors. For example, assume 
human capital is one point each for being employed, being in management, graduating 
high school, graduating college, being an entrepreneur or business owner, etc. Obviously, 
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the list can be expanded as necessary to achieve consensus. Some representative values 
are used in the sample model. 
 Social capital is distinguished from human capital since it is not individualistic, 
but relational. Putnam (2000) suggests it emerges from repeated interactions among 
individuals engaged in purposeful activity. Walker et al. specifically refer to “equity” so 
it seems this should figure prominently, though it is difficult to understand what equity 
might mean in this context. Very likely it is undifferentiated and included as required by 
the “social” aspects of the sustainability discourse. In a liberal democracy like Australia, 
equity might mean equal access to the rule of law, police protection, healthcare, etc.—all 
of which are “standard” in Australia. Though there are likely exceptions and failings 
(e.g., displacement of aboriginals), social equity must be assumed and hence would be 
difficult to model. Walker et al. also mention “participation” (presumably in governance) 
which is easily measured by statistics like membership in political parties and voter 
turnout. There are likely far more nuanced means if higher fidelity is required. For use 
herein, and following Fukuyama (2001), social capital is derived from a network of 
relationships among those with shared values, and the consequent positive participation it 
engenders in society. Specific items like safety, trust, and voting can be measured and 
tracked but, as Fukuyama points out, are derivative of the actual relationships which are 
the important thing. For this example analysis, assume social capital is comprised of one 
point each for membership in various groups: family, school, political party, business, 
religious organization, etc. 
 Note that one could persuasively argue there are many more valued functions of a 
society. This simple model summarizes all that value in the social capital function. Future 
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expansion with a team of experts is encouraged if higher fidelity resilience 
characterization is required. Table 27 lists a summary of the valued functions in each 
interest area. 
 
Table 27 
Valued Functions of the GBC 
Ecological 
(Biophysical) 
 Water table depth by hectare (meters: 0 m is bad for 
agriculture whereas 2 m is acceptable) 
 Dry land vegetative cover by hectare (percent: 20% is bad, 
50% is acceptable, 80% is best) 
 Vegetation (as assessed in MDBA 2012) 
 Native fish (as assessed in MDBA 2012) 
 River basin health (as assessed in MDBA 2012) 
 Wetland health (percent of 113 total deemed healthy per 
Walker et al.) 
Economic  Economic productivity (dollars) 
Social  Social capital (points for relationships, participation, etc.) 
 Human capital (points for education, employment level, etc.) 
 
 For this sample analysis no claim about completeness or correctness is made. In 
the absence of collaborators (and data) I can only be representative and model in broad 
trends. My only claim is that such modeling is absolutely necessary. Scholars can argue, 
persuade, and come to consensus on what is permissible and what best reflects real value, 
but they cannot ignore this important step. 
Resilience 
 
 This analysis will demonstrate the quantum resilience approach with discussion of 
a several GBC resilience models. First, a simple illustration of only the economic value 
of the agricultural output of the region is demonstrated (Simple Economy). This is done 
with a fairly flat decomposition of the economic sectors. No interfaces have been created 
between sectors, so no relational complexity is involved. This demonstrates the manner in 
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which incremental delivery of valued function by many systems enhances resilience. 
Second, representative sector interfaces are created (as in Figure 24) to add relational 
complexity to the system (Complex Economy). Obviously, considerable interaction 
among sectors is required to generate the economic productivity of the GBC. While this 
remains representative and high level its impacts on resilience are obvious. The complex 
economy also includes estimated valuation of the social and biophysical aspects 
discussed above. This analysis results in what can be considered a baseline resilience 
characterization of the GBC. Third, in an attempt to demonstrate use of quantum 
resilience in comparing alternative system deployments, the analysis moderates the 
economic output and shows restoration of the ecological aspects in accordance with the 
aforementioned “shared values” regime (Moderated Economy). Since this necessarily 
results in a smaller economy and lower population, it clarifies how valuation of the 
ecological aspects contributes to the resilience characterization. Finally, and with limited 
discussion, the pristine reference condition model is shown to illustrate the contribution 
of the economic and social sectors to overall resilience. After these models are presented 
some concluding remarks summarize the outcomes and suggest whether or not it is 
appropriate to consider resilience at such scales. 
 
 Simple Economy 
 
 A simple illustration of only the economic value of the agricultural output of the 
region serves as a baseline for comparison. Note that this is done with only the (nearly 
flat) hierarchical decomposition of Figure 22 (i.e., hierarchical complexity is represented, 
but no interfaces have been created between sectors, so no relational complexity is 
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involved). This example demonstrates the manner in which incremental delivery of 
valued function by many systems enhances resilience. 
 Walker et al. (2009) suggest the top 16 economic sectors shown in Table 28 
contribute nearly $8B to the economy. For the quantum resilience analysis, each pair of 
columns in Table 21 illustrates a progressively larger number of subsystems delivering 
the same quantity of valued function (economic production in dollars). For example, 
Walker et al. suggest dairy farms provide $0.45B to the GBC economy. In the first pair of 
columns the sector is not decomposed, so one system (e.g., one dairy farm) delivers all 
the economic value. In the second pair of columns the sector is decomposed into 45 
systems or representative dairy farms with each providing $0.01B. Finally the third pair 
of columns suggests there are 450 dairy farms each contributing $0.001B. In all cases the 
same total economic value is provided. The same is done for all 16 sectors. Note that 
none of these decompositions is likely to approach the actual decomposition of the 
region. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2013) suggests there are over 30,000 
businesses involved in agriculture in Victoria, but it has proven difficult to determine the 
exact number in the GBC. Further, vetting Walker et al.’s estimates has proven difficult. 
ABS (2013) suggests Victoria had a total agricultural production of over $11B in 2007-8, 
and Walker et al. suggest the number for the GBC alone at over $3B in 2003 (counting 
farms and processing), though other sources put that as low as $1.2B), so it is difficult to 
ascertain the actual values. Still, the numbers can be considered representative and 
certainly have utility in demonstrating quantum resilience. If an actual resilience analysis 
were to be done, fully vetted numbers would be used. 
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 Resilience is characterized for each configuration and shown at the bottom of 
Table 28. Notice particularly how the resilience increases as the more distributed 
functional deployment is implemented. This satisfies the intuition that more systems that 
deliver the valued function are better for the resilience of the overall system. This also 
provides at least a preliminary answer to Walker et al.’s assertion that they must “cope 
with shocks”. Assuming shocks are individualized to the decomposed subsystems (e.g., 
specific farms, or specific land areas) the important take away is that since there are many 
farms, if the “shocks” are regionally focused, this will only marginally impact overall 
productivity performance of the system. 
 Note well that this resilience characterization is incomplete since it has no 
relational complexity. It is intended only as a first step in demonstrating importance of 
distribution of valued function. It is clear that with the sectors partially decomposed into 
separate farms, processing plants, etc., redundancy of function contributes to higher 
resilience. With the addition of the interfaces and relational complexity, we should 
anticipate lower (and more accurate) resilience characterizations. 
 
Table 28 
R-characterization: GBC Agricultural Economic Production 
 
Sectors not 
decomposed 
Sectors partially 
decomposed 
Sectors further 
decomposed 
Sector $ B # $ B # $ B # 
Dairy Farm 0.45 1 0.01 45 0.001 450 
Orchard 0.19 1 0.01 19 0.001 190 
Horse Farm 0.13 1 0.01 13 0.001 130 
Ranch 0.18 1 0.01 18 0.001 180 
Dairy Plant 1.6 1 0.1 16 0.01 160 
Fruit Plant 0.5 1 0.1 5 0.01 50 
Vegetable Plant 0.22 1 0.01 22 0.001 220 
Wood and Paper 0.17 1 0.01 17 0.001 170 
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Sectors not 
decomposed 
Sectors partially 
decomposed 
Sectors further 
decomposed 
Plant 
Companies 0.35 1 0.01 35 0.001 350 
Water/Sewage 0.25 1 0.25 1 0.25 1 
Transport/ 
Communications 
0.9 1 0.9 1 0.9 1 
Community Services 0.95 1 0.95 1 0.95 1 
Bank 0.7 1 0.1 7 0.01 70 
Other 0.2 1 0.2 1 0.2 1 
Tourist Organizations 0.13 1 0.01 13 0.001 130 
Trade 0.9 1 0.9 1 0.9 1 
Overall Productivity 125.12 
 
1681.3 
 
16461.1 
 
Complexity 37 
 
434 
 
4214 
 
R-characterization 3.3816 
 
3.874 
 
3.9063 
 
 
 
 Complex Economy 
 
 Second, a more complete model of the system is provided. This includes creation 
of representative economic sector interfaces to add relational complexity to the system. 
Obviously, considerable interaction among sectors is required to generate the economic 
productivity of the GBC. While this remains representative and high level its impacts on 
resilience are obvious. Further, the biophysical system valuation is added as described 
above. Biophysical interactions are also created but probably well under represented. 
Finally, social capital and human capital are added with their representative relationships. 
Like computer networks, human social networks tend to be scale-free (i.e., high degree of 
interaction with relatively few and little interaction with many). While analysts of the 
SES should not trivialize the actual connections, for the purposes of this notional model, 
it is fair to model only a few of the most impactful relationships. The complex economy 
analysis represents the entire catchment and it is based on the “partially decomposed” 
system discussed above (i.e., 45 representative farms, etc.). 
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 Since economic productivity is based almost entirely on the ability to irrigate and 
manage land in the farms, it is vital to tie that somehow to the surface water systems. The 
Australian Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics (BITRE) reports 
Victoria’s surface waters provide approximately 2 trillion liters of water per year. Of this, 
approximately 1.65 trillion liters are used for irrigation (BITRE, 2013, pp. 274, 283). In 
making our simplifying assumptions, assume that water is distributed equally to the 45 
farms we are using in the simplified study. For this we envision a valued function (water 
supply to farm connections) assigned to the irrigation sector and measured in billions of 
liters. Obviously, the infrastructure required for this is massive (as are the pumping 
energy costs and ripple effects on the power generation industry). It is outside the scope 
of this brief example to decompose the infrastructure to any great extent, but any 
complete resilience analysis should do so. Since the agriculture sector has been similarly 
simplified, this analysis will assume that the energy and water sectors each maintain 45 
connections, one to each of the farms. 
 
Table 29 
R-characterization: GBC Complex Economy 
System (Function) Productivity Multiplicity 
Dairy Farm (Economic output) 0.01 45 
Orchard (Economic output) 0.01 19 
Horse Farm (Economic output) 0.01 13 
Ranch (Economic output) 0.01 18 
Dairy Plant (Economic output) 0.1 16 
Fruit Plant (Economic output) 0.1 5 
Vegetable Plant (Economic output) 0.01 22 
Wood and Paper Plant (Economic output) 0.01 17 
Companies (Economic output) 0.01 35 
Water/Sewage (Economic output) 0.25 1 
Transport/Communications (Economic output) 0.9 1 
Community Services (Economic output) 0.95 1 
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System (Function) Productivity Multiplicity 
Bank (Economic output) 0.1 7 
Other (Economic output) 0.2 1 
Organizations (Economic output) 0.01 13 
Trade (Economic output) 0.9 1 
Water Connection (Water Supply) 35 45 
Power Connection (Energy Supply) 170 45 
   
Upper Catchment (Vegetative Cover) 0.5 900 
Mid Catchment (Vegetative Cover) 0.2 1000 
Lower Catchment (Vegetative Cover) 0.02 500 
Broken River Valley (Native Fish) 7 1 
Broken River Valley (River health) 97 1 
Broken River Valley (Vegetation) 21 1 
Goulburn River Valley (Native Fish) 15 1 
Goulburn River Valley (River health) 43 1 
Goulburn River Valley (Vegetation) 46 1 
   
Dairy Management (Human Capital) 2 135 
Dairy Management (Social Capital) 2 135 
Dairy Workers (Human Capital) 1 4500 
Dairy Workers (Social Capital) 1 4500 
Bank Workers (Human Capital) 2 200 
Bank Workers (Social Capital) 2 200 
Processing Management (Human Capital) 2 250 
Processing Management (Social Capital) 2 250 
Processing Workers (Human Capital) 1 20000 
Processing Workers (Social Capital) 1 20000 
Other Workers (Human Capital) 1 20000 
Other Workers (Social Capital) 1 20000 
Other Skilled Workers (Human Capital) 2 5000 
Other Skilled Workers (Social Capital) 2 5000 
Productivity 5578465164.30  
Complexity 721787  
R-characterization 7728.6861  
 
 Table 29 shows the dramatic increase in productivity (due to the additional valued 
function) and complexity (due to the additional system elements and relationships). It is 
clear that modeling the human and social capital of over 50,000 workers greatly increases 
the valued function output (despite the small numbers assigned). Though the complexity 
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contributed through their relationships (on average, each human modeled as three 
relationships) tends to decrease the overall resilience characterization it is clear that 
measuring human capital in the manner shown has a dramatic impact on the cumulative 
resilience characterization. This is most clearly evidenced when the valued functions are 
listed according to their individual contribution to the overall resilience as shown in 
Table 30. Shown like this, it is clear that human and social capital contribute over 99% of 
the resilience. 
 Based on the simplified “partially decomposed” approach, a resilience baseline 
for the full GBC system has been established. 
 
Table 30 
GBC Resilience by Valued Function 
Function R-Contribution 
Economic output 0.0023 
Water Supply 0.0982 
Energy Supply 0.4769 
Vegetative Cover 2.1946 
Native Fish 0.0001 
River health 0.0004 
Vegetation 0.0002 
Human Capital 3862.96 
Social Capital 3862.96 
 
 
 Moderated Economy 
 
 Moderating the economy of the GBC necessarily entails significantly decreasing 
the economic output. For this simple assessment, economic productivity will be roughly 
halved by removing half the farms and processing infrastructure (all fractions were 
rounded up). Though tourism was not changed (assuming that industry may even be 
helped by the changes), the total economy is reduced to $4.45B (57%) of the original 
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$7.82B. Obviously, with the decrease in the economy, human workers will be impacted 
and this will result in the loss of nearly half the human workers—reducing human and 
social capital. Given the limited production, it is assumed there will be lower impact on 
the environment allowing some recovery toward the pristine reference condition. The 
model increases the biophysical assessment by setting the assessments to half-way 
toward 80% of the pristine reference condition (it is unclear if this is realistic, but rapid 
recovery of the environment is assumed). For example, if “fish” was assessed at 15 by the 
SRA-2 (MDBA, 2012), then fish will be set to 15 + (80-15)/2 = 48 (again, rounding up as 
necessary). Table 31 lists the results of the moderated economy configuration. 
 
Table 31 
R-characterization: GBC Moderated Economy 
System (Function) Productivity Multiplicity 
Dairy Farm (Economic output) 0.01 23 
Orchard (Economic output) 0.01 10 
Horse Farm (Economic output) 0.01 7 
Ranch (Economic output) 0.01 9 
Dairy Plant (Economic output) 0.1 8 
Fruit Plant (Economic output) 0.1 3 
Vegetable Plant (Economic output) 0.01 11 
Wood and Paper Plant (Economic output) 0.01 9 
Companies (Economic output) 0.01 18 
Water Connection (Water Supply) 35 23 
Water/Sewage (Economic output) 0.25 1 
Transport/Communications (Economic output) 0.5 1 
Community Services (Economic output) 0.5 1 
Bank (Economic output) 0.1 4 
Power Connection (Energy Supply) 170 23 
Other (Economic output) 0.2 1 
Organizations (Economic output) 0.01 13 
Trade (Economic output) 0.5 1 
Upper Catchment (Vegetative Cover) 0.65 900 
Mid Catchment (Vegetative Cover) 0.5 1000 
Lower Catchment (Vegetative Cover) 0.42 500 
Broken River Valley (Native Fish) 43 1 
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System (Function) Productivity Multiplicity 
Broken River Valley (River health) 97 1 
Broken River Valley (Vegetation) 50 1 
Goulburn River Valley (Native Fish) 48 1 
Goulburn River Valley (River health) 60 1 
Goulburn River Valley (Vegetation) 63 1 
Dairy Management (Human Capital) 2 70 
Dairy Management (Social Capital) 2 70 
Dairy Workers (Human Capital) 1 2300 
Dairy Workers (Social Capital) 1 2300 
Bank Workers (Human Capital) 2 100 
Bank Workers (Social Capital) 2 100 
Processing Management (Human Capital) 2 125 
Processing Management (Social Capital) 2 125 
Processing Workers (Human Capital) 1 10000 
Processing Workers (Social Capital) 1 10000 
Other Workers (Human Capital) 1 10000 
Other Workers (Social Capital) 1 10000 
Other Skilled Workers (Human Capital) 2 2500 
Other Skilled Workers (Social Capital) 2 2500 
Productivity 1403016801.00  
Complexity 364056  
R-characterization 3853.8489  
 
 As expected, the result is dramatically lower than the baseline resilience of the 
complex economy. What is most interesting about the result is that though economic 
production remained at over half (57%) of the complex economy, and though the 
biophysical productivity was nearly doubled, the overall resilience assessment is less 
than half that of the complex economy (3854 compared to 7729). Whether or not the 
numbers are “real”, the formulation is consistently applied in both cases demonstrating 
two things: (1) the importance of the redundant and incremental delivery of valued 
function, and (2) the importance of the human capital contributions and the need to gain 
consensus among experts on how they are quantified. 
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 Pristine Reference Condition 
 
 As indicated in Table 27, the vegetative cover is calculated on a per-thousand-
hectares basis (hence, the upper catchment with 900,000 hectares, etc.). This may be 
thought to greatly skew the outcome, but recall that consistency is the only requirement 
in managing the values. In the pristine reference condition, it is assumed that 80% 
vegetative cover is regained in the catchment. Further, it is assumed that the MDBA 
assessment of the river valleys would achieve 100% of reference condition. Table 32 
demonstrates the resilience of the pristine catchment. It is clearly far lower than the 
catchment while under production. 
 Once again, whether or not the valuations are approved by a consensus among 
experts, consistency and transparency are maintained in the characterization process. 
With collaboration among experts, the numbers may be refined and granularity added as 
needed. 
 
Table 32 
R-characterization: GBC Pristine 
System (Function) Productivity Multiplicity 
Upper Catchment (Vegetative Cover) 0.8 900 
Mid Catchment (Vegetative Cover) 0.8 1000 
Lower Catchment (Vegetative Cover) 0.8 500 
Broken River Valley (Native Fish) 100 1 
Broken River Valley (River health) 100 1 
Broken River Valley (Vegetation) 100 1 
Goulburn River Valley (Native Fish) 100 1 
Goulburn River Valley (River health) 100 1 
Goulburn River Valley (Vegetation) 100 1 
Productivity 4609200.00  
Complexity 4808  
R-characterization 958.6522  
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 Discussion 
 
 As expressed in the introduction, it is unlikely that assessing the resilience of 
region so large has practical utility when done from the top down as illustrated here. 
Since the outcomes devolve into a conservationist v. agriculturalist argument, and any 
recommended changes will be only marginally helpful, it is probably more important to 
focus on the resilience of specific infrastructure (e.g., just the water distribution network 
or the electrical grid), or on the resilience of the individual farms themselves (e.g., 
exploring alternative deployments of crop portfolios, etc.). This obviously leads to a 
much more complete analysis several hierarchical levels down from the catchment itself. 
Tighter-scoped assessments could lead to actionable results since exploring “what-if” 
scenarios with alternative system deployments remains tractable at those levels. 
 As with most systems engineering efforts, smaller models can be merged to create 
larger (catchment-level) models if desired. If analysts have vetted the smaller models and 
ensure consistency in the approach, the tools and methods of quantum resilience are 
clearly able to provide the insights required at all levels. Even in the simplified form 
presented here, assessments like this simply cannot proceed without the instrumentation 
offered by model-based system engineering tools. In order to properly execute such an 
analysis, an entire team would need to be assembled, not because the modeling is hard, 
but because almost every decision is debatable. As consensus is achieved, the models, the 
methods of valuation, and the consequent resilience characterizations can be trusted. 
 Importantly, it is clear that valuation of human and social capital will dominate 
any resilience characterization in which it is included. Especially at the size of a 
catchment, the large populations and cumulative impact of the human and social capital 
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very quickly results in extremely large numbers. Due to this, it is tempting to think this is 
artificially inflating the human side of the characterization at the expense of the other 
sectors. Obviously, since consistency is enforced by the quantum resilience approach, 
whether they are aggregated (with economic and ecological aspects) or segregated to be 
published separately, the numbers are useful when it is remembered they are all relative. 
There is no theoretical maximum for resilience and the resilience characterizations are 
not absolute in any sense. That is, they can only be compared with similarly modeled 
homologous systems. What this means is that if experts agree on the approach and the 
valuation methods, it matters very little if the social dimension contributes 99% of the 
total outcome (as it does here). None of the numbers are lost, they all remain transparent, 
and resilience is properly characterized. Still, if communicating specific differences or 
nuances is important, reporting the social and human capital numbers separately might 
lead to better understanding of results. 
 Similarly, it is tempting to think resilience of ecosystems would better proceed on 
an individual basis and not be included with human and economic systems. It is 
dangerous, however, to separate the outcomes since it might tempt some to argue that 
pristine nature is indeed the ideal high mark for resilience. This is only so in normative 
senses and can lead to discounting the economic productivity gained from an ecosystem 
simply because such gain “uses up” (or, damages) the ecosystem. Still, it might be 
important to consider each regime in its own right. For example in the analyses above, 
three different biophysical regimes were modeled, but until the pristine nature regime is 
shown alone at the end, it is easy to miss the differences in the wash of numbers. Since 
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the tools of quantum resilience allow the characterizations to be isolated, it is easy to 
present them together as shown in Table 33. 
 
Table 33 
Biophysical Resilience in all three regimes 
System (Function) Multiplicity Complex 
Economy 
Productivity 
Moderated 
Economy 
Productivity 
Pristine 
Productivity 
Upper Catchment 
(Vegetative Cover) 
900 0.5 0.65 0.8 
Mid Catchment 
(Vegetative Cover) 
1000 0.2 0.5 0.8 
Lower Catchment 
(Vegetative Cover) 
500 0.02 0.42 0.8 
Broken River Valley 
(Native Fish) 
1 7 43 100 
Broken River Valley 
(River Health) 
1 97 97 100 
Broken River Valley 
(Vegetation) 
1 21 50 100 
Goulburn River 
Valley (Native Fish) 
1 15 48 100 
Goulburn River 
Valley (River Health) 
1 43 60 100 
Goulburn River 
Valley (Vegetation) 
1 46 63 100 
Productivity  1584458 3108722 4609200 
Complexity  4808 4808 4808 
R-characterization  329.55 646.57 958.65 
 
 
 Given the presentation in Table 33, it is easy to see how some would assume 
pristine nature represents the idealized goal of maximum resilience. The numbers are 
clearly growing as nature returns to its pristine reference condition. Obviously this is due 
to the normative approach taken in its valuation (which introduces the systemic trend). As 
mentioned above, however, it is vital to see that overall resilience of the catchment is 
much higher when the agricultural production is added. This is because all the valued 
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functions are taken into consideration in a proper characterization of resilience. Though it 
could be provocatively suggested that based on these outcomes (and contra Walker et al.) 
resilience has improved since pre-colonial times, it must be remembered that such 
comparisons are unscientific since they constitute entirely different systems. Only when 
consensus is achieved about how to balance the normative valuations with the actual 
measured values can a true resilience characterization be accomplished. Quantum 
resilience provides this way forward since it ensures that transparency and consistency is 
maintained in all assessments. 
 Finally, it was noted earlier that Walker et al. suggest insurance is an aspect of 
resilience. This is far too casual a remark and demands further comment. If insurance is 
an aspect of resilience, it is because it can be construed as a “backup plan,” i.e., a form of 
redundancy. Since redundancy drives resilience this is a tempting equation, but care must 
be taken in any effort to equate insurance with resilience. First, on the positive side, since 
insurance is generally a financial arrangement, it provides a uniform medium of 
conversion between “everything” and money. If insured infrastructure fails, money is 
paid. If someone dies, money is paid. If a crop fails, money is paid. Such object-to-cash 
conversions (and the institutions which perform them) may be important in 
determinations of valued function quantification. As has been exemplified, economic 
valuation is by far the easiest way to gain consensus on value. So if the tools of the 
insurance industry can assist, this is a potentially positive approach. Second, since 
Walker et al. define resilience in terms of disturbances, and since insurance is generally 
paid after a particular disturbance removes the ability of a system to provide its valued 
function, insurance payouts suggest the valued function might ultimately be restored as 
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the money is reinvested. This assumption requires important caveats: (a) the process of 
insurance payout and rebuilding temporarily leave a system with less function and only 
restore the provision of function at a future time, and (b) it allows for the creation of new 
(different) systems which provide different functions. Obviously in the latter case, this is 
not resilience. In both cases, loss of function implies a change in the system so the 
system’s resilience must be re-characterized. Once the rebuilding (or whatever) is 
accomplished, a similar re-characterization must occur. Third, insurance is generally 
sourced from outside the system scope (the same is true for bank loans, but, in general, 
loans are paid back, whereas insurance payouts are always losses for the insurance 
company). What this means is that either the system scale has accidentally been 
broadened leaving the resilience assessment in question, or analysts are expressly 
allowing for “resilience” to be bolstered by external or containing systems. This is 
important. When resilience is defined with “recovery” or “restoration” in mind, the latter 
is generally the case, and this calls into question the validity of the assessment. When this 
happens the only appropriate thing to do is admit to the system expansion and admit that 
the analysis is really not about the specific system but includes external contributors. 
 In summary, when performing resilience analysis, especially in a normative 
sustainability framework as attempted by Walker et al., it is vital to consider all aspects 
of the triple bottom line together, but it might be more effective to do it in smaller 
chunks. If an overall catchment assessment is required, a bottom up approach can be used 
to assemble larger analyses once they have been vetted. In all cases, teams of experts 
must achieve consensus on valuation and decomposition of the systems and their 
relationships. 
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 Future Experiments 
 
 While Walker et al. have suggested that the region is a likely candidate for 
“transformation”, they leave the plan undeveloped. The intent seems to be to allow the 
region to revert to Nature and become a tourist mecca. This is, of course, completely in 
accordance with their conservationist hopes, but does not deal honestly with the 
significant economic and human impact that would result. Sure, values are changing and 
even those living there are willing to admit to the damage done, but certainly they would 
rather continue their livelihood than be forced to relocate and learn a new trade 
(euphemistically referred to as “development of human capital”). Further, expecting that 
the region can be turned into a tourist haven is legitimate, but to expect the economic 
value of that particular sector to equal the agriculture production is a false hope. 
 Interestingly, there may be an opportunity to experiment with the idea of 
opportunistic exploitation of redundancy. It has been reported that Eastern Australia will 
have a surplus of electrical power generation capacity in the next decade to 2025 
(AEMO, 2014). Most are responding to this situation by applauding their ability to lower 
carbon emissions by shutting down power plants. However, since the impact of that is so 
small (consider the Chinese directly to the North installing over 30 coal-burning power 
plants per year), it might be better to explore alternative uses of the power. Instead of 
idling the power plants and the operations staff, perhaps this would be a good time for 
Australia to consider subsidizing some level of power generation that could be used for 
pumping the increasingly saline groundwater from the Murray-Darling basin into the 
Pacific Ocean (or perhaps something a bit less radical but equally productive). This 
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would serve the dual purpose of preserving jobs in the power industry as well as 
preserving the economy of an agriculture producing region that is failing due to rising 
water tables. Southeastern Australia might benefit from a national contribution to its 
power needs during a period when they need to do additional groundwater pumping. 
Making the scale of the system a national one makes it possible to sustain that $20B 
annual economy in grazing, fruit production and processing that the basin provides. 
 The implication of the report is that AEMO future demand projections are being 
attenuated by rooftop PV uptake. Unfortunately, this is not well documented, and a 24% 
growth in that industry may not say much if the numbers are small. It also seems their 
demand model would be much more sophisticated than what is shown in their data files 
(given the intermittencies of solar power, seasonal change in demand, etc.). That they 
allude to future developments in storage technology is good, but they freely admit the 
technology is not yet available. If, however, the reduction in demand comes from closing 
of a high demand industry (to which they allude) we are free to assume it has something 
to do with agriculture processing in that area. If closing a high demand industry is a 
leading indicator of a highly depressed economy, it is important to understand. If it is 
caused by crop failures due to water table and salinity issues it may be something that can 
be rectified. 
 Such a change in approach demonstrates the human ability to plan and alter 
futures, but still, is not an example of adaptation until after the proposal is implemented 
and proven to be a positive step. Otherwise, from a resilience perspective, all we can say 
is there remains some extra generation capacity that can be redundantly applied as 
needed.  
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RESILIENCE IN THE PHOENIX FUEL SUPPLY CHAIN 
 Introduction 
 
 Resilience analysis of water distribution networks (WDN) has not been distracted 
by the metaphors and analogies proposed by thought leaders in the resilience literature. 
Instead, engineers have focused on developing specific resilience indices that can be 
applied to real networks (Todini, 2000; Prasad & Park, 2004; Jayaram & Srinivasan, 
2008). While this is a hopeful step, unfortunately resilience is conflated with efficiency as 
these so-called resilience metrics are generally measured as surplus internal power in the 
network divided by the maximum power that could be dissipated internally after 
satisfying the delivery constraints. While understandable and perhaps an effective metric 
for this discipline, it is not specifically resilience. 
 Fortunately, and for several reasons, it is still a largely productive path. First, they 
are focusing on the performance of the network (i.e., as measured in pressure head) 
which is akin to finding the valued function and calculating productivity for the system. 
Second, they are (inadvertently) introducing structural complexity ideas into the 
calculations by considering pipe dimensions, number of connections, performance of 
pumps, etc. This is important because it shows that these engineers recognize that the 
structure of the system is an important contributor to resilience characterization. Third, 
though this tends to conflate resilience with performance during failure, extensive Monte 
Carlos or Genetic Algorithm approaches introduce failure modes, and then with each 
failure mode, the index is recalculated for the system. This is effectively an exploration of 
alternative system deployments (e.g., with this or that pipe missing). Usually, cost 
estimates are developed for non-inferior solutions and multi-criteria analysis is done to 
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provide recommendations that target a “sweet spot” which balances cost and “resilience” 
for proposed WDNs. Again, while this might be exactly what is needed for their 
discipline, it is not specifically resilience that is being assessed. 
 In a review of three available WDN “resilience” indices, Baños et al. (2011) 
suggest: 
It can be concluded that, as none of the resilience indexes consider where 
over-demand is applied, but rather the global excess of pressure in the 
network, they do not accurately determine the capability of the network to 
provide adequate supply under demand uncertainty. Therefore, it is 
suggested that resilience indexes consider the topology of the network in 
order to determine its critical points, where over-demand could make 
solutions unfeasible, i.e. where the head pressure is lower than the required 
pressure (p. 2365). 
 
 Importantly, they recommend consideration of the topology of the network and a 
focus on critical points. This suggests several important amplifications are required. First, 
as quantum resilience asserts, these scholars are beginning to understand that modeling 
the structure and connectedness (topology) of the system is vital for any resilience 
characterization. Second, they allude to an important evolution of thought that suggests 
pressure head might not be the only valued function they must track. The suggestion that 
“over-demand” may impact the “capability of the network to provide adequate supply” 
suggests that an additional service level agreement might be emerging (i.e., volume or 
flow at terminals, rather than just pressure in pipes). This observation leads to, third, the 
realization that for WDNs, resilience may not be so important a concept. Instead, while 
resilience can certainly be characterized, for water distribution it could well be that 
robustness is a far more vital concept. If “critical points” and “over-demand” can make 
solutions “unfeasible”, the implication is that there is more work to do on ensuring 
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appropriate supply. In essence, it may well be that WDNs should be considered more like 
appliances where mean time between failures (MTBF) and mean time to repair (MTTR) 
drive deployment decisions far more than resilience. If MTBF is long, and MTTR is 
short, it is likely more cost effective to have a repair staff on hand than it is to design for 
resilience. While these are not yet factored into the current WDN “resilience” metrics, 
they should be. 
 System Analysis 
 
 This is significant for this example because a large part of the Phoenix petroleum 
supply chain is a special case of a water (fluid) distribution network. Interestingly, though 
it is very long, from the standpoint of a fluid distribution engineer, the system is very 
simple because it has effectively no looping and very low complexity. Since the ultimate 
goal is fuel availability to consumers, however, the system involves more than pipes. Fuel 
availability can be modeled in the final delivery of fuel to the filling stations and 
consequent availability to consumers. This involves long-haul pipelines from Los 
Angeles and El Paso as shown in Figure 25 and Figure 26 (KinderMorgan, 2015). Once 
the fuel has arrived in the Phoenix terminal it is shipped via truck to nearly 1000 filling 
stations in the Phoenix metropolitan area. 
 Note that capricious consumer demand constitutes a perturbation on the system, 
not part of the supply system. This demand can be projected with stochastic demand 
models if necessary (the telecommunications industry calls these “traffic models”), but 
they will not play a role in this resilience analysis. In fact, such demand is quite stable 
when considered over the period of time for which consumers value the function of the 
Phoenix fuel supply chain. Importantly (and as presaged by the Baños discussion above), 
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we have only passing interest in the pressure head of the fluid supply system. While this 
is a vitally important engineering design aspect, at the system level, where the valued 
function can be appreciated, it can be ignored. Focus here will be on available volume. 
 
 
Figure 25. Phoenix Fuel Supply - West Line 
 
 
Figure 26. Phoenix Fuel Supply - East Line 
 
 Selection of the “headwaters” of the Phoenix fuel supply network sets the scope 
of the system, but is essentially an arbitrary decision. Selecting the source as back under 
the sands of Saudi Arabia (and Canada, and Mexico, etc.) would implicate a significant 
number of infrastructure systems, dramatically increasing analysis time and model 
complexity. Selecting the crude deliveries at refineries in California and Texas as the 
source implicates a smaller number of systems, but is still quite involved. Note that crude 
harvested in Saudi Arabia can be sent anywhere and crude arriving in Los Angeles or El 
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Paso can be refined and sent (nearly) anywhere as well, so these are not specifically 
appropriate choices for this system. For this analysis, the pumping stations in Los 
Angeles and El Paso have been selected as the source since these stations are ultimately 
what start the fuel on the path to Phoenix. This selection has the benefit of focusing the 
problem on the specific fuel and transport infrastructure that impacts the final goal of 
delivery to filling stations and availability to consumers. Refined petroleum sent from 
Los Angeles to Phoenix (via Yuma) over a specific 20-inch pipe can only arrive in 
Phoenix, so this is the best definition of the Phoenix fuel supply network source. Similar 
statements can be made about the El Paso source. 
 Note, however, that it is not wrong to select a wider scope. The Watson pumping 
station’s resilience is likely very important to someone, and it is certainly enhanced by a 
variety of supply lines that could easily be modeled. Similarly, the Colton terminal can 
have its resilience characterized and this would likely be very interesting to the operators 
of the California-Nevada petroleum network. These could certainly be separately 
analyzed and then included in a broader system model once vetted and understood. As 
will be shown here, however, the Phoenix fuel supply network is itself comprised of 
several other important subsystems which can be seen to contribute to the resilience of 
the overall system, but should also be considered in isolation. These details will be 
highlighted in this simple example. 
 Figure 27 provides a simple overview of the system as modeled for this analysis. 
Five terminals (Watson, Colton, El Paso, Tucson, and Phoenix) are modeled with their 
storage (though the storage is probably not entirely for Phoenix). For this analysis, no 
further decomposition has been done though it can certainly be added if details become 
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available. Each segment of pipe is also modeled with the specifics of fuel flow as 
allocated to Phoenix. Note that ethanol is received from regional as well as Midwest 
suppliers for use in the clean-burning gasoline blending, but this is not modeled for this 
simple example. There are many considerations that would result in higher fidelity. 
 
 
Figure 27. Phoenix Fuel Supply System Overview 
 
 Valued Function 
 
 For this model three valued functions were selected: pipeline transport and 
commercial distribution (both in thousands of gallons per day), and tank storage (in 
thousands of gallons). Applying what was learned in the trivial pipe example discussed 
above, pipeline transport “capacity” is modeled. The single 20” West line has a capacity 
of 100,000 barrels (4.2M gallons) per day. After the August 2003 failure that hobbled the 
Phoenix fuel supply for two weeks, the 60,000 barrels-per-day East line was expanded to 
support a capacity of 200,000 barrels per day in two redundant pipes, commencing 
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operations in 2007. Each of the pipes in the redundant East line has 100,000 barrel per 
day capacity for a total of 8.4M gpd. Note that it is apparent that not all the capacity is 
used. Though likely out of date, azenergy.gov (2004) suggests that approximately 2.8M 
gpd (60%) arrive from the West line, while 1.8M gpd (40%) arrive from the East line. 
 Commercial distribution is modeled with a minimally sized fleet (100) of 8,700 
gallon trucks that are filled at the Phoenix terminal loading rack (21 truck bays) and 
deliver fuel to the approximately 1000 filling stations in the Phoenix area. Further, this 
fuel is modeled as gallons per day available to Phoenix fuel users whose consumption is 
approximately 4.6M gpd. Given this consumption, 100 trucks can supply the filling 
stations with 5 trips on a given work day. Because of some of the distances involved, this 
is very likely an oversimplification that should be revisited for fidelity enhancements. 
 Since there must remain a mass-flow balance, storage tanks are used to manage 
fluctuations in demand that might occur over periods over which scheduled inbound fuel 
flow from the long haul pipelines cannot be responsive. Since it takes approximately a 
week for fuel to arrive from Watson and El Paso, demand fluctuations on the scale of 
days can be managed by the 3-5 day storage capacity provided at the Phoenix terminal. 
This makes storage another important valued function. 
 
 Resilience 
 
 Based on the system analysis discussed above (with the caveat that complexity 
has not been fully modeled) and the quantification of valued function, the resilience of 
the Phoenix fuel supply network is depicted in Table 34. 
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Table 34 
R-characterization: Phoenix Fuel Supply 
System (Function) Productivity Multiplicity 
Long-haul Transport   
Watson Tank (fuel storage) 2333 18 
Watson to Colton (fuel transport) 4200 1 
Colton Tank (fuel storage) 1575 32 
Colton to Phoenix (fuel transport) 4200 1 
El Paso Tank (fuel storage) 2333 9 
EP-Tucson Line 1 (fuel transport) 4200 1 
EP-Tucson Line 2 (fuel transport) 4200 1 
Tucson Tank (fuel storage) 1000 33 
Tucson-Phx Line 1 (fuel transport) 4200 1 
Tucson-Phx Line 2 (fuel transport) 4200 1 
Phx Tank (fuel storage) 1350 61 
   
Local Distribution   
Filling Station Tank (fuel storage) 10 1000 
Filling Station (fuel distribution) 5 1000 
Truck (fuel distribution) 43.5 100 
Productivity 285704573.00  
Complexity 4005018  
R-characterization 71.3367  
 
 
 Though this provides a resilience baseline for the overall system, because of the 
number of subsystems (multiplicity) involved, it should be immediately obvious that 
there are really two systems here. That is, even at this simplified modeling level, long-
haul transport requires roughly two orders of magnitude fewer systems than local 
distribution. While higher fidelity modeling would alter this somewhat, it is unlikely to 
result in dramatically different ratios in outcomes. There are simply many more systems 
involved in the local distribution network due to the many trucks and filling stations. For 
this reason, in order to glean the most information from the resilience characterization, it 
is probably more appropriate to model these as separate and non-comparable systems, 
than it is to include them together. 
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 This is illustrated in  
Table 35 and Table 36 which highlight the dramatic differences in complexity even when 
no real complexity has been emphasized (for example, no attempt has been made to 
consider any of the human dimensions or the variety of organizations and contracts that 
are involved in Phoenix fuel distribution). 
 
Table 35 
R-characterization: Phoenix Local Distribution 
System (Function) Productivity Multiplicity 
Filling Station Tank (fuel storage) 10 1000 
Filling Station (fuel distribution) 5 1000 
Truck (fuel distribution) 43.5 100 
Productivity 20285000.00  
Complexity 4004403  
R-characterization 5.0657  
 
 
Table 36 
R-characterization: Phoenix Long-haul Transport 
System (Function) Productivity Multiplicity 
Watson Tank (fuel storage) 2333 18 
Watson to Colton (fuel transport) 4200 1 
Colton Tank (fuel storage) 1575 32 
Colton to Phoenix (fuel transport) 4200 1 
El Paso Tank (fuel storage) 2333 9 
EP-Tucson Line 1 (fuel transport) 4200 1 
EP-Tucson Line 2 (fuel transport) 4200 1 
Tucson Tank (fuel storage) 1000 33 
Tucson-Phx Line 1 (fuel transport) 4200 1 
Tucson-Phx Line 2 (fuel transport) 4200 1 
Productivity 13619172.00  
Complexity 339  
R-characterization 40174.5487  
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 Discussion 
 
 Obviously, if a more complete model of the long haul pipeline were developed the 
resilience characterization would have higher fidelity and become more accurate. The 
same can be said about the model of the local distribution network. Even simplistic 
models, however, allow some important observations to be made. As shown above, the 
dramatic differences in the decomposed system count points to a need to segregate these 
models and suggests that the Phoenix fuel supply network is probably better thought of as 
(at least) two separate systems. The first system—worthy of analysis but not particularly 
interesting from a resilience standpoint—would follow fuel delivery from Los Angeles 
and El Paso to the Phoenix terminal where it would end with fuel storage. The second 
system, local distribution of fuel within Phoenix, should be understood to constitute its 
own system and is far more interesting from a resilience standpoint. 
 For the long haul pipelines, it is obvious that additional redundancy could 
contribute to resilience, but only at significant cost. This was adequately demonstrated in 
the 2007 upgrades to the East line which were precipitated by the 2003 pipeline rupture 
that impacted fuel availability in Phoenix for several weeks (Evans, 2003). Though 
redundancy was added, the important upgrades consisted of new pipe and weld 
technologies which did more to increase the robustness of the system than add additional 
capacity. Further redundancy is unlikely to be cost effective and focus is better placed on 
maintenance and responsiveness in the event of failures. 
 Note well that the local distribution system (from Phoenix terminal to filling 
stations) is already highly redundant (and hence, resilient). In fact, it is this redundancy 
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which supplied adaptive capacity allowing trucks to be routed on roundtrips to Tucson in 
order to fill-in the gaps left by the failed East line during the 2003 crisis. 
 It is tempting to consider what additional redundant capacity in the West line 
might contribute to the Phoenix fuel supply. Obviously this could easily be modeled and 
resilience characterization performed, but it is perhaps more interesting to consider such 
redundancy as adaptive capacity. That is, an additional (redundant) pipeline between 
Phoenix and West Coast could certainly provide petroleum to Phoenix, but since it is not 
specifically required at this time, it could be exploited for other purposes. For example, 
Intel’s Phoenix area manufacturing plants generate two million gallons per day of 
wastewater that is treated in a local reverse osmosis desalination plant (Hackley, 2013). 
While 60% of the treated water is returned to the underground aquifer, there remains a 
large quantity of brine that is pumped to evaporation ponds in South Chandler where 
there is significant fly infestation. Though a complete analysis would be required, there is 
no specific reason the brine could not be pumped from Phoenix to Los Angeles using the 
redundant pipeline. With some additional infrastructure, the brine could then be 
distributed into the Pacific Ocean. This approach (or some other) allows the redundant 
pipeline to be exploited for alternative uses and opens the door to further experimentation 
with adaptive capacity. 
  
235 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Quantum resilience pragmatically focuses on operationalizing resilience. To this 
end, a rigorous and enforceable definition has been provided which clarifies and positions 
resilience in the literature. Further, a system analysis approach has been demonstrated to 
permit characterization of resilience in accordance with valued function delivery and the 
complexity of the delivery system. This frees resilience analysis from ambiguous 
analogies and metaphors and permits even normative values to be acknowledged and 
quantified while enforcing transparency and consistency. Importantly, this demonstrates 
that resilience is not an end in itself, but simply one contributor to a more complete 
understanding of a system. 
 Quantum resilience analysis both reinforces and challenges human intuition. It 
highlights the specific mechanisms whereby resilience can be incrementally increased in 
important systems and makes it clear that protectionist features frequently do not increase 
resilience but instead contribute to robustness. Formal characterization permits designers 
and managers to compare alternative or extant system deployments and develop trade 
spaces that contribute to decision-making processes. Since it works at all scales, quantum 
resilience is helpful in determining exactly where resilience can be bolstered and where it 
makes no sense to consider it. This permits understanding of the trade between system 
productivity and complexity, and reminds designers that increasing system robustness is 
frequently vital, but will not necessarily augment system resilience. 
 Since quantum resilience frees analysts from the crippling infinities of 
perturbation-oriented definitions of resilience, it removes the mystery from the concept 
and clarifies its utility in forward engineering and management initiatives. Quantification 
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of function forces analysts to define exactly what they value about their systems instead 
of permitting a generalized sense that reflects their hope that the system persist. Focus on 
actual system structures that deliver valued function forces rigor in system definition and 
transparency in definition of actual system scope. Further, quantum resilience reverses 
the equation on perturbations by first removing them from the definition and then by 
providing a mechanism by which the magnitude of specific perturbations can be 
measured. That is, once system resilience is properly characterized, the impacts of 
alternative system deployments can be quantified whether such alternatives are designed, 
evolved, or occur as the outcome of a disturbance. 
 In addition to making it clear that resilience is not measured on an absolute scale 
and cannot be quantified as an absolute number, quantum resilience demonstrates that 
even the relative resilience characterizations can only be compared between homologous 
systems. It is perhaps obvious that it makes no sense to compare the resilience of a bridge 
to the resilience of the Internet, but it is now also clear that comparable systems will offer 
the same valued functions and be modeled at fidelities for which it makes sense to 
compare them to other similar systems. 
 As a novel and complete theory, quantum resilience provides many advantages 
beyond clarifying the discourse and providing a way to characterize resilience for all 
systems. It can make predictions about how to increase resilience in given systems and 
guide research that leads to discovery of alternative deployment options for systems. It 
can also project approaches by which adaptive capacity can be incorporated through 
redundancy. Further, by specifically addressing system complexity it demonstrates how a 
more complete theory of complexity can be incorporated if one is ever created. Defining 
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apparent complexity in the denominator leaves the door open to characterizations that 
might include complexity that is not apparent. 
 Quantum resilience not only provides the required characterizations that permit 
resilience to be operationalized, but also stages problems in a way that forces 
acknowledgement of what is actually valued, how it must be measured, what its true scale 
and extent are, and what the actual contributors to the valued functions are. This serves to 
clarify the scales at which resilience can be successfully pursued and demonstrates that 
frequently the analysis scope must be tightened to provide meaningful results. 
 Finally, quantum resilience is deployed openly and transparently so it can be 
easily integrated into commercially available model-based system engineering tools. This 
is a reminder that resilience is not a mysterious idea that must be addressed in vague 
terminology with custom tools and partial solutions. Instead, resilience characterization 
flows out of solid systems engineering practice and is a concept that is available and 
useful to all. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
FRACTALSYS OVERVIEW 
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FractalSys is a system modeling tool (and model-based reasoning engine) that represents 
any system as a collection of an arbitrary number of other systems. FractalSys can be 
used in off-line system modeling applications for analysis, design, or trade space 
characterization, or it can be directly embedded in operational control systems. The 
model-based approach allows engineers to develop their systems in an incremental 
manner which better supports the common merging of top-down and bottom-up design 
approaches observed in a given project life cycle.  
 
The “big picture” is quickly and easily captured in the model and details and fidelity can 
be added as they become important or necessary. Since the model-based approach to 
design and development is incremental, there is no problem defining operations and 
progressively augmenting them to increase their fidelity. Details can be added whenever 
they are required and can be simulated (or simply not referenced) until it is appropriate to 
augment the model for higher fidelity. System demonstrations do not require all the 
subsystems to be functioning and interim progress is easily assessed by taking an overall 
view of the model. Internal consistency is enforced and transparency is facilitated. 
 
Systems can be treated as black boxes, placed in a library and used as necessary in other 
efforts. They can be included in larger systems or isolated for individual test and 
simulation. When verified and tested, they can be used as necessary without concern for 
what is on the inside. They manage messages as designed and affect no external data. 
Their low level details can be invisible to the casual user when necessary or exposed to 
the critical eye if required. The built-in simulation capability is useful to verify all the 
required parts are defined. Function of one system is easily borrowed for inclusion in 
another system. 
 
The system hierarchies represented by FractalSys are nested containment hierarchies, 
though “containment” should not be construed as restricting such hierarchies to physical 
or spatial ones. Hierarchies can be purely conceptual as necessary, for example, as 
employees in a corporation. Such system decompositions can be considered hierarchies 
of “nearly decomposable” systems (Simon, 1962) in which intra-component linkages are 
generally stronger than inter-component linkages. Modularization of this sort is common 
practice in systems engineering. Note as well that Simon’s near decomposability is a 
convenient way to allow for future expansion and to support incomplete or bounded 
human expertise in the sense that less-understood or not-yet-finalized systems can remain 
as “black boxes” while their interfaces solidify. Ultimately, deployed systems must 
deliver their functions rationally, so solid systems engineering practice must ensure 
system completeness to the extent required to meet valid requirements. Note, however, 
that while some “models” used in simulation or analysis can remain incomplete and 
allow for future expansion, operational systems must be decomposed to the extent 
required to meet functional specifications. This may seem to be a trivial observation, but 
it is important in light of the manner in which FractalSys can be used for off-line 
modeling and analysis, or embedded in an actual operational system. 
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As shown in Figure 28, each system is composed of other systems and can be defined to 
assume any of an arbitrary number of states. Further, an arbitrary number of transitions 
can serve to move the system between its states. Systems at every level are identified by 
(1) their function as represented by their behavior when operating in specific states 
(which are frequently a useful proxy for function) and (2) their interfaces—especially 
those that “actuate” other (external) systems. Hence, system identity is an important 
concept represented by inter-system arrangement, interfaces, and state. System identity 
can be defined in (typically) equal parts structure and function. Where experts debate 
how a system should be structured, function can take the lion’s share in providing system 
identity until consensus is achieved. Where system function is debated, structure is 
usually better understood. Function and structure find themselves in a sort of Heisenberg 
balance. 
 
 
Figure 28. “Fractal” Nature of Systems Modeled by FractalSys 
Ashby (1956, p. 25) suggests the state of a system is “any well-defined condition that can 
be recognized if it occurs again.” More precisely, states are a summarized aggregation of 
the values of an arbitrary (though generally consensus-based) number of system variables 
(sometimes referred to as “observables”, “measurables”, or “sensors”) and configuration 
parameters. Variables and parameters are similar concepts, but are typically differentiated 
by how fast they change and who (or what) controls them. In general, variables are faster 
changing and are generally implicated in the fast microdynamics of dynamic system 
theory. Parameters are usually “settings” that broadly control how the system operates 
and hence are slower to change. They fit better into the slow macrodynamics of systems 
theory and are frequently static over certain system-specific time frames (for a discussion 
of “comparative statics” see Rapoport, 1986, p. 66ff). In general, states are “named 
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concepts” superimposed by humans on certain configurations and behaviors of a system. 
Variables can be external sensor readings or the states of other contained systems. 
 
Transitions are the mechanisms by which a system is moved among its states in either a 
reactive or anticipatory manner (cf. Rosen, 1985). In fact, the concept of nearly 
decomposable systems is important in this context since in anticipatory modes, 
FractalSys can identify missing transitions if it is compelled to do something that is 
currently undefined. The reactive/anticipatory distinction is important since FractalSys 
can be used in both control and simulation environments. This is accomplished by 
manipulating external system actuators or the surrounding environment (which, recall, is 
just a larger “containing” system). Transitions can be triggered by external data shared 
among systems or by other transitions within the parent (or containing) system. 
 
As implied by the name, FractalSys supports this hierarchical system-state-transition 
structure to an arbitrary depth as needed to completely model the system of interest to the 
level of fidelity required for a specific analysis or control application. FractalSys does not 
enforce arbitrary rules concerning depth of modeling, and assumes domain experts are 
employed to ensure appropriate fidelity for particular analysis, simulation, or control 
tasks. 
 
FractalSys offers a black-box view of systems that ultimately proves to be all that is 
needed for adequate modeling fidelity. Though a system’s identity is defined by both 
structure and function, from the outside, a system is understood by what it presents via its 
interfaces (measurable inputs and outputs). Where internal structure is important to 
external systems, it can be “presented” as an interface and queried as necessary. Output 
parameters and variable values serve to define the state of the system as it might be 
observed by a containing or sibling system. Inputs allow a system to be internally 
impacted by parent or sibling systems. Changes to the surrounding environment (that is, 
the containing system) can be modeled as changes in system configuration parameters 
and variables. Specifically directed impacts (e.g., commands, or forced transitions) are 
managed through exposed (and controlled) interfaces.  
 
FractalSys considers all activity as a series of system events (driven by data update cycles 
or a regular update “polling” period). FractalSys monitors all system events and induces 
state transitions as a function of the changes in variables and parameters (including state 
variables) in a depth-first manner (which is appropriate for Simonesque “nearly 
decomposable” systems). The state transition mechanism is extremely important to 
FractalSys. Sequencing is initiated by, and continued on, the occurrence of events. Each 
of these events can have one or more transitions associated with it. Once the transition 
engine has completed the cascade of transitions, the system waits until it needs to act on 
new incoming data. Note that while the controlling model might be quiescent, controlled 
models and attached “real” systems usually continue to be very active performing their 
simulated or real functions. 
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When effecting system transitions, FractalSys traverses a recursively defined hierarchy of 
transition objects using a depth-first search algorithm. This object hierarchy is depicted in 
Figure 29. 
 
Transition
Vector
Entry 1
Entry 2
Entry N
Command
 
Figure 29. Recursive Definition of Transition Objects 
As shown in Figure 29, a transition is comprised of a number of transition entries. 
Among other things described below, each entry contains a transition vector which is to 
be executed. This vector can be another transition or a terminal command object that can 
be used to interface FractalSys to external systems or simulators. In the case of a 
command, data is transmitted via the command interface to an external system or 
simulator. When the transition vector is another transition, the transition hierarchy must 
be recursively traversed to perform the command and/or transition sequences which must 
be executed in order to satisfy the highest level transition. Since the transition entry is the 
most important atom of processing (for control or simulation), a brief overview of the 
standard processing which occurs for each entry is provided. The transition entry object 
contains the following items: 
 
1. transition vector (another transition or a terminal command), 
2. verification vector (a state, comprised of a specified list of system variables and 
values), 
3. timeout (nominally a number of seconds), 
4. failure vector (a transition, which could be comprised of other entries), and 
5. pause (nominally a number of seconds). 
 
When a transition entry is executed, the transition vector is the primary item of actuation. 
As previously mentioned, in the case of a simple command (which must be defined and 
instrumented in the command interface database), the command is transmitted via the 
external commanding interface which will be unique for specific implementations. 
Thereafter, the transition manager will wait for the verification vector to be satisfied. It 
will do this by checking the system state until either the requirement is satisfied, or the 
timeout is exceeded. If the requirement is satisfied prior to a timeout condition, the 
transition manager will pause for the number of seconds specified before proceeding to 
the next transition entry (if any). If the timeout condition occurs prior to satisfaction of 
the verification vector, the failure vector is executed. This failure vector is itself a 
transition which is managed in the same way. Typically, the failure vector will display 
error messages and/or execute a safing sequence if FractalSys is connected to hardware. 
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For safety-critical systems, constraints and restriction processing is effectively built into 
the transition management routines in two ways. First, many transitions will contain 
multiple entries, the first of which will verify proper system configuration before the 
remainder of the entries are executed to change system state. Second, all state transition 
requests will be “validated” prior to their execution. For example, given a request to 
transition a system from state A to state B, there will be an internal check to ensure it is a 
legal (i.e., defined) transition from the current state. Obviously, if no transition is defined, 
the desired state is unreachable. A violation of such a defined constraint or restriction will 
generate an alert message. 
 
The transition engine operates from the functional model of the system which defines the 
systems, states and transitions necessary to successfully simulate or control the system. 
The system model (function and structure) is developed in the FractalSys software 
package (Figure 30) and is saved in a database. 
 
 
Figure 30. FractalSys User Interface 
 
System “function” occurs while a system resides in a particular state (in general, the 
model orchestrates the operation of other models). For example, think superficially of a 
two-state system where it is either “on” or “off”. Clearly, such a system would not be 
performing its function while in the “off” state. Arguably, function also occurs during 
transitions, though the best models will limit this to simple “notifications of change.” In 
this regard, transitions should be viewed as “catastrophic” in the mathematical sense of 
catastrophe theory (see Rapoport, 1986, p. 67ff).  Further, function occurs while a system 
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is “maintaining” its state—though for most homeostats this is generally invisible to the 
surrounding or containing systems. Hence, “state” becomes a viable proxy for “function” 
assuming the granularity of the system definition has been managed well by the experts 
who define it. 
 
Obviously systems maintain interfaces with other systems. This can be implemented by 
shared variables or by modeling interfaces as systems themselves. For example, shared 
variables like “temperature” can be used in state determination by two proximate 
systems. Such variables allow any data, information, influence, material, etc. that 
traverses an interface to be modeled as raw data items that are modified by one system 
and used by another system in determining state. So-called “interface systems,” on the 
other hand, can be helpful if interfaces are more complicated. For example, to model an 
RF interface, a “system” can be employed so delays (due to distance) and disturbances 
(like rainfall) can be specifically modeled. This also allows “interface” systems to have 
states and transitions. Thus, interfaces are not ontologically “other” and require no special 
considerations. They are simply systems themselves. 
 
Variables represent measurable items or user-definable items that contribute to definition 
of system states. Unlike the states they help define (which are fabrications superimposed 
on systems by human observers), the idea behind variables is that they are more “real” 
and tethered in the physical world. This is not always the case, but (avoiding the 
epistemological discussion) the intent is that system states which are based on measurable 
variables are more grounded in physical reality. For this reason, each “measurable” has a 
scope or a system to which it is most accurately associated. For example, since an 
environment temperature might be measurable by many systems, its scope is clearly 
beyond any one of the systems that measure it, and might properly be best associated 
with a parent system (like, the environment). 
 
As expected, a variable may contribute to defining many states. For example, 
“temperature is 100F and humidity is 90% so the weather is muggy”, and, “temperature is 
70F and humidity is 30% so the weather is nice” are both valid state definitions which 
share variables like temperature and humidity. Variables can be employed in state 
definitions for any system for which they are within scope. 
 
As shown in Figure 31, it is the extent to which variables are shared by systems that 
defines the connectedness of those systems. Consider a variable that is “controlled” (or 
“set”) by a certain system X (e.g., a temperature is “set” by an external weather or 
climate system). If that variable is used to define the state of another system (e.g., Y 
employs it to determine if it is “hot” outside), there is a “direct connectivity” between X 
and Y that constitutes a connection. Setting a variable that is used by another system 
increases connectedness between systems. Using a variable which is set or controlled by 
another system specifically creates a dependency for the using system. Note that if 
another system (Z) uses the same measurable variable from X in defining one of its 
states, this constitutes “indirect connectivity” between systems Y and Z (see Figure 31). 
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Figure 31. Direct and Indirect Connections Between Systems 
 
FractalSys observes fairly typical scoping and accessibility rules for variable data. As 
indicated above, any state or transition that uses a variable defined in an external scope 
(that is, inherited, see Figure 32) creates a dependency. FractalSys does not acknowledge 
directionality of interfaces since there was no driving reason to support such ideas (i.e., 
all interfaces are bi-directional, though some may only be employed in one direction).  
 
 
Figure 32. FractalSys Variable Scoping Protocol 
x
“measurable”
y z
Direct connectivity exists 
between systems that 
consume “measurables” 
generated by other systems
Indirect connectivity exists 
between systems that share 
“measurables”
System: Main
Defined Variables: x
Inherited Variables: none
Accessible Variables: x
System: A, child of Main
Defined Variables: y
Inherited Variables: x
Accessible Variables: x, y
System: C, child of A
Defined Variables: z
Inherited Variables: x, y
Accessible Variables: x, y, z
System: D, child of A
Defined Variables: none
Inherited Variables: x, y
Accessible Variables: x, y
System: B, child of Main
Defined Variables: none
Inherited Variables: x
Accessible Variables: x
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Data Model 
 
The FractalSys data model is highly recursive and very dense (see Figure 33). 
 
 
Figure 33. FractalSys Data Model 
 
In general, FractalSys supports an object-oriented physical model of whatever system it 
models. This physical model of the system is positioned within some reasonable 
“environment,” then starts at the highest containing level and adds detail as it progresses 
down the decomposition hierarchy. For example: 
 
 A rocket launch vehicle might have four stages 
      Stage 1 might have four SRB Castors, Stage 2 has two SRB Castors, etc. 
           An SRB Castor might have a TVC system 
                TVC systems have Electrical Control Systems (ECS) 
                     ECS's have.... etc. 
 
Eventually, the hierarchy decomposes to the level of detail where sensors are available to 
attach real values to these items. For example: 
 
 A launch vehicle has a Stage 3. 
      Stage 3 has a Fairing. 
           The Fairing has a temperature sensor. 
                The temperature sensor provides an analog value in degrees. 
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Thus, the physical model of the system completely defines what can be known (e.g., 
measured or dictated) about the system. 
 
On this physical model of the system, a topical model can be superimposed if desired. 
Where the physical model addresses completeness, the topical model addresses clarity 
and context. For instance, in the example above, the temperature sensor may indeed be 
physically located on the stage 3 fairing of the rocket system, but from the perspective of 
a hypothetical thermal engineer, it may be considered part of the thermal subsystem 
which is a hypothetical subsystem distributed throughout the actual physical 
configuration. Likewise, while for example there may be an ignition safety device 
physically located in every rocket castor, from the perspective of an ordnance engineer 
they all belong to the ordnance subsystem. These parallel models support both 
approaches to the system design and allow a very flexible approach to status monitoring 
and state determination. Further, the alternative model views add negligible overhead to 
the system model. 
 
A database containing the latest model values (“measurables” and states) is maintained. 
This database is accessed by the physical and any topical models of the system. 
Generally, system state determination is handled by the two (or more) separate models of 
the system. The physical model (as the most complete representation of the 
“measurables”) processes data and develops a physical status of the system. For example, 
system equipment can be in any of a number of states: on, off, standby, etc. While 
specific details of the physical system will be available, it may be largely ignored in lieu 
of reviewing the more human-oriented topical model states. These states can be generated 
by the topical model of the system. Hence, the physical model provides a complete 
skeleton to which the more “interpreted” topical models can add flesh. However, in 
practice, system engineers will opt to model the system according to personal or team 
preference. 
 
Typically, in hardware-in-the-loop systems, state determination is done at predefined 
intervals during which data is read from the various input data sources and is placed in 
the database (the “polling” approach). Thereafter, the state models are updated to reflect 
the current system state based on the physical data sources. 
 
FractalSys forces both the physical and topical models (if developed) of the system to 
update their states on a regular basis. This is done by messaging the highest level object 
and telling it to update its state. This message will propagate down the hierarchy (with a 
depth-first algorithm) until the lowest level object updates its state. As this is done the 
state propagates up the hierarchy causing all components and subsystems to derive their 
current states. Finally the top level system state will be derived and in the process all the 
database variables will be updated. 
 
Absolute tolerances for each individual data item will be established as required. 
However, each tolerance will have a context (or, multiple contexts) associated with it by 
a cognizant engineer. For example, if a power supply is ON, then perhaps the voltage 
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should register 32  6 Volts, however, in a different context, if it is turned OFF for 
example, then appropriate values for its voltage may be 0  50 mV. These tolerances, 
defined in the system definition database, will be used to clarify system states. Anomalies 
will be flagged if the required values are unknown or if they are out of tolerance for a 
particular context. 
 
 
